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buddhavacana

Kaccānagotta (`kaccānagottasutta`)

· 11 min read

12S2/1.2.5 Kaccānagottasutta

This is an important sutta that repudiates the Sarvāstivādins’ belief that “everything exists” (past, present and future) and also Nāgārjuna’s thesis that “nothing exists”. Here the Buddha (or, more likely, a disciple who is repudiating both extreme views that have become common amongst some Buddhists) postulates a “middle way” that says our perception of reality is based on the concept of dependent origination.

I have crafted a perhaps unconventional translation of this sutta to illustrate the above point succinctly.

Note that the Buddha’s use of lokasamudayaṃ and lokanirodhaṃ (the origin and cessation of the world) is not referring to the creation and destruction of the physical universe (although it is tempting for modern readers to interpret it this way). He is referring to the instantiation and destruction of our perceived reality - based on our perceptual experience of phenomena. This is our own “personal” world, created in our minds.

The dvayanissito (dependent on a duality) that is referred to here is the debate whether there is an extrinsic reality corresponding to our perceived reality (atthitaṃ) or not. This has been an intriguing debate that has consumed Buddhist thinking for many centuries after the Buddha’s death.

The two “extremes” referred to by the Buddha could also be a reference to the “extremes” of Brahmanical thinking (the eternal self exists and can be purified through rituals) vs Jain thinking (the physical self is burdened by karma and needs to be shattered through asceticism).

88. [The Bhagavā] was dwelling at Sāvatthī.

Then āyasmā Kaccānagotta approached the Bhagavā. Having approached, he bowed to the Bhagavā and sat down to one side. Seated to one side, āyasmā Kaccānagotta said this to the Bhagavā:

“‘Sammādiṭṭhi (right view), sammādiṭṭhi,’ it is said, Bhante. How far, Bhante, is there right view?”

89. “Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part dvayanissito (dependent on a duality) — both atthitaṃ (existence: that reality exists) and natthitaṃ (non-existence: that it does not).

  • When one sees, Kaccāna, lokasamudayaṃ (the origin of the world) yathābhūtaṃ (as it really is) with sammappaññā (correct understanding), the notion ‘the world does not exist’ does not occur.
  • When one sees, Kaccāna, lokanirodhaṃ (the cessation of the world) as it really is with correct understanding, the notion that ‘the world exists’ does not occur.

Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part upayupādānābhinivesavinibandho (bound by engagement, fuel and adherence). But this one does not enter that upayupādānaṃ (engagement and fuel), cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ (standpoint of the mind), abhinivesānusayaṃ (adherence and inclination); he does not grasp, he does not fixate on: ‘attā me’ (“This is my eternal self.”). ‘When arising, it is only dukkha (suffering) that arises; when ceasing, it is suffering that ceases’ — he does not doubt, he is not perplexed. Herein, knowledge independent of others is found in him. To this extent, Kaccāna, there is right view.

  • 90. “‘Sabbamatthi (everything exists, i.e. there is an extrinsic reality beyond our perceptions),’ Kaccāna, is one extreme.
  • ‘Sabbaṃ natthi (everything does not exist, i.e. reality is an illusion),’ is the second extreme.

Without veering towards either of these two extremes, Kaccāna, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle [way] [this is a restatement of paṭiccasamuppādo (dependent origination)]—

  • ‘With avijjā (ignorance) as cause, saṅkhārā (mental constructions) [arise];
  • with mental constructions as cause, viññāṇaṃ (consciousness) [arises] …
  • and so on …

Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of mental constructions; with the cessation of mental constructions comes the cessation of consciousness … and so on … Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

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