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Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Root Verses on the Middle Way)

· 364 min read

The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (“Root Verses on the Middle Way”, also called Prajñā) is Nāgārjuna’s foundational work of the Madhyamaka school, composed in India around the second to third century CE. In 448 verses in twenty-seven chapters it examines, one by one, the categories through which experience is described, causes, motion, the sense bases, the skandhas (collections), the dhātus (components), arising and ceasing, action and agent, fire and firewood, bondage and release, action and its fruit, the self, time, the tathāgata (thus-gone one), the four realisations, nirvāṇa (extinguishment) and the twelve links of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), and shows of each that it cannot be found with a svabhāva (intrinsic nature) of its own. What is dependently originated is śūnyatā (emptiness), and that emptiness is itself a dependent prajñapti (designation), the madhyamā pratipad (middle way) between the extremes of eternalism and annihilation (24.18). The verses are compressed to the point of riddles, and were meant to be read with a commentary; each chapter below has its own tabbed section so that commentary can follow it.

0.1 Without cessation, without arising, without annihilation, not eternal,
not one thing, not different things, without coming, without going1 —

0.2 He who taught2 pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), the auspicious calming3 of prapañca (proliferation),
the fully awakened one: him I honour, the best of speakers.

§1 Pratyayaparīkṣā (Examination of causes)

Section titled “§1 Pratyayaparīkṣā (Examination of causes)”

1.1 Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor from no primary cause:
existents, anywhere, of any kind4, are never found to have arisen.

1.2 Four are the causes: the primary cause, the objective support5, the immediate antecedent,
and likewise the dominant cause; there is no fifth cause.

1.3 For the svabhāva (intrinsic nature) of existents is not found in the causes and so on;
when svabhāva is not found, parabhāva (extrinsic nature) is not found.

1.4 Activity does not possess causes, nor is activity without causes;
causes are not without activity, nor indeed are they with activity6.

1.5 ‘It arises in dependence on these’ — so these are causes, it is said;
as long as it does not arise7, how, for so long, are these not non-causes?

1.6 Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent thing is a cause fitting;
of a non-existent, a cause of what? and of an existent, what is the use of a cause?

1.7 When neither an existent, nor a non-existent, nor a both existent and non-existent dharma (phenomenon) is produced,
how, this being so, is a productive primary cause fitting?

1.8 This existent dharma is taught as simply without objective support8;
now, when a dharma is without objective support, whence, again, an objective support?

1.9 When dharmas have not arisen, cessation is not possible;
therefore the immediate antecedent is not fitting; and when it has ceased, what cause is there?

1.10 Since the existence9 of existents10 without svabhāva is not found,
‘when this is, that comes to be’ — this is not possible at all.

1.11 And that fruit does not exist in the causes, separately or together;
and how could that which is not in the causes come to be from the causes?

1.12 Now if that, though non-existent, comes forth from those causes,
why does the fruit not come forth from non-causes as well?

1.13 And the fruit is made of the causes, and the causes are not made of themselves;
how is that fruit which is from things not made of themselves made of the causes?11

1.14 Therefore neither a fruit made of the causes nor one made of non-causes
is found; because the fruit is non-existent, whence causes and non-causes?

§2 Gatāgatagamyamānaparīkṣā (Examination of the gone, the not gone and the being gone)

Section titled “§2 Gatāgatagamyamānaparīkṣā (Examination of the gone, the not gone and the being gone)”

2.1 The gone is not traversed12, first of all; the not gone is not traversed at all;
the being gone, free of the gone and the not gone, is not traversed.

2.2 Where there is movement, there is going; and since it is in the being gone,
and movement is not in the gone, not in the not gone, therefore going is in the being gone.

2.3 How indeed will the motion of the being gone be possible,
when a being gone without motion13 is not possible at all?

2.4 For whom there is the motion of the being gone, for him it follows
that the being gone is without going; for the being gone is traversed14.

2.5 When the being gone has motion, a pair of motions follows:
that by which it is the being gone, and, moreover, that which is the motion here.

2.6 When a pair of motions follows, two goers follow;
for, setting aside the goer, motion is not possible.

2.7 If, setting aside the goer, motion is not possible,
then, when there is no motion, whence indeed will a goer be?

2.8 The goer does not go, first of all15; the non-goer does not go at all;
then what third, other than the goer and the non-goer, goes?

2.9 ‘The goer, first of all, goes’ — how indeed will that be possible,
when a goer without motion is not possible at all?

2.10 For whom the position is ‘the goer goes’, for him it follows
that there is a goer without motion, for the one who wants the motion of the goer16.

2.11 If indeed the goer goes, two motions follow:
that by which he is made manifest17 as ‘goer’, and that which, being a goer, he goes.

2.12 In the gone, one does not begin to go; one does not begin to go in the not gone;
one does not begin in the being gone; where does one begin to go?

2.13 Before the beginning of motion there is neither a being gone nor a gone18
where motion might be begun; in the not gone, whence motion?

2.14 What gone, what being gone, what not gone is conceived,
when the very beginning of motion is in no way seen?

2.15 The goer does not stand still, first of all; the non-goer does not stand still at all;
then what third, other than the goer and the non-goer, stands still?

2.16 ‘The goer, first of all, stands still’ — how indeed will that be possible,
when a goer without motion is not possible at all?

2.17 One does not stand still from the being gone, nor from the gone, nor even from the not gone;
the commencing and the ceasing of motion are the same as going19.

2.18 ‘The goer is the very same as the motion’ — that is not fitting;
‘the goer, again, is quite other than the going’ — that is not fitting.

2.19 If the goer were the very same as the motion,
oneness of the agent and of the karman (action) would follow.

2.20 If, again, the goer is conceived as quite other than the going,
there would be motion without a goer, and a goer without motion.

2.21 Of which two the establishment, whether by oneness or by difference,
is not found — how indeed is the establishment of those two20 found?

2.22 The going by which the goer is made manifest, that going he does not go,
since there is no one before the going; for someone goes somewhere21.

2.23 The going by which the goer is made manifest, other than that he does not go,
since two goings are not possible22 in one goer.

2.24 A real goer does not go a threefold motion;
nor does an unreal one go a threefold motion.

2.25 One both real and unreal23 does not go a threefold motion;
therefore going, goer and what is to be traversed are not found.

§3 Āyatanaparīkṣā (Examination of the sense bases)

Section titled “§3 Āyatanaparīkṣā (Examination of the sense bases)”

3.1 Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and mind
are the six faculties; the range of these is what is to be seen and so on24.

3.2 For that seeing does not see its very own self;
since it does not see itself, how then will it see others25?

3.3 The example of fire is not adequate for establishing seeing;
together with seeing, it has been refuted by the being gone, the gone and the not gone.

3.4 When there is no seeing whatever that is not seeing,
how then is this fitting: “seeing sees”?

3.5 Seeing does not see at all, nor does non-seeing see at all;
and let the seer too be understood26 as explained by seeing itself.

3.6 There is no seer, whether not setting aside seeing or setting it aside;
and when the seer does not exist, whence those two, what is to be seen and seeing?27

3.7 From the non-existence of what is to be seen and seeing, the four beginning with vijñāna (consciousness)
do not exist28; so how, again, will upādāna (fuel)29 and the rest come to be?

3.8 Explained are hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and mind
by seeing itself30; and one should know the hearer, what is to be heard and the rest.

§4 Skandhaparīkṣā (Examination of the collections)

Section titled “§4 Skandhaparīkṣā (Examination of the collections)”

4.1 Form freed from the cause of form is not found;
the cause of form, too, is not seen freed from form.

4.2 When form is freed from the cause of form, it follows that form
is without a primary cause31; and there is no thing anywhere32 without a primary cause.

4.3 But if the cause of form were freed from form,
the cause would be without an effect; and there is no cause without an effect.

4.4 When form does exist33, a cause of form is not possible;
when form does not exist, a cause of form is not possible.

4.5 And form without a cause is not possible at all, not at all;
therefore one should not conceive any conceptions about form34.

4.6 That the effect is like the cause35 is not possible;
that the effect is unlike the cause is not possible.

4.7 For feeling, mind and apperception, and for the saṃskāras (mental constructions), in every way,
for all existents whatever36, the procedure is the same as with form.

4.8 If, when an objection has been made by means of śūnyatā (emptiness)37, someone should state a rebuttal,
everything of theirs, being unrebutted, becomes equal to what is to be proved.

4.9 If, when an explanation has been made by means of śūnyatā38, someone should state a criticism,
everything of theirs, being uncriticised, becomes equal to what is to be proved.

§5 Dhātuparīkṣā (Examination of the components)

Section titled “§5 Dhātuparīkṣā (Examination of the components)”

5.1 No space whatever is found prior to the characteristic of space;
if it were prior to the characteristic, it would follow that39 it is without a characteristic.

5.2 And no existent without a characteristic is found anywhere;
when an existent without a characteristic does not exist, where is the characteristic to proceed?

5.3 There is no application of the characteristic to what is without a characteristic, nor to what has a characteristic;
nor does it apply elsewhere than40 to what has a characteristic and what is without one.

5.4 And when the characteristic does not apply, the characterised is not possible;
and when the characterised is not possible, there is no coming to be of the characteristic either.

5.5 Therefore the characterised is not found, and the characteristic is not found at all;
and an existent, too, freed from the characterised and the characteristic, is not found at all.

5.6 And when an existent does not exist, of what will the non-existent be?41
And who, differing in nature from the existent and the non-existent42, understands the existent and the non-existent?

5.7 Therefore, not an existent, not a non-existent, not the characterised, nor even the characteristic43
is space44; the five other dhātus (components) are the same as space.

5.8 But those of little intelligence45 who see the existence and non-existence
of existents do not see the auspicious calming of what is to be seen.

§6 Rāgaraktaparīkṣā (Examination of passion and the impassioned)

Section titled “§6 Rāgaraktaparīkṣā (Examination of passion and the impassioned)”

6.1 If the impassioned, with passion set aside, were before passion,
depending on it passion would be; when the impassioned exists, passion would be.

6.2 But when the impassioned does not exist, whence at all will passion be?
Whether passion exists or does not exist, for the impassioned too46 this procedure is the same.

6.3 Again, an arising of passion and the impassioned together is not fitting;
for passion and the impassioned would be independent of each other.

6.4 In identity there is no coexistence, for it is not together with its very self47;
and then in separateness, whence at all will coexistence be?

6.5 If there were coexistence in identity, it would be even without a companion;
if there were coexistence in separateness, it would be even without a companion.

6.6 And if coexistence is in separateness, is it that, of passion and the impassioned,
a separate existence of each is established48, and hence the coexistence of the two?

6.7 Or if a separate existence of each of passion and the impassioned is established,
for what purpose, then, do you conceive the coexistence of the two?

6.8 “It is not established separately” — thus you aim at coexistence;
for the sake of establishing coexistence49, you again wish for separateness.

6.9 And since separate existence is not established, coexistence is not established50;
there being which separate existence, do you wish for coexistence?

6.10 Thus the establishment of passion is neither together with the impassioned nor not together51;
as with passion, the establishment of all dharmas (phenomena) is neither together nor not together.

§7 Utpādasthitibhaṅgaparīkṣā (Examination of arising, enduring and dissolution)

Section titled “§7 Utpādasthitibhaṅgaparīkṣā (Examination of arising, enduring and dissolution)”

7.1 If arising is saṃskṛta (constructed), the triad of characteristics is fitting for it;
but if arising is asaṃskṛta (unconstructed), how is it a characteristic of the saṃskṛta52?

7.2 The three, arising and the rest, separately are not adequate for the work of a characteristic
of the saṃskṛta; combined, how could they be in one place at one time?

7.3 Of arising, enduring and dissolution, another characteristic of the saṃskṛta53:
if there is one, thus there is infinite regress; if there is not, they are not saṃskṛta.

7.4 The arising of arising is the arising of the root arising alone54;
the root arising, in turn, generates the arising of arising55.

7.5 If, for you, the arising of arising is the arising of the root arising56,
how, for you, will it, not generated by the root one, generate that?

7.6 If, for you, it, generated by the root one, generates the root one,
how does that root one, not generated by it, produce it?

7.7 This one, while arising, may well produce that one57, for you,
if this one, unborn, could produce that one.

7.8 Just as a lamp illuminates itself and another,
so arising would produce both itself and another.

7.9 There is no darkness in a lamp, nor where it stands58;
what does the lamp illuminate?59 For illumination is the destruction of darkness.

7.10 How is darkness destroyed by the lamp that is arising,
when indeed the lamp that is arising does not reach darkness?

7.11 Or if darkness is destroyed by the lamp without reaching it at all,
it, standing here, will destroy the darkness standing in the whole world.

7.12 If a lamp illuminates itself and another,
darkness too will conceal itself and another, without doubt.

7.13 How could this arising, not arisen, generate its own self?
But if, arisen, it generates: when it is born, what is generated again?

7.14 Neither what is arising, nor what has arisen, nor what has not arisen, in any way
arises; so it was explained by the being gone, the gone and the not gone.

7.15 When this, which is arising, does not proceed to origination,
how then is it said to be arising in dependence on origination60?

7.16 Whatever comes to be in dependence, that is at peace in respect of svabhāva61 (intrinsic nature);
therefore both what is arising and origination itself are at peace.

7.17 If some existent that has not arisen is found somewhere,
it might arise; when that existent does not exist, what arises?62

7.18 And if this arising produces what is arising63,
which arising, again, would produce that arising?

7.19 If another arising produces this one64, there is infinite regress;
but if it has arisen without an arising, let everything arise in that way65.

7.20 Firstly, the origination of what exists, and of what does not exist, is not fitting,
nor of what both exists and does not exist: this was already demonstrated before.

7.21 The origination of an existent that is ceasing is not possible;
and that existent which is not ceasing66, however, is not possible.

7.22 An existent that has not endured does not endure67; an existent that has endured does not endure;
what is enduring does not endure; and what, not arisen, endures?

7.23 The enduring of an existent that is ceasing is not possible;
and that existent which is not ceasing, however, is not possible.

7.24 Among all existents68, whose nature is always jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death),
which existents endure, that are without jarāmaraṇa?

7.25 The enduring of enduring by another enduring, and by that very one, is not fitting,
just as the arising of arising is neither by itself nor by another.

7.26 What has not ceased does not cease69; what has ceased does not cease;
likewise what is ceasing; and what, unborn, ceases?70

7.27 Firstly, the cessation of an existent that has endured is not possible;
nor is the cessation of an existent that has not endured possible.

7.28 For a state, being that very one, does not cease by that very state;
nor does a state, being another, cease by another state71.

7.29 Just when the arising of all dharmas (phenomena) is not possible,
then, in this way72, the cessation of all dharmas is not possible.

7.30 Firstly, the cessation of an existent that exists is not possible;
for in oneness, an existent and a non-existent are not both possible.

7.31 Nor is the cessation of an existent that does not exist possible,
just as no cutting off of a second head is found.

7.32 Cessation is not by its own self, nor is cessation by another,
just as the arising of arising is neither by itself nor by another.

7.33 Because arising, enduring and dissolution are not established, there is no saṃskṛta;
and when the saṃskṛta is not established, how will the asaṃskṛta be established?

7.34 Like an illusion, like a dream, like a city of gandharvas,
so arising, so enduring, so dissolution have been declared.

§8 Karmakārakaparīkṣā (Examination of action and agent)

Section titled “§8 Karmakārakaparīkṣā (Examination of action and agent)”

8.1 This real agent does not perform a real karman (action);
nor does an unreal agent attempt an unreal karman73.

8.2 There is no activity of the real, and the karman would be without an agent;
there is no activity of the real, and the agent would be without a karman.

8.3 If an unreal agent performs an unreal karman,
the karman would be without a primary cause, and the agent would be without a primary cause.

8.4 When there is no primary cause, neither effect nor cause is found;
in the non-existence of that, activity, agent and instrument74 are not found.

8.5 dharma (merit)75 and adharma (demerit)76 are not found when activity and the rest do not come to be;
and when there is no dharma and no adharma, the fruit born of them is not found.

8.6 When there is no fruit, neither for release nor for heaven is there possible
a path; and the uselessness of all activities follows.

8.7 An agent both real and unreal does not perform that which is both real and unreal;
for how could the real and the unreal, mutually contradictory, be together?

8.8 And the unreal is not performed by a real, nor is the real performed by an unreal,
agent; for all those very faults follow there.

8.9 Neither an unreal one nor one that is both real and unreal does the real
agent perform as karman, for the very reasons stated before.

8.10 Nor a real one, nor one that is both real and unreal, does the unreal
agent perform as karman, for the very reasons stated before.

8.11 An agent both real and unreal does not perform a real, nor an unreal77,
karman; but that one should understand from the very reasons stated before.

8.12 The agent proceeds in dependence on the karman, and in dependence on that agent
the karman proceeds; we see no other cause of establishment.

8.13 Thus one should understand upādāna (fuel)78, by the dismissal of karman
and of agent; and by karman and agent one should discern the remaining existents.

§9 Upadātrupādānaparīkṣā (Examination of the taker of fuel and the fuel)

Section titled “§9 Upadātrupādānaparīkṣā (Examination of the taker of fuel and the fuel)”

9.1 Now seeing, hearing and the rest, and feeling and the rest too:
he whose they are79 exists prior to these — so indeed some say.80

9.2 For how will seeing and the rest come to be of an existent that is not found?
Therefore that existent exists, established prior to these.

9.3 Seeing, hearing and the rest, and feeling and the rest as well:
the existent that is established prior to them — by what, then, is it designated?

9.4 And if that one is established even without seeing and the rest,
those too will exist without that one; there is no doubt.

9.5 Someone is made manifest by something; something is made manifest by someone:
whence someone without something? Whence something without someone?81

9.6 Someone prior to all of seeing and the rest is not found;
rather, he is made manifest by another of seeing and the rest at another time82.

9.7 If one prior to all of seeing and the rest is not found,
how is he found prior to each one of seeing and the rest?

9.8 If that very one is the seer, that one the hearer, that very one the feeler,
he would be prior to each one; and so this is not fitting.

9.9 If, again, the seer is quite different, the hearer different, the feeler different,
there would be a hearer when there is a seer, and there would be a multiplicity of selves.

9.10 Now seeing, hearing and the rest, and feeling and the rest too:
in those elements from which they come to be, this one is not found either83.

9.11 Now seeing, hearing and the rest, and feeling and the rest too:
if he whose they are is not found, these are not found either.

9.12 And he who, before seeing and the rest, and at present, and after as well,
is not found — with regard to him84 the conceptions “he exists”, “he does not exist” have ceased.

§10 Agnīndhanaparīkṣā (Examination of fire and firewood)

Section titled “§10 Agnīndhanaparīkṣā (Examination of fire and firewood)”

10.1 If the fire is that which is the firewood, there is oneness of agent and karman (object)85;
if the fire is other than the firewood, it would exist even without the firewood.

10.2 It would simply be permanently ablaze, without a primary cause of kindling;
beginning again is pointless86; and, this being so, it is without karman.

10.3 Because of not depending on another, it is without a primary cause of kindling;
it follows that it is permanently ablaze87 and that beginning again is pointless.

10.4 If here this should be so88: “the firewood is that which is being kindled”,
by what is that firewood to be kindled, when this is only that much?

10.5 Being other, it will not reach89; not having reached, it will not burn; not burning, moreover,
it will not be extinguished; or, not extinguished, it will remain, bearing its own mark.

10.6 If the fire were wholly other than the firewood, it could reach the firewood,
just as a woman reaches a man, and a man a woman.

10.7 The fire, wholly other than the firewood, may well reach the firewood,
if the fire and the firewood were set apart from one another.

10.8 If the fire depends on the firewood, and if the firewood depends on the fire,
which of the two is accomplished first, that depending on which there is fire or firewood90?

10.9 If the fire depends on the firewood, there is the establishing of a fire that is established;
this being so, the firewood too will be without fire.

10.10 The existent that is established depending on another — depending on that very existent the other is established:
if that which is to be depended on is to be established, which, depending on which?

10.11 The existent that is established depending — how does it, not established, depend?
Or if it depends once established, then its dependence is not fitting.

10.12 There is no fire depending on the firewood91, nor fire not depending on the firewood;
there is no firewood depending on the fire, nor firewood not depending on the fire.

10.13 The fire does not come from elsewhere; the fire is not found in the firewood;
here, as to the firewood, the rest has been stated by means of the being gone, the gone and the not gone92.

10.14 Again, the fire is not the firewood; nor is the fire elsewhere than the firewood93;
the fire does not possess firewood; the firewood is not in the fire, nor is the fire in it.

10.15 By fire and firewood the sequence of the self and the upādāna (fuel)94 is explained,
all of it without remainder, together with pot, cloth and the rest95.

10.16 And those who declare the sameness of the self and of existents, and their separateness96,
I do not think them skilled in the meaning of the teaching.

§11 Saṃsāraparīkṣā (Examination of the cycle of rebirth)

Section titled “§11 Saṃsāraparīkṣā (Examination of the cycle of rebirth)”

11.1 “The prior limit is not discerned”, said the great sage;
for saṃsāra (the cycle of rebirth) is without beginning or end: it has no beginning, nor any end.97

11.2 That which has neither beginning nor end — whence would it have a middle?
Therefore the sequences of before, after and together are not possible here.

11.3 If jāti (birth) were before and jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death) after,
there would be jāti without jarāmaraṇa, and one who has not died would be born98.

11.4 If jāti were after and jarāmaraṇa from the start,
how would there be jarāmaraṇa, without primary cause, of one unborn?

11.5 Nor is it fitting that jarāmaraṇa and jāti are together99;
one being born would die, and both would be without primary cause.

11.6 Where these sequences of before, after and together do not arise,
why do they proliferate100 that jāti and that jarāmaraṇa?

11.7 Effect and cause, and the characterised and the characteristic,
feeling and the feeler, and whatever things there are101 —

11.8 Not only is the prior limit of saṃsāra not found;
of all existents too102 the prior limit is not found.

§12 Duḥkhaparīkṣā (Examination of suffering)

Section titled “§12 Duḥkhaparīkṣā (Examination of suffering)”

12.1 Made by itself, made by another, made by both, without primary cause:
so some hold duḥkha (suffering) to be; and that is not fit to be made103.

12.2 If it were made by itself, it would not then come to be dependently;
for those skandhas (collections) come to be in dependence on these skandhas.

12.3 If these were other than those, or if those were other than these,
duḥkha would be made by another, those made by these others104.

12.4 If duḥkha is made by its own person, then, apart from duḥkha,
which is that own person105 by whom duḥkha is made by itself?

12.5 If duḥkha is born of another person, he to whom it is given106 —
that duḥkha having been made by another — whence is he, apart from duḥkha?

12.6 If duḥkha is born of another person, who is the other person
who, apart from duḥkha, having made it, sends it to another?107

12.7 Since the self-made is not established, whence is duḥkha made by another?
For whatever duḥkha another would make108, that would be self-made for him109.

12.8 First, duḥkha is not self-made, for it is not made by that very one110;
if the other is not made by itself, how would duḥkha be made by another?

12.9 duḥkha would be made by both, if it could be made by each one111;
whence duḥkha without primary cause, not made by another and not made by itself?

12.10 For not only is the fourfoldness of duḥkha not found;
the fourfoldness of external existents112 too is not found.

§13 Tattvaparīkṣā (Examination of reality)

Section titled “§13 Tattvaparīkṣā (Examination of reality)”

13.1 ‘That is false which is of deceptive quality’ — thus the Bhagavān spoke;
and all saṃskāras (mental constructions)113 are of deceptive quality; therefore they are false114.

13.2 If that is false which is of deceptive quality, what is deceived there?
But this was spoken by the Bhagavān as illuminating śūnyatā (emptiness).115

13.3 The lack of svabhāva (intrinsic nature) in existents is from the seeing of alteration;
and there is no existent without svabhāva, since there is the śūnyatā of existents.

13.4 Of what would there be alteration, if svabhāva is not found?
Of what would there be alteration, if svabhāva is found?

13.5 Alteration is not fitting of that very thing, nor indeed of another;
since a youth does not age, since the aged does not age.

13.6 If there were alteration of that, milk itself would be curd;
or else, of what other than milk116 will there be the state of curd?

13.7 If there were anything not empty, there would be something empty too117;
and there is nothing not empty; whence will the empty be?

13.8 Śūnyatā was proclaimed by the Conquerors as the escape from all dṛṣṭis (views);
but those whose dṛṣṭi is śūnyatā, those they declared incurable118.

§14 Saṃsargaparīkṣā (Examination of conjunction)

Section titled “§14 Saṃsargaparīkṣā (Examination of conjunction)”

14.1 The visible, the seeing, the seer: these three, two by two
and altogether, do not indeed go into conjunction with one another.

14.2 Thus let passion, the impassioned and what is to be impassioned be seen;
in the threefold way119, the remaining kleśas (defilements) too, and the remaining āyatanas (sense bases).

14.3 Conjunction is of another with another, and that otherness is not found120
of the visible and the rest; hence they do not go into conjunction.

14.4 And not only is the otherness of the visible and the rest not found;
the otherness of anything together with anything121 is not possible.

14.5 Another is another in dependence on another122; another is not another apart from another;
and for what depends on something to be other than it is not possible123.

14.6 If another were other than another, it would be so even apart from the other124;
that other is not other apart from the other; and hence it does not exist.

14.7 Otherness is not found in another; it is not found in a non-other;
and otherness being not found, there is neither another nor that very thing.

14.8 The conjunction of that with that is not fitting, nor of another with another;
the being conjoined, the conjoined and the conjoiner are not found.

§15 Bhāvābhāvaparīkṣā (Examination of the existent and the non-existent)

Section titled “§15 Bhāvābhāvaparīkṣā (Examination of the existent and the non-existent)”

15.1 The coming to be of svabhāva (intrinsic nature) through causes and primary causes is not fitting;
a svabhāva come to be from primary causes and causes would be artificial.

15.2 How, again, will a svabhāva be called artificial125?
For svabhāva is not artificial and is independent of another126.

15.3 In the non-existence of svabhāva, whence will parabhāva (extrinsic nature) be?
For the svabhāva of another existent127 is called parabhāva.

15.4 Apart from svabhāva and parabhāva, whence, again, an existent?
For when there is svabhāva and parabhāva128, an existent is established.

15.5 If the existent is unestablished, the non-existent is not established at all;
for people call the alteration of an existent the non-existent.

15.6 Svabhāva and parabhāva, and the existent and the non-existent too:
those who see these do not see tattva (reality) in the Buddha’s teaching.

15.7 And in the Instruction to Kātyāyana both ‘it is’ and ‘it is not’
were denied by the Bhagavān, who discerns the existent and the non-existent.

15.8 If existence were by nature, there would be no non-existence of it;
for the alteration of a nature is never possible.

15.9 Or, when the nature does not exist129, of what will there be change?
Or, when the nature exists, of what will there be change?

15.10 ‘It is’ is grasping at the eternal; ‘it is not’ is the view of annihilation;
therefore the clear-sighted one should not rely on130 existence and non-existence.

15.11 For what exists by svabhāva, that is not non-existent — thus the eternal;
‘it is not now, it was before’ — thus annihilation follows.

§16 Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā (Examination of bondage and release)

Section titled “§16 Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā (Examination of bondage and release)”

16.1 If saṃskāras (mental constructions)131 transmigrate, they do not transmigrate as permanent ones;
nor do they transmigrate as impermanent ones; for a being too, this is the same procedure.

16.2 If a person transmigrates — in the skandhas (collections), the āyatanas (sense bases) and the dhātus (components)
sought in five ways, that one does not exist; who will transmigrate?

16.3 Transmigrating from upādāna (fuel)132 to upādāna, that one would be free from existence133;
and free from existence and without upādāna, who is that one, what will transmigrate?134

16.4 The nirvāṇa (extinguishment) of saṃskāras is not possible in any way;
the nirvāṇa of a being, too, is not possible in any way.

16.5 Those whose nature is to rise and pass away are not bound, are not released —
the saṃskāras; as before, a being is not bound, is not released.

16.6 If bondage is upādāna, one with upādāna is not bound;
one without upādāna is not bound; then in what state is one bound?

16.7 Bondage would bind, granted135, if it existed136 before the one to be bound;
and it does not exist; the rest has been said through the being gone, the gone and the not gone.

16.8 The bound, to begin with, is not released; the unbound is not released at all;
if the bound were being released, binding and releasing would be simultaneous.

16.9 ‘Without upādāna I shall be extinguished, nirvāṇa will be mine’ —
those whose grasping is thus, theirs is the great grasping of upādāna137.

16.10 Where there is no superimposing of nirvāṇa, no removing of saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth),
there what saṃsāra, what nirvāṇa, is imagined?138

§17 Karmaphalaparīkṣā (Examination of action and fruit)

Section titled “§17 Karmaphalaparīkṣā (Examination of action and fruit)”

17.1 The mind that restrains oneself and that favours others,
of goodwill139: that is dharma (righteousness); that is the seed of fruit after death and here.

17.2 Intention, and having intended, were declared to be karman (action) by the supreme seer;
of that karman a division of many kinds has been proclaimed.

17.3 There, the karman that is called “intention” is held to be mental;
but that which is called “having intended” is bodily and verbal.

17.4 Speech and movement, and the non-abstentions140 designated “non-intimation”,
and likewise the other non-intimations, held to be abstentions,

17.5 merit consequent on enjoyment, and demerit of the same kind,
and intention: these seven dharmas141 are held to be the manifestations of karman.

17.6 If karman endures until the time of ripening142, it would go to permanence;
if it has ceased, being ceased, what fruit will it generate?

17.7 The continuum beginning with the sprout, which proceeds from the seed,
from that is the fruit; and without the seed it does not proceed.

17.8 And since from the seed is the continuum, and from the continuum the coming forth of the fruit,
the fruit, preceded by the seed, is therefore neither annihilated nor eternal.

17.9 The continuum of mind which proceeds from that mind143,
from that is the fruit; and without the mind it does not proceed.

17.10 And since from the mind is the continuum, and from the continuum the coming forth of the fruit,
the fruit, preceded by karman, is therefore neither annihilated nor eternal.

17.11 The means of accomplishing dharma144 are the ten white paths of karman;
the fruit of dharma, after death and here, is the five qualities of desire.

17.12 Many and great would be the faults, if the conception
were this; therefore this conception is not at all possible here.

17.13 But I shall declare this conception, which is applied here145,
described by the Buddhas, by the solitary Buddhas and by the disciples.

17.14 The non-perishing is like a document146, and so karman is like a debt;
it is fourfold by dhātu (component)147, and by nature it is indeterminate.

17.15 It is not to be abandoned by abandonment, or else it is to be abandoned by cultivation alone;
therefore the fruit of karmans is born through the non-perishing.

17.16 If it were to be abandoned by abandonment, or by the transference of karman148,
faults would follow there, the destruction of karman and so on.

17.17 Of all the karmans, the dissimilar and the similar,
of the same dhātu, at rebirth149, however, it arises as one150.

17.18 But it arises for each and every karman in the present life151,
for every one of the two kinds; and it endures even when ripened152.

17.19 It ceases153 either through the passing over of the fruit or through death;
there one should mark the division into the undefiled and the defiled154.

17.20 Śūnyatā (emptiness), and not annihilation155; saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth), and not the eternal;
and the non-perishing of karman: the dharma taught by the Buddha.

17.21 Why does karman not arise? Since it is without svabhāva (intrinsic nature), therefore156;
and since it is unarisen, therefore it does not perish.

17.22 If karman were by svabhāva, it would be eternal, without doubt;
and karman would be not done, for the eternal is not done.

17.23 There would be the fear of the arrival of what was not done, if karman were not done;
and the fault of dwelling in what is not the optimal life157 follows there.

17.24 All the vyavahāras (conventions) indeed are contradicted, no doubt;
and the distinction between the doer of merit and the doer of evil158 is not at all fitting.

17.25 And that whose ripening has ripened would, for that reason, ripen yet again,
since karman is fixed, if it has svabhāva159.

17.26 And this karman consists of kleśa (defilement)160, and those kleśas are not in tattva (reality);
if those kleśas are not in tattva, how would karman be in tattva?

17.27 Karman and the kleśas are declared the causes of bodies;
if that karman and those kleśas are empty, what talk is there of bodies?

17.28 The creature is enveloped by avidyā (ignorance), and he has tṛṣṇā (craving) as his fetter;
he is the experiencer, and he is not other than the agent, nor is he the very same as it.

17.29 Since neither arisen from causes nor risen from non-causes
is this karman, therefore the agent too does not exist, indeed.

17.30 If there is no karman and no agent, whence would there be the fruit born of karman?
And when there is no fruit, whence indeed will there be an experiencer?

17.31 As the Teacher conjures a conjured one by the perfection of supernormal power,
and the conjured one conjures another, and that one in turn is a conjured one,

17.32 so the agent has the form of a conjured one, and the karman which he does, that is done
just as another conjured one is conjured by a conjured one; so it is.

17.33 Kleśas, karmans, bodies, and agents and fruits
have the form of a city of gandharvas, resembling a mirage and a dream.

§18 Ātmadharmaparīkṣā (Examination of the self and phenomena)

Section titled “§18 Ātmadharmaparīkṣā (Examination of the self and phenomena)”

18.1 If the self were the skandhas (collections), it would partake of arising and passing away;
if it were other than the skandhas, it would be without the characteristic of the skandhas161.

18.2 And when the self does not exist, whence indeed will there be what belongs to the self?
One is without “mine” and without the making of “I”, through the quieting of the self and of what pertains to the self.

18.3 And he who is without “mine” and without the making of “I”, he too is not found;
he who sees one162 without “mine” and without the making of “I” does not see.

18.4 When “mine” and “I” are exhausted, outwardly and inwardly too,
upādāna (fuel)163 ceases; from its exhaustion, the exhaustion of birth.

18.5 Release is from the exhaustion of karman (action) and the kleśas (defilements); karman and the kleśas are from discrimination164;
those are from prapañca (proliferation), but prapañca ceases in śūnyatā (emptiness).

18.6 “Self” has also been designated; “not-self” has also been taught;
by the Buddhas it has also been taught that there is neither self nor any not-self165.

18.7 What is to be expressed has turned back166; the range of mind has turned back167;
for the nature of dharmas (phenomena), unarisen and unceased, is like nirvāṇa (extinguishment).

18.8 Everything is real, or not real, and both real and not real,
neither not real nor real: this is the instruction of the Buddhas.

18.9 Not dependent on another168, at peace, not proliferated by prapañcas,
without discrimination, not different things169: this is the characteristic of tattva (reality).

18.10 Whatever comes to be depending on whatever, that, to begin with, is indeed not that very thing,
nor is it other than it either; therefore it is neither annihilated nor eternal.

18.11 Not one thing, not different things170, not annihilation, not eternal:
this is that deathless teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world.

18.12 When the fully awakened have not arisen, and again when the disciples have perished,
the knowledge of the solitary Buddhas proceeds from non-association171.

§19 Kālaparīkṣā (Examination of time)

Section titled “§19 Kālaparīkṣā (Examination of time)”

19.1 If the present and the future are indeed relative to the past,
the present and the future will be in the past time.

19.2 If, again, the present and the future are not there,
how would the present and the future be relative to it?

19.3 Again, without being relative to the past, the establishment of those two is not found;
therefore the present and the future time172 is not found.

19.4 By just this, one should mark the remaining two, rotated in turn,173
and the highest, the lowest, the middle and so on, and oneness and so on.

19.5 A non-enduring time is not grasped; an enduring time is not found
which might be grasped;174 and how is an ungrasped time designated?

19.6 If time is dependent on an existent, whence is time without an existent?
And no existent at all exists; whence will time be?

§20 Hetuparīkṣā (Examination of primary cause and fruit)

Section titled “§20 Hetuparīkṣā (Examination of primary cause and fruit)”

20.1 If it is born from the assemblage of the primary cause and of the causes,
and the fruit exists in the assemblage, how is it born from the assemblage?

20.2 If it is born from the assemblage of the primary cause and of the causes,
and the fruit does not exist in the assemblage, how is it born from the assemblage?

20.3 If the fruit exists in the assemblage of the primary cause and of the causes,
surely it would be grasped in the assemblage; and in the assemblage it is not grasped.

20.4 If the fruit does not exist in the assemblage of the primary cause and of the causes,
the primary causes and the causes would be equal to what are not primary causes and not causes.

20.5 And if the primary cause, having given175 the primary cause to the fruit,176 ceases,
what is given and what has ceased would be two selves of the primary cause.

20.6 And if the primary cause ceases without having given the primary cause to the fruit,
that fruit, born when the primary cause has ceased, would be without a primary cause.

20.7 If, again, the fruit should appear just together with the assemblage,
it follows that the generator and what is generated are simultaneous.

20.8 And if the fruit should appear even before the assemblage,
the fruit, freed of primary cause and causes, would be without a primary cause.

20.9 If, when the primary cause has ceased, the fruit were a transference of the primary cause,
then a second birth of the primary cause born before follows.

20.10 How could a ceased, vanished [primary cause] generate the arisen fruit?
How could the primary cause, even while standing, enveloped by the fruit,177 generate [it]?

20.11 But if that one is not enveloped by the fruit, which fruit would it generate?178
For the primary cause generates the fruit neither without having seen nor having seen [it].

20.12 For of a past fruit, with a past primary cause,
with an unborn one, with a born one, no coming together is ever found.

20.13 For of a born fruit, with an unborn primary cause,
with a past one, with a born one, no coming together is ever found.

20.14 For of an unborn fruit, with a born primary cause,
with an unborn one, with a perished one, no coming together is ever found.

20.15 When there is no coming together, how does the primary cause generate the fruit?
Or when there is a coming together, how does the primary cause generate the fruit?

20.16 If the primary cause is empty of the fruit, how does it generate the fruit?
If the primary cause is not empty of the fruit, how does it generate the fruit?

20.17 A non-empty fruit will not arise; a non-empty one will not cease;
that non-empty one will be unceased, unarisen.179

20.18 How will an empty one arise? How will an empty one cease?
It follows that that empty one too is unceased, unarisen.

20.19 For oneness of the primary cause and the fruit is never possible;
for otherness of the primary cause and the fruit is never possible.

20.20 Given oneness of fruit and primary cause, there would be identity of generator and generated;
given separateness of fruit and primary cause, the primary cause would be equal to what is not a primary cause.180

20.21 What fruit that truly exists by svabhāva (intrinsic nature) will a primary cause generate?181
What fruit that does not truly exist by svabhāva will a primary cause generate?

20.22 And being a primary cause is not possible for one that is not generating;
and when being a primary cause is not possible, whose will the fruit be?

20.23 And this assemblage of the causes and primary causes does not [generate] itself by itself;182
the assemblage that does not generate [itself]: how would that generate the fruit?

20.24 Therefore the fruit is neither made by an assemblage nor made by a non-assemblage;
how at all is there an assemblage of causes without a fruit?

§21 Saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣā (Examination of coming to be and passing away)

Section titled “§21 Saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣā (Examination of coming to be and passing away)”

21.1 Whether without or together with coming to be, there is indeed no passing away;
whether without or together with passing away, there is indeed no coming to be.

21.2 How indeed will passing away be without coming to be?
Death without birth indeed;183 passing away is not without origination.

21.3 How will passing away be together with coming to be itself?
For birth and death are not found at the same time.184

21.4 How indeed will coming to be be without passing away?
For impermanence is at no time not found in existents.

21.5 How will coming to be be together with passing away itself?
For birth and death are not found at the same time.

21.6 Those two whose establishment, whether together with each other or without each other,
is not found: how then indeed is the establishment of those two found?

21.7 There is no coming to be of what decays;185 there is no coming to be of what does not decay;
there is no passing away of what decays, and no passing away of what does not decay.

21.8 Coming to be and passing away are not found without an existent;
an existent is not found without coming to be and passing away.

21.9 Coming to be and passing away are not possible of what is empty;
coming to be and passing away are not possible of what is not empty.

21.10 That coming to be and passing away are one is not possible;
that coming to be and passing away are different is not possible.

21.11 “Coming to be is seen, and passing away as well”—that might be yours;
coming to be is seen, and passing away as well, from delusion.

21.12 An existent is not born from an existent; an existent is not born from a non-existent;
a non-existent is not born from a non-existent; a non-existent is not born from an existent.

21.13 An existent is not born from itself, nor is it born from another;
it is not born from itself and another: from where is it born?

21.14 For one who has accepted an existent, the view of the eternal and of annihilation
follows; for that existent would be either permanent or impermanent.186

21.15 For one who has accepted an existent,187 there is neither annihilation nor the eternal;
for that bhava (existence)188 is the continuum of appearance and disappearance of fruit and primary cause.

21.16 If that bhava is the continuum of appearance and disappearance of fruit and primary cause,
since there is no arising again of what has disappeared,189 annihilation of the primary cause follows.

21.17 And of what really exists by svabhāva (intrinsic nature), non-existence is not fitting;
and at the time of nirvāṇa (extinguishment) there is annihilation,190 from the quieting of the continuity of bhava.

21.18 And when the last has ceased, the first bhava is not fitting;
and when the last has not ceased, the first bhava is not fitting.

21.19 If, while the last is ceasing, the first is born,
the one ceasing would be one and the one being born would be another.

21.20 If both the one ceasing and the one being born are not fitting
together,191 then one is born in those skandhas (collections) in which one dies.

21.21 Thus in all three times the continuity of bhava is not fitting;
that which does not exist in the three times, how is it a continuity of bhava?

§22 Tathāgataparīkṣā (Examination of the thus-gone one)

Section titled “§22 Tathāgataparīkṣā (Examination of the thus-gone one)”

22.1 Not the skandhas (collections), not other than the skandhas; the skandhas are not in him, he is not in them;
the tathāgata (thus-gone one) does not possess the skandhas; which one here is the tathāgata?

22.2 If the Buddha, taking up the skandhas192, does not exist by way of svabhāva (intrinsic nature),
and he who does not exist by way of svabhāva, whence is he by way of parabhāva (extrinsic nature)?

22.3 Whoever is dependent on parabhāva, ‘he is not a self’ is possible193;
and whoever is not-self, how will he be the tathāgata?

22.4 And if there is no svabhāva, how could there be parabhāva?
Apart from svabhāva and parabhāva, who is that tathāgata?

22.5 If, not taking up the skandhas194, there could be some tathāgata,
he would now take them up; having taken them up, he would then exist.

22.6 And also, not taking up the skandhas, there is not any tathāgata;
and he who, not taking up, does not exist, how will he take up?195

22.7 And there is no upādāna (fuel)196 whatsoever that is not taken up;
and there is in no way a tathāgata without upādāna197.

22.8 He who, being sought in five ways, does not exist by way of identity or otherness198,
how is that tathāgata designated by means of upādāna?

22.9 Also whatever this upādāna is, that is not found by way of svabhāva;
and what does not exist by way of svabhāva, whence is that by way of parabhāva?

22.10 Thus the upādāna and the taker of fuel are empty in every way;
and how is an empty tathāgata designated by what is empty?

22.11 “Empty” is not to be said, nor would “not empty” be,
nor “both”, nor “not both”; but it is said for the sake of prajñapti (designation).

22.12 Whence here, in one at peace, the tetrad eternal, not eternal and so on?
And also whence here, in one at peace, the tetrad finite, infinite and so on?

22.13 But he by whom a firm grasp has been grasped that the tathāgata exists,
conceiving that he does not exist199, would imagine it even of the extinguished one.

22.14 And with regard to this one, empty by way of svabhāva, the thought is not possible at all
that after cessation the Buddha exists, or does not exist.

22.15 Those who make prapañca (proliferation) of the Buddha, who is beyond prapañca and imperishable,
all those, struck down by prapañca, do not see the tathāgata.

22.16 Whatever svabhāva the tathāgata has, that svabhāva this world has;
the tathāgata is without svabhāva; this world is without svabhāva.

§23 Viparyāsaparīkṣā (Examination of the distortions)

Section titled “§23 Viparyāsaparīkṣā (Examination of the distortions)”

23.1 Passion, hatred and delusion are said to have conception as their source;
for they come to be depending on the distortions of the pleasant and the unpleasant200.

23.2 Those which come to be depending on the distortions201 of the pleasant and the unpleasant,
they are not found by way of svabhāva (intrinsic nature)202; therefore the kleśas (defilements) are not in tattva (reality).

23.3 And the existence and non-existence of the self are not established in any way;
without that, how are the existence and non-existence of the kleśas established?

23.4 For these kleśas are someone’s, and that one is not established;
is there someone?203 Without anyone, do the kleśas exist, belonging to no one?

23.5 Like the dṛṣṭi (view) of one’s own body, the kleśas do not exist in the defiled one in five ways;
like the dṛṣṭi of one’s own body, the defiled one too does not exist in the kleśas in five ways.

23.6 The distortions of the pleasant and the unpleasant204 are not found by way of svabhāva;
depending on which distortions of the pleasant and the unpleasant are the kleśas?

23.7 Forms, sounds, tastes, tangibles205, smells and dharmas (phenomena): the sixfold
object of passion, of hatred206 and of delusion is conceived.

23.8 Mere207 forms, sounds, tastes, tangibles, smells and dharmas
have the appearance of a city of the gandharvas, resembling a mirage and a dream.

23.9 Whence will either the unpleasant or even the pleasant be in those
which resemble illusory persons208 and are equal to reflections?

23.10 Independently of the pleasant209 there is no unpleasant; we would designate210
the pleasant depending on it; therefore the pleasant is not possible at all.

23.11 Independently of the unpleasant there is no pleasant; we would designate
the unpleasant depending on it; therefore the unpleasant is not found at all.

23.12 And when the pleasant is not found, whence will passion be?
And when the unpleasant is not found, whence will hatred be?

23.13 If the grasp “permanent” in regard to the impermanent is thus a distortion,
the impermanent is not found in what is empty; whence is the grasp a distortion?211

23.14 If the grasp “permanent” in regard to the impermanent is thus a distortion,
why is the grasp “impermanent” in what is empty212 not a distortion too?

23.15 That by which one grasps, the grasp, the grasper and what is grasped:
all are calmed; therefore a grasp is not found.

23.16 And when a grasp is not found, whether wrong or indeed right,
whose would be the distortion, whose would be the non-distortion?

23.17 And neither do distortions come to be for one who is distorted,
nor do distortions come to be for one who is not distorted.

23.18 Distortions do not come to be for one who is being distorted;
consider for yourself: for whom do distortions come to be?

23.19 How indeed will distortions that have not arisen come to be?
When distortions are unborn, whence one gone into distortion?

23.20 An existent is not born from itself, nor is it born from another,
nor from itself and another; so whence one gone into distortion?213

23.21 If the self, and the pure, and the permanent, and happiness are found,
the self, and the pure, and the permanent, and happiness are not distortions.

23.22 If the self, and the pure, and the permanent, and happiness are not found,
not-self, the impure and the impermanent, and duḥkha (suffering), are not found at all.

23.23 Thus avidyā (ignorance) ceases through the cessation of distortion;
when avidyā has ceased, what begins with the saṃskāras (mental constructions) ceases.

23.24 For if some kleśas of someone were real by svabhāva214,
how indeed could they be abandoned? Who will abandon a svabhāva?

23.25 For if some kleśas of someone were unreal by svabhāva,
how indeed could they be abandoned? Who will abandon a non-existence?

§24 Āryasatyaparīkṣā (Examination of the realisations)

Section titled “§24 Āryasatyaparīkṣā (Examination of the realisations)”

24.1 If all this is empty, there is no arising, no passing away;
the non-existence of the four āryasatya (realisations) follows for you.

24.2 Full understanding, giving up, development and personal realisation215,
because of the non-existence of the four āryasatya, are not possible.

24.3 Because of their non-existence, the four fruits too216 are not found;
when there is no fruit, those abiding in the fruit do not exist, nor those who have entered upon the way.

24.4 There is no Saṃgha if those eight individual persons do not exist217;
and because of the non-existence of the āryasatya, the true dharma (teaching) too is not found.

24.5 And when the dharma and the Saṃgha do not exist, how will there be a Buddha?
Speaking thus, you reject all three jewels218.

24.6 Speaking of śūnyatā (emptiness)219, you reject the real existence of the fruit, adharma (demerit) and dharma (merit)220,
and all worldly conventions.

24.7 Here we say: you do not know the purpose of śūnyatā,
śūnyatā and the meaning of śūnyatā221; therefore you are thus thwarted.

24.8 The teaching of the dharma by the Buddhas rests upon two truths:
the truth of worldly saṃvṛti (convention), and the truth according to the paramārtha (ultimate).

24.9 Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths
do not understand the tattva (reality) in the profound instruction of the Buddha222.

24.10 Without relying on vyavahāra (convention), the paramārtha is not taught;
without arriving at the paramārtha, nirvāṇa (extinguishment) is not attained.

24.11 śūnyatā wrongly seen destroys one of dull intellect223,
like a snake wrongly grasped, or a spell wrongly mastered224.

24.12 And hence the mind of the sage was turned back from teaching
the dharma, having considered how hard this dharma is for the dull to fathom.

24.13 Moreover, the objection225 which you, sir, make to śūnyatā:
that consequence of fault is not ours; it is not possible in the empty.

24.14 And everything is fitting for one for whom śūnyatā is fitting;
nothing is fitting for one for whom the empty is not fitting.

24.15 You, hurling your own faults upon us,
have, while mounted on the very horse, forgotten the very horse226.

24.16 If you perceive the real existence of existents as from svabhāva (intrinsic nature),
then, that being so, you see existents as without primary cause and cause227.

24.17 Effect and cause, agent, instrument228, action,
arising and cessation and fruit, you reject.

24.18 That which is pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), we declare that to be śūnyatā;
that is a prajñapti (designation) in dependence229; that itself is the madhyamā pratipad (middle way).

24.19 No dharma (phenomenon) whatever is found that has not dependently arisen;
for which reason, indeed, no dharma whatever is found that is not empty.

24.20 If all this is not empty, there is no arising, no passing away;
the non-existence of the four āryasatya follows for you.

24.21 How will there be duḥkha (suffering)230 that has not dependently arisen?
For duḥkha is said to be impermanent; that is not found in the state of svabhāva.

24.22 What exists by svabhāva, why will that originate again?
Therefore there is no origin for one who rejects śūnyatā.

24.23 No cessation of duḥkha that exists by svabhāva is found;
because of the fixation on svabhāva231, you reject cessation.

24.24 When there is the state of svabhāva, the development of the path is not possible;
but if that path is developed, the state of svabhāva is not found for you232.

24.25 When duḥkha, origin and cessation are not found,
which path, for the cessation of duḥkha233, will bring one to attainment?

24.26 If by svabhāva there is no full understanding of it234, how could there later235
be full understanding? Does not svabhāva indeed stand firm?

24.27 Giving up and personal realisation236, and development, in just this way for you,
like full understanding, are not fitting, and the four fruits too.

24.28 A fruit which by svabhāva is unattained237, how could that later
be attainable, for one who holds to svabhāva?

24.29 When there is no fruit, those abiding in the fruit do not exist, nor those who have entered upon the way;
there is no Saṃgha if those eight individual persons do not exist.

24.30 And because of the non-existence of the āryasatya, the true dharma too is not found;
and when the dharma and the Saṃgha do not exist, how will there be a Buddha?

24.31 It follows, for you, that there is a Buddha even without depending on awakening;
it follows, for you, that there is awakening even without depending on a Buddha.

24.32 And one who by svabhāva is not a Buddha, even striving for awakening,
will not, for you, attain awakening in the conduct of a bodhisattva.

24.33 And no one will ever do dharma or adharma;
what is to be done with what is not empty?238 For svabhāva is not made.

24.34 For a fruit is found for you without dharma and adharma;
and a fruit occasioned by239 dharma and adharma is not found for you240.

24.35 Or if a fruit occasioned by dharma and adharma is found for you,
how is a fruit arisen from dharma and adharma not empty, for you?

24.36 And you reject all worldly conventions241,
you who reject242 the śūnyatā of pratītyasamutpāda.

24.37 There would be nothing to be done, action would be unbegun,
an agent would be one not acting, for one who rejects śūnyatā.

24.38 Unborn and unceased and immovable will be
the world, devoid of its diverse states, when there is svabhāva.

24.39 And the attainment of what is unattained, and the act of ending duḥkha,
and the giving up of all kleśa (defilements) are not found, if it is not empty243.

24.40 One who sees pratītyasamutpāda, he sees this:
duḥkha and origin and cessation and the path.

§25 Nirvāṇaparīkṣā (Examination of extinguishment)

Section titled “§25 Nirvāṇaparīkṣā (Examination of extinguishment)”

25.1 If all this is empty, there is no arising and no passing away;
through abandoning or through cessation of what is nirvāṇa (extinguishment) accepted244?

25.2 If all this is not empty, there is no arising and no passing away;
through abandoning or through cessation of what is nirvāṇa accepted?

25.3 Not abandoned, not attained, not annihilated, not eternal,
not ceased, not arisen: this is called nirvāṇa.

25.4 To begin with, nirvāṇa is not an existent: having jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death) as its characteristic would follow;
for there is no existent without jarāmaraṇa.

25.5 And if nirvāṇa were an existent, nirvāṇa would be saṃskṛta (constructed);
for no asaṃskṛta (unconstructed) existent whatsoever is found anywhere.

25.6 And if nirvāṇa were an existent, how could that nirvāṇa be without taking up?245
For no existent at all is found without taking up.

25.7 If nirvāṇa is not an existent, will nirvāṇa be a non-existent?246
Where there is no existent, there no non-existent is found.

25.8 And if nirvāṇa were a non-existent, how could that nirvāṇa be without taking up?
For there is no non-existent that is found without taking up.

25.9 Whatever state of moving to and fro there is, taking up or depending,
that, not depending and not taking up, is taught to be nirvāṇa247.

25.10 And the Teacher spoke of the abandoning of bhava (existence) and of passing away;
therefore it is fitting that nirvāṇa is not an existent and not a non-existent.

25.11 If nirvāṇa were both, a non-existent and an existent,
release would be a non-existent and an existent, and that is not fitting.

25.12 If nirvāṇa were both, a non-existent and an existent,
nirvāṇa would not be without taking up; for both of those take up248.

25.13 How could nirvāṇa be both, a non-existent and an existent?
For nirvāṇa is asaṃskṛta, while the existent and the non-existent are saṃskṛta.

25.14 How could nirvāṇa be both, a non-existent and an existent?
For the non-existence of those two in one place is like that of light and darkness249.

25.15 The making clear that nirvāṇa is neither a non-existent nor an existent,
that is established only when a non-existent and an existent are both established.

25.16 If nirvāṇa, neither a non-existent nor an existent, is found,
by what is that250 “neither a non-existent nor an existent”251 made clear?

25.17 It is not made clear at all252 that the Bhagavān exists after cessation;
nor is “he does not exist”, nor “both”, nor “not both” made clear.

25.18 Even while the Bhagavān remains, it is not made clear at all that he exists;
nor is “he does not exist”, nor “both”, nor “not both” made clear.

25.19 There is no distinction at all of saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth) from nirvāṇa;
there is no distinction at all of nirvāṇa from saṃsāra.

25.20 And what is the limit of nirvāṇa and the limit of cycling through rebirth,
between those two no difference at all253, not even a very subtle one, is found.

25.21 The dṛṣṭis (views) “after cessation”, “finite” and so on, and “eternal” and so on,
rest upon nirvāṇa, upon the future and upon the past254.

25.22 When all dharmas (phenomena) are empty, what is infinite, what is finite255,
what is both infinite and finite, and what is neither infinite nor finite?

25.23 What is just that, what is other, what is eternal, what is not eternal,
what is both not eternal and eternal, or what, then, is not both?

25.24 The quieting of all apprehension, the auspicious quieting of prapañca (proliferation):
no dharma was taught by the Buddha anywhere to anyone.256

Section titled “§26 Dvādaśāṅgaparīkṣā (Examination of the twelve links)”

26.1 For appearing again, one covered by avidyā (ignorance) constructs the saṃskāras (mental constructions)257 in three ways,
and by those karmans (actions) one goes to a destination.

26.2 vijñāna (consciousness), with the saṃskāras as its cause, settles into the destination;
then, when vijñāna has settled, nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects) is infused.

26.3 But when nāmarūpa has been infused, there is the coming to be of the six sense bases;
owing to the six sense bases258, contact proceeds.

26.4 Depending on the eye and on form, and on attention too,
thus, depending on nāmarūpa, vijñāna proceeds.

26.5 The coming together of the three, form, vijñāna and the eye,
that is contact; and from that contact, feeling proceeds.

26.6 tṛṣṇā (craving) has feeling as its cause, for one craves for the sake of feeling259;
one who is craving takes up the fourfold upādāna (fuel)260.

26.7 When there is upādāna, the bhava (existence) of the taker of fuel proceeds261;
for if one were without upādāna, one would be released; there would be no bhava.

26.8 And that bhava is the five skandhas (collections); from bhava, jāti (birth) proceeds;
jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), duḥkha (suffering) and so on262, sorrows with lamentations,

26.9 displeasure, despairs: this proceeds from jāti;
thus is the coming to be of this whole mass of suffering.

26.10 The one who does not know constructs the saṃskāras, the root of saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth)263; hence
the one who does not know is the agent; therefore the one who knows is not, because of seeing tattva (reality).

26.11 When avidyā has ceased, there is no coming to be of the saṃskāras;
but the cessation of avidyā is from the development of this very knowledge264.

26.12 By the cessation of each one, each one does not proceed;
thus this whole mass of suffering completely ceases.

§27 Dṛṣṭiparīkṣā (Examination of views)

Section titled “§27 Dṛṣṭiparīkṣā (Examination of views)”

27.1 ‘I was in the past time’, ‘I was not’: the dṛṣṭis (views)
which are those265, ‘eternal world’ and so on, rest upon the past266.

27.2 The dṛṣṭis ‘I shall not be’ and ‘shall I be another in the future time?’267,
‘finite’ and so on, rest upon the future.

27.3 ‘I was in the past time’ — this is not possible;
for the one who was in previous births, this one is not that very one.

27.4 But if it were ‘that very one is the self’, the upādāna (fuel)268 differs269;
freed from upādāna, which one, then, is your self?

27.5 When it is settled that there is no self freed from upādāna,
the self would be the upādāna itself; and then again, for you, the self does not exist.

27.6 And the self is not the upādāna itself: that passes away and arises;
for how indeed will the upādāna be the taker of fuel270?

27.7 And a self other than the upādāna is not possible at all;
for if it were other, it would be apprehended without upādāna, and it is not apprehended271.

27.8 Thus it is not other than the upādāna, nor is it the upādāna itself;
there is no self without upādāna272, nor does it not exist: this is certain.

27.9 ‘I was not in the past time’ — this is not possible;
for the one who was in previous births, this one is not other than that.

27.10 For if this one were other, it would exist even setting that one aside;
and that one would remain just so273, and there it would be born274 not having died275.

27.11 Annihilation, the loss of karman (actions), and karman done by one
another would experience: this and so on follows.276

27.12 Nor has it arisen without having been, for here a fault follows277:
the self would be either made, or else come to be without a primary cause.

27.13 Thus the dṛṣṭi about the past, which is ‘I was not’, ‘I was’,
‘both’, and ‘not both’ — this is not possible.

27.14 The view ‘shall I indeed be in the future time?’
and ‘I shall not be’ — this is the same as with the past time.

27.15 If that god is that human278, thus it is eternal279;
and the god would be unarisen, for the eternal is not born280.

27.16 If the human is other than the god281, from that it would be non-eternal;
if the human is other than the god, continuity is not possible282.

27.17 If one part were divine and one part human,
it would be non-eternal and eternal283; and that is not fitting.

27.18 If both the non-eternal and the eternal were established,
that being established, granted, ‘neither eternal nor non-eternal’ too would be established284.

27.19 If someone, having come from somewhere, were in any way to go again somewhere,
then that one would be beginningless and eternal285; and that one does not exist.

27.20 If there is no one eternal, who will be non-eternal,
both eternal and non-eternal, or set apart from both of these?

27.21 If the world were finite, how would there be the other world?
And if the world were infinite, how would there be the other world?

27.22 Since this continuity286 of skandhas (collections) is like that of the flames of a lamp287,
therefore neither infinitude nor finitude is fitting.

27.23 And if the previous ones were to break up, and those skandhas
were not to arise in dependence on these, then the world would be finite.

27.24 If the previous ones were not to break up, and those skandhas
were not to arise in dependence on these288, then the world would be infinite.

27.25 If one part were finite but one part infinite,
the world would be finite and infinite; and that is not fitting.

27.26 How, in the first place, will one part of the taker of fuel perish,
and one part not perish? And thus this is not fitting.

27.27 And how indeed will one part of the upādāna perish,
and one part not perish? This too is not possible.

27.28 If both the finite and the infinite were established,
that being established, granted, ‘neither finite nor infinite’ too would be established289.

27.29 Or else, because of the emptiness of all existents, ‘eternal’ and so on —
where, of whom, which ones, from what, will the dṛṣṭis come to be?

27.30 The one who, for the abandoning of all dṛṣṭis, taught290 the true dharma (teaching)
out of compassion — to him, Gautama, I bow.

  1. The eight epithets qualify pratītyasamutpādam in 0.2, into which the verse runs on, as Garfield (1995) also takes them; Kalupahana (1986) makes them, with pratītyasamutpāda, prapañcopaśama and śiva, ten coordinate objects of “preached” (“the non-ceasing and the non-arising, … the dependent arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious”), but aśāśvatam, anekārtham and anānārtham can only be adjectives, so all eight are epithets of pratītyasamutpādam. ↩

  2. The DSBC prints ya pratītyasamutpādaṃ; read yaḥ, “he who”, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  3. śivam is taken with prapañcopaśamam, “the auspicious calming of prapañca”; Candrakīrti reads it as a further epithet of pratītyasamutpāda, “the calming of proliferation, the auspicious”, as Kalupahana (1986) also separates it, and the point is the same either way. ↩

  4. The DSBC prints kecanaḥ; read kecana, “of any kind”, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  5. The DSBC prints heturārambaṇam, and in 1.8 anārambaṇa, anārambaṇe and ārambaṇaṃ; Poussin’s edition reads hetuś cālambanam and anālambana, anālambane, ālambanaṃ, and the word is read as ālambana, “the objective support”, throughout. ārambaṇa is also a Buddhist Sanskrit spelling of the word, recorded by Edgerton, so it may be the text’s own rather than a slip of the input. ↩

  6. kriyāvantaś ca santy uta, with uta marking the last alternative, asks “and are they with activity?”, which after the three denials is answered no, so the pāda is rendered as the fourth denial, as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) also take it; Kalupahana’s “nor is it not non-constituted of conditions” for nāpratyayavatī kriyā in the first half is a double negative the Sanskrit does not have. ↩

  7. utpadyate and notpadyate are singular and their subject is unexpressed: the fruit, which Candrakīrti supplies. Kalupahana (1986) makes ime the subject of both, “depending upon them these [others] arise”, and Garfield (1995) “those … come from these”; the plural ime of the second half is the subject of nāpratyayāḥ, “how are these not non-causes”. ↩

  8. The DSBC prints anārambaṇa, anārambaṇe and ārambaṇaṃ; read anālambana, anālambane, ālambanaṃ, as in 1.2. ↩

  9. Garfield (1995) renders the first half as a condition, “if things did not exist without essence, the phrase … would not be acceptable”, from the Tibetan; the Sanskrit yataḥ gives the reason, and the second half states what is therefore not possible, as Kalupahana (1986) also reads it. ↩

  10. The DSBC prints bhāvanāṃ; read bhāvānāṃ, “of existents”, the genitive plural with which niḥsvabhāvānāṃ agrees, as Poussin’s edition has it (bhāvanā, “cultivation”, is impossible here). ↩

  11. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) render the second half “how can that effect made of conditions [arise] from what is not self-made?”; yat closes the relative clause phalam asvamayebhyo yat, “that fruit which is from things not made of themselves”, and tat pratyayamayaṃ katham asks of it how it is made of the causes. ↩

  12. gam is both “go” and “understand”, and gamyate “is understood” is a commentator’s idiom; Kalupahana (1986) renders the third gamyate “present moving is not known” and Garfield (1995) “movement cannot be conceived”, with the Tibetan. The one verb “is traversed” is kept for all three, with the verse’s three identical na gamyate and Candrakīrti’s argument, that no third thing besides the gone and the not gone is being traversed. ↩

  13. The DSBC’s vigamanaṃ is read as a bahuvrīhi, “without motion”, not as “departure”; Poussin’s edition reads hy agamanaṃ, “for [a being gone] without motion”, to the same sense. ↩

  14. Kalupahana (1986) makes the last pāda an objection, “[however,] the present moving, indeed, means being moved”, and Garfield (1995) “but having motion follows from being a mover”, from the Tibetan; hi is “for”, and the pāda is the ground of the consequence; the adversative is their supplement. ↩

  15. tāvat on the first limb is “first of all”, as Kalupahana (1986) has it in 2.1 (“in the first instance”); his “as much as a mover does not move, a non-mover too does not move” here and in 2.15, and Garfield’s (1995) “inasmuch as” here and “just as” in 2.15, make the first denial a reason for, or a comparison with, the second, where the two are coordinate denials. ↩

  16. gantur gamanam icchataḥ is a genitive participle agreeing with tasya: the consequence falls on him who maintains (iṣ, “wish, maintain”) the goer’s motion. Kalupahana (1986) coordinates it with the position, “and who looks for the movement of a mover”, and Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, makes it a reason, “because a mover moves”. ↩

  17. Poussin’s edition reads cocyate, “is called”, and in 2.22–23 yāyocyate, as Kalupahana (1986) translates, “is spoken of as a mover”; the DSBC’s cājyate, yayājyate (añj, “is made manifest”), which the Tibetan also reflects, is kept, and the sense, the going by which one is shown to be a goer, is the same. ↩

  18. The DSBC reads prāg asti gamanārambhād gamyamānaṃ na vā gatam, where Poussin’s edition has na pūrvaṃ gamanārambhād, “not before the beginning of motion is there a being gone, nor a gone”, as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate; the DSBC’s na vā is read as denying both, “neither … nor”, to the same sense. ↩

  19. gateḥ samā is “the same as going”, sama taking its standard in the genitive, and the subject is the pair saṃpravṛttiś ca nivṛttiś ca, the commencing and the ceasing of gamanam, motion: the refutation of going (2.3–6) applies to its beginning (2.12–14) and its ending (2.15–17), as Candrakīrti explains it. Kalupahana (1986) keeps motion as a third subject, “movement, commencement and cessation (of movement) are all comparable to motion”, and Garfield (1995) “motion and coming to rest and starting to move are similar”. ↩

  20. The DSBC prints tayoḥ siddhiṃ; read siddhiḥ, the subject of vidyate, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  21. Kalupahana (1986) makes the last pāda a question, “who or what is it that moves?”, and Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “what and where is the thing that moves?”; kaścit and kiṃcit are indefinites and hi is “for”: the pāda states the ground, that someone goes some stretch (the gantavyam of 2.25), so that there is no goer before a going. ↩

  22. The DSBC prints nopapadyate; read the dual nopapadyete, with its subject gatī dve, “two goings”, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  23. Poussin’s edition reads the neuter sadasadbhūtaṃ, with gamanam, which Kalupahana (1986) translates, “a movement, both existent and non-existent”; the DSBC’s nominative sadasadbhūtaḥ, the goer who is both real and unreal, the third of the goers of 2.24–25, is kept, as Candrakīrti reads it, and Garfield (1995) likewise makes it the mover, “neither an entity nor a non-entity”. ↩

  24. The DSBC prints draṣṭavyādini; read draṣṭavyādīni, the neuter plural “what is to be seen and so on”, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  25. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) read yad … tat as the relative pronoun, “how can that which does not see itself see others?”; the page reads the conjunctions, yad “since” with tat “then”; both are regular, and the sense is the same. ↩

  26. Poussin’s edition reads upagamyatām, “let it be admitted”, as Kalupahana (1986) translates (“one should admit that a seer is explained …”); the DSBC’s avagamyatām, “let it be understood”, is kept, and Garfield (1995), from the Tibetan, also has “is understood”. ↩

  27. Poussin’s edition and the Tibetan have a verse after this one, pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putrasaṃbhavaḥ …, “as the birth of a son is said to depend on mother and father, so the arising of vijñāna is said to depend on the eye and form”, Kalupahana’s (1986) and Garfield’s (1995) 3.7, so that their 3.8 and 3.9 are 3.7 and 3.8 here; the DSBC does not have it, and its numbering is kept. ↩

  28. iti closes the statement that the four do not exist, and the second half asks what then follows (bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham); Kalupahana (1986) makes the first half a hypothesis, “if it is the view that the four factors … do not exist”. The four are vijñāna, sparśa, vedanā and tṛṣṇā, the links of pratītyasamutpāda before upādāna, as Candrakīrti says; Garfield’s (1995) “the other four faculties of knowledge” and “all the aggregates, etc.” follow the Tibetan, not the Sanskrit. ↩

  29. upādāna here is the link of pratītyasamutpāda that follows tṛṣṇā, the grasping that takes up a new birth, Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept. ↩

  30. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) take darśanenaiva with jānīyāt, “should be known in the same way as seeing”; it is taken here with vyākhyātam, “explained … by seeing itself”, as 3.5’s vyākhyāto darśanenaiva has it; either is possible, and the sense is the same. ↩

  31. āhetukam: hetu is here the cause in general, the kāraṇa of 4.1–4.6, and Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) write “cause” for both; the glossary’s “primary cause”, which sets hetu apart from pratyaya in chapter 1, is kept. ↩

  32. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) render arthaḥ “effect”; the word is “thing, object”, as the Tibetan also has it, and the effect, kārya, enters only in 4.3. ↩

  33. The DSBC prints satveva; read saty eva, “when form does exist”, the counterpart of the second half’s 'saty eva, as Poussin’s edition and Candrakīrti’s text have it. ↩

  34. Garfield (1995) renders “think about form, but do not construct theories about form”, Tsongkhapa’s gloss; the Sanskrit and the Tibetan forbid every conception about form, and Candrakīrti: rūpālambanān na kāṃścit parikalpayitum arhati, “one may not conceive any [conceptions] that have form as their object”. Kalupahana (1986), “one should not discriminatively think of anything confined to material form”, detaches kāṃścit as a separate object; rūpagatān kāṃścin … vikalpān are three accusatives in agreement, “any conceptions about form”. ↩

  35. Kalupahana (1986) renders sadṛśam “identical with the cause”, the Sāṃkhya thesis of the effect’s identity with its cause; the word is “like, similar”, as Garfield (1995) has it, and Candrakīrti glosses the pair as similarity, kāryakāraṇayoḥ sādṛśyam eva nāsti. ↩

  36. Kalupahana (1986) renders “all existents such as feeling, thought, perception and dispositions”, making the four the whole; sarveṣām eva bhāvānām extends the procedure beyond the four named (the Tibetan: “and all existents too”), and Candrakīrti: yathaiva hy ekasya dharmasya śūnyatā … tathaiva sarvadharmāṇām api, “as the emptiness of one dharma, so of all dharmas”. ↩

  37. śūnyatayā goes with kṛte, not with vadet: the objection is the one made by means of emptiness, and the rebuttal is the opponent’s, as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) construe it with the Tibetan; Candrakīrti: śūnyatayā kāraṇabhūtayā … sasvabhāvavāde pratiṣiddhe, yadi paraḥ parihāraṃ brūyāt, “when the doctrine of intrinsic nature has been refuted with emptiness as the ground, if the opponent should state a rebuttal”. ↩

  38. As in 4.8, śūnyatayā goes with kṛte: the explanation is the one made by means of emptiness and the criticism the objector’s; Candrakīrti: vyākhyānakāle 'pi yaḥ … upālambhaṃ kuryāt, tasyāpi tac codyam … pūrvavat sādhyasamaṃ veditavyam, “whoever, at the time of the explanation too, should raise a criticism, that objection of theirs likewise is to be known, as before, as equal to what is to be proved”. ↩

  39. The DSBC prints prasajyet; read prasajyeta, “it would follow”, as Poussin’s edition and Candrakīrti’s text have it: the pāda alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta is eight syllables where alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyet would be seven. ↩

  40. Kalupahana (1986) renders “nor does it proceed from something other than those with or without characteristic”, giving the ablative to pravartate; it goes with anyatra, “elsewhere than”, a third locus, as Garfield (1995) has it, and Candrakīrti answers the objection that the characteristic might apply elsewhere than to the two (salakṣaṇālakṣaṇābhyām anyatra pravartiṣyata iti) with asadbhāvāt, there being no such third thing. ↩

  41. kasyābhāvo bhaviṣyati asks “of what will there be non-existence?”, abhāva being here the non-existence of something, Kalupahana (1986) “whose non-existence”, Garfield (1995) “of what will there be nonexistence?”; the glossary’s noun “non-existent” is kept. ↩

  42. Kalupahana (1986) renders “who could comprehend the distinct things: existent and non-existent as well as existence and non-existence?”, making bhāvābhāvavidharmā an object; it is nominative singular, agreeing with kaḥ, and describes the knower, as Garfield (1995) has it; Candrakīrti: na ca bhāvābhāvavisadṛśadharmā kaścit tṛtīyaḥ padārtho 'sti, yo 'nayor avagamakaḥ, “nor is there any third thing, of a nature unlike the existent and the non-existent, that would be the knower of the two”. ↩

  43. Garfield (1995) has “not without character” for nāpi lakṣaṇam; the Sanskrit and the Tibetan alike say “nor a characteristic”, the four limbs being existent, non-existent, characterised and characteristic. ↩

  44. Kalupahana (1986) makes space a fifth item negated, “neither space nor the other five elements similar to space”; ākāśam is the subject of the four negations and ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye 'pare a statement, as Garfield (1995) has it; Candrakīrti: yathā cākāśam, evam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye pare, “and as space, so the five other components are the same as space”. ↩

  45. Garfield (1995) has “Fools and reificationists” for alpabuddhayaḥ, “those of little intelligence” (so the Tibetan), and no rendering of śivam, “auspicious”; “reificationists” is Tsongkhapa’s gloss. ↩

  46. Garfield (1995) renders “whether or not desire or the desirous one exist, the analysis would be the same”, folding rakte 'pi into the alternative; it is a locative of reference, “for the impassioned too”, the procedure applied to passion in 6.1–6.2 being applied to the impassioned in turn, as Kalupahana (1986) and the Tibetan read it; Candrakīrti: eṣa eva rāgānupapattikramo 'nantarokto rakte 'pi tulyaḥ, “this very procedure of passion’s impossibility, just stated, holds equally for the impassioned too”. ↩

  47. Kalupahana (1986) renders na tenaiva hi tat saha “that which is associated does not arise together”; the words say that a thing is not together with its very self, as Garfield (1995) and the Tibetan have it, and Candrakīrti: na hi rāgasvātmā rāgād avyatirikto rāgeṇa saheti vyapadiśyate, “for passion’s own self, not distinct from passion, is not called ‘together with passion’”. ↩

  48. The DSBC prints pṛthakpṛthagbhāgaḥ, “a portion [of each]”; read pṛthakpṛthagbhāvaḥ, “a separate existence of each”, the word of 6.7 and 6.9 (pṛthakpṛthagbhāvo, pṛthagbhāva), which Poussin’s edition, the Tibetan and Candrakīrti read (kim anayoḥ siddhaḥ pṛthakpṛthagbhāvaḥ? kiṃ rāganirapekṣo raktaḥ siddho yatas tayoḥ sahabhāvaḥ syāt). Poussin’s edition also reads yatas for the DSBC’s tatas, “from which” for “and hence”, as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate it; the sense is the same and the DSBC is kept. ↩

  49. Garfield (1995) renders the second half “since they are established as simultaneous, do you also assert that they are different?”; sahabhāvaprasiddhyartham is purpose, “for the sake of establishing coexistence” (so the Tibetan), as Kalupahana (1986) has it, and Candrakīrti draws out the circle: nanv evaṃ sati itaretarāśrayāyāṃ siddhau sthitāyāṃ kasyedānīṃ siddhau satyāṃ kasya siddhir astu, “but then, the establishment resting on each other, which is to be established first, for the other to be established?”. ↩

  50. Garfield (1995) makes sahabhāvo na sidhyati a condition, “if one is asserting simultaneity”; it is a statement, “coexistence is not established”, in the Sanskrit and the Tibetan alike, as Kalupahana (1986) has it. ↩

  51. saha and asaha are, in Candrakīrti’s gloss, establishment in coexistence and in sequence: rāgaraktayor na paurvāparyeṇa siddhiḥ nāpi sahabhāvena, “passion and the impassioned are established neither one after the other nor in coexistence”; Kalupahana (1986) “with or without the lustful one”, Garfield (1995) “as simultaneous or not simultaneous”. ↩

  52. Kalupahana (1986) renders the second half “how can there be characteristics of the conditioned?” and Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “How could the characteristics of the produced exist?”, making the characteristic the subject; the Sanskrit has two nominatives, utpādaḥ and saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam, predicated of each other, and asks how an unconstructed arising can be a characteristic of the saṃskṛta. ↩

  53. Kalupahana (1986) takes the genitive utpādasthitibhaṅgānām with anyat, “a characteristic of the conditioned other than arising, duration, and destruction”, a fourth characteristic; it is possessive, a further characteristic of the three themselves, since te na saṃskṛtāḥ (masculine plural) says that the three would then not be saṃskṛta, and 7.4 answers with the arising of arising. Garfield (1995) reads as the page. ↩

  54. The DSBC prints mulotpādasya; read mūlotpādasya, as in 7.5 and in Poussin’s edition. ↩

  55. Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, has the arising of arising “give rise to the basic arising” and “the arising of the basic arising give rise to arising”; in the Sanskrit the first half has no verb of producing, the arising of arising being the arising of the root arising alone, and in the second maulo utpādaḥ is the nominative and utpādotpādam the accusative: the root arising generates the arising of arising, as Kalupahana (1986) has it. ↩

  56. Kalupahana (1986) renders the first half “If arising of arising is the primary arising”, dropping the genitive mūlotpādasya; the arising of arising is the arising of the root arising, not identical with it, and the question of the second half turns on the two being distinct. Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, has the arising of arising “give rise to the basic arising”, as in his 7.4. ↩

  57. Kalupahana (1986) reads kāmam as “if it may so desire” and the second half as a consequence, “so that it, being not yet born, will be able to produce that”; kāmam is the adverb “granted, readily”, conceding the first half, and yadi … śaknuyāt is the condition on which it is conceded. Garfield (1995) makes what is arising the object, “It will give rise to that which is arising”; ayam utpadyamānaḥ is the nominative subject and imam the object. ↩

  58. The DSBC prints casau; read cāsau, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  59. The DSBC prints the accusative dīpaṃ, which would make the lamp the object of prakāśayate, “what illuminates the lamp?”; Poussin’s edition reads the nominative dīpaḥ, and the lamp is read as the subject, “what does the lamp illuminate?”, which the argument of 7.10–7.12 requires and which Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) also translate. ↩

  60. Kalupahana (1986) takes pratītyotpattim as the compound “dependent arising” (“spoken of as dependent arising”) and utpattau as “from within arising”; pratītya is the gerund and the accusative utpattim its object (a predicate of ucyate would stand in the nominative), “arising in dependence on origination”, which 7.16 takes up with pratītya yad yad bhavati, and the locative utpattau is the goal of kramate, “proceed to”. Garfield (1995) reads as the page. ↩

  61. Kalupahana (1986) renders śāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ “inherently peaceful” and Garfield (1995) “essentially peaceful”, taking the suffix -taḥ as “by nature”; it can equally mean “as regards”, and the page reads “at peace in respect of svabhāva”, at peace as to intrinsic nature, that is, without one, which is the chapter’s argument against arising by intrinsic nature. Both readings are possible. ↩

  62. tasmin bhāva utpadyate 'sati resolves either as the locative bhāve, in the absolute tasmin … bhāve … asati, “when that existent does not exist, what arises?”, which the page reads and Garfield (1995) has (“But if it were nonexistent, what could arise?”), or as the nominative bhāvaḥ, “when that does not exist, what existent arises?”, which Kalupahana (1986) renders “how can an existent arise?”; both are possible. ↩

  63. Kalupahana (1986) renders “If arising were to produce this present arising”, taking ayam with utpadyamānam; ayam is masculine nominative and goes with utpādaḥ, “this arising”, the neuter utpadyamānam being its object, as Garfield (1995) has it. ↩

  64. Kalupahana (1986) renders “If this arising were to produce another”; anyaḥ … utpādaḥ is the nominative and enam the accusative: the other arising produces this one, as Garfield (1995) has it. ↩

  65. Poussin’s edition reads the indicative sarvam utpadyate tathā, “everything arises in that way”, which Garfield (1995) follows (“all things could arise in this way”); the DSBC’s imperative utpadyatāṃ is kept. Kalupahana (1986), “then it will produce everything in this manner”, makes the intransitive verb transitive on either reading. ↩

  66. Kalupahana (1986) renders anirudhyamānaḥ “non-arising”, a slip for “not ceasing”, as he has it in 7.23, where the line recurs. ↩

  67. Poussin’s edition has the first two clauses in the other order, na sthitabhāvas tiṣṭhaty asthitabhāvo na tiṣṭhati, which Kalupahana (1986) follows (“An existent that has endured is not stationary, nor is an existent that has not endured”); the DSBC’s order is kept. ↩

  68. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) read the locative jarāmaraṇadharmeṣu sarvabhāveṣu as absolute, “When all existents are always of the nature of decay and death” and “Inasmuch as the nature of all things is aging and death”; the page reads it as partitive with katame bhāvāḥ, “among all existents … which existents”. Both are possible and the point is the same. ↩

  69. The DSBC prints nirūddhaṃ twice; read niruddhaṃ, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  70. Kalupahana (1986) takes kim as the question particle, “Is it the unborn that ceases?”; it is the pronoun, “what, unborn, ceases?”, on the pattern of 7.22 ko 'nutpannaś ca tiṣṭhati, where kaḥ can only be the pronoun, and as Garfield (1995) has it. ↩

  71. The DSBC prints ananyāvasthayāvasthā, “by a state that is not other”; read anyayāvasthayāvasthā, “nor does a state, being another, cease by another state”, as Poussin’s edition has it and as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate: the second half denies cessation by another state as the first denies it by the very same one. ↩

  72. Poussin’s edition reads tadaiva, “just then”, answering yadaiva, which Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate (“then”); the DSBC’s tadaivaṃ, “then, in this way”, is kept. ↩

  73. Kalupahana (1986) renders īhate impersonally, “Neither is it intended that a really non-existent agent performs a really non-existent action”; the nominative kārakaḥ … asadbhūtaḥ is its subject and īh is “aim at, attempt”: the unreal agent does not attempt the unreal action. Garfield (1995) has “perform”, with the Tibetan. ↩

  74. The DSBC prints kāraṇaṃ in the second half as in the first; Poussin’s edition reads karaṇaṃ, the instrument, which completes the triad activity, agent, instrument, and the word is rendered so (kāraṇa itself has the sense “instrument, means”), the cause having just been denied. Kalupahana (1986) renders it “performance of action”, the other sense of karaṇa; Garfield (1995) “action”, with the Tibetan. ↩

  75. dharma here is merit and adharma demerit, the pair that bears a fruit and, in 8.6, makes a path to release and heaven possible, Kalupahana (1986) “good and bad”; Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, renders dharmādharmau “Entities and nonentities”. The glossary’s senses, phenomenon and teaching, do not apply, and the word is glossed “merit” here. ↩

  76. The DSBC prints dharmādharmo; read the dual dharmādharmau, the subject of the dual vidyete, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  77. Kalupahana (1986) renders na san nāsac ca as one object, “an action that exists and does not exist”, and Garfield (1995) has “an action that is unreal or both real and unreal”, the pattern of his 8.9–8.10; the two negatives give two objects, neither a real nor an unreal karman, which with 8.9–8.10 completes the nine pairings of the three agents with the three actions. ↩

  78. upādāna here is what is taken up, with its taker, the pair that chapter 9 examines, Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”, Garfield (1995) “appropriation”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept. ↩

  79. Garfield (1995) makes the first half a ground, “Since sight and hearing, etc., and feeling, etc., exist”, and supplies “he who has and uses them”, the Tibetan’s gloss of the possessor; the Sanskrit has only the relative clause bhavanti yasya, “whose they are” (Candrakīrti: yasya upādātuḥ, “of which taker of fuel”), which Kalupahana (1986) keeps, “For whomsoever there exists seeing, hearing, etc.”; nothing in yasya is causal. ↩

  80. The DSBC’s chapter heading prints upadātrupādānaparīkṣā; read upādātṛ-, “the taker of fuel”, the one who takes up seeing, hearing, feeling and the rest as his upādāna (Candrakīrti, of the opponent’s view: sa darśanādikam upādānam upādatte), the word rendered “fuel” after chapter 10’s simile. Poussin’s edition names the chapter pūrvaparīkṣā, Kalupahana (1986) “Examination of the Prior Entity”; the DSBC’s title is kept. ↩

  81. The DSBC prints kiṃcit kiṃcid vinā kutaḥ; read kiṃcit kaṃcid vinā, “whence something without someone?”, the counterpart of kiṃcid vinā kaścit in the first half, as Poussin’s edition reads it, as Candrakīrti glosses it (kenacic cātmanā kiṃcid upādānam … abhivyajyate, “and by some self some fuel is made manifest”) and as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate it. ↩

  82. Kalupahana (1986) renders darśanādīnām anyena … anyadā “by things different from seeing, etc., on different occasions”; anya “other than” takes the ablative, and the genitive is partitive, “by another one of seeing and the rest at another time”, the opponent’s rejoinder that 9.7 answers with ekaikasmāt: Candrakīrti introduces it with kiṃ tarhi ekaikasmāt pūrvo vidyate, “rather, he is found prior to each one”, and explains that when he is made manifest as seer by seeing he is not then designated by hearing and the rest. Garfield (1995) “Through seeing, etc., by another one, that other one becomes disclosed” is the same construal. ↩

  83. Garfield (1995) renders “that from which these are arisen: there is no existent there”, the Tibetan’s word for the elements also meaning “arising”; the Sanskrit has eṣa, “this one”, the self, as the subject and teṣu … bhūteṣu, “in those elements”, as the place (Candrakīrti: yebhyo mahābhūtebhyo darśanādikam utpadyate, teṣv api … eṣa na yujyate, “in those great elements too from which seeing and the rest arise, this one is not fitting”), as Kalupahana (1986) reads; bhūta is the four material elements, not the dhātu (component) of chapter 5. ↩

  84. Garfield (1995) renders “For whomever … there is nothing, for such a one … conceptions will cease”, the Tibetan’s dative subject and future verb; in the Sanskrit the relative yaḥ … na vidyate has the self as the subject of “is not found”, tatra is “with regard to him” (Candrakīrti: tasya … astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā kaḥ parikalpayet prājñaḥ, “what wise person would conceive existence or non-existence of him?”) and nivṛttāḥ is a past participle, “have ceased”, as Kalupahana (1986) reads. ↩

  85. karman here is the grammatical object, the thing burnt, the pair kartṛ–karman being agent and object: Candrakīrti glosses tasya dagdhā kartā agniḥ, “the fire is its burner, the agent”, and compares pot and potter, cutter and what is cut, and 10.2’s akarmakaḥ is the grammarians’ “without an object”. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) render “agent and action”, the glossary’s other sense of karman (action), which is why the gloss here reads “(object)”. ↩

  86. punarārambha- is read as the compound, “beginning again”, the re-kindling of a fire that is always alight; Kalupahana (1986) takes punar as the particle, “Furthermore, its commencement will be rendered meaningless”, and Garfield (1995) omits it. Candrakīrti repeats punarārambhavaiyarthyaṃ ca syāt as one of the fire’s three consequences and glosses the pointless undertaking as its fuelling and fanning up to keep it from going out (upādānasaṃdhukṣaṇādikaṃ vyartham eva syāt), which favours the compound; the particle reading, “furthermore, beginning is pointless”, is equally grammatical. He attaches evaṃ ca sati, “and, this being so”, to akarmakaḥ alone, as Kalupahana and Garfield do. ↩

  87. Kalupahana (1986) makes the fire the subject, “would imply the meaninglessness of its commencement”, and Garfield (1995) makes nityadīptaḥ a condition, “If it were eternally in flames”, with the Tibetan; prasajyate is intransitive, “it follows”, and nityadīptaḥ (nominative, as nityapradīpta eva syāt in 10.2) and -vaiyarthyam are the two things that follow, as Candrakīrti spells them out (nityapradīpta eva bhavet … vyartham eva syāt). ↩

  88. Poussin’s edition reads tatraitasmāt, “herein, from this”, whence Kalupahana (1986) “Herein, if it is assumed … and, therefore”; the DSBC’s tatraitat syāt, “if here this should be so”, is kept. The opponent’s rejoinder (iti cet) either way, as Candrakīrti takes it (yadi manyase, “if you think”). ↩

  89. Kalupahana (1986) makes the fuel the subject and the verbs passive, “[Fuel] that is different is not reached; the unreached is not ignited”, and adds a simile, “like one that has its own mark”; Garfield (1995) has “they” and “connected”. anyaḥ is masculine, the fire (indhana is neuter), prāpsyate “will reach”, dhakṣyati “will burn”, anirvāṇaḥ “not gone out”, and there is no “like” in the Sanskrit: Candrakīrti, so 'nyatvād … indhanaṃ na prāpnuyāt … anirvāṇaś ca svaliṅgavān eva sthāsyati, pradīpta ity arthaḥ, “being other, it would not reach the firewood … and not gone out it will remain bearing its own mark, that is, ablaze”. ↩

  90. Kalupahana (1986) renders “which of them is pre-accomplished so that fire could be contingent upon fuel?”, taking indhanam as the object of apekṣya; indhanam beside the nominative agniḥ is the second thing established, as Candrakīrti puts the question, kim indhanaṃ yad apekṣyāgniḥ syāt, uta agnir yam apekṣyendhanaṃ syāt, “is it the firewood, depending on which there would be fire, or the fire, depending on which there would be firewood?”; Garfield’s (1995) two questions are the Tibetan’s. ↩

  91. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) render “Fire is not dependent upon fuel; fire is not independent of fuel”, turning the absolutive into a predicate; the Sanskrit negates the fire, apekṣyendhanam agnir na, “there is no fire depending on the firewood”, the absolutive qualifying the noun, so that the verse denies a fire of either kind. ↩

  92. Garfield (1995) renders “fire and the rest are just like the moved, the not-moved, and the goer”, with the Tibetan; the Sanskrit has atrendhane śeṣam uktam, “here, as to the firewood, the rest has been stated”, by chapter 2’s analysis with the words changed, as Candrakīrti writes it out, dagdhaṃ na dahyate tāvad adagdhaṃ naiva dahyate, “the burnt is not being burnt, nor is the unburnt being burnt”, and as Kalupahana (1986) reads. ↩

  93. Garfield (1995) renders nāgnir anyatra cendhanāt “Fire does not arise from anything different from fuel”; the Sanskrit has no verb of arising, and anyatra … indhanāt, “elsewhere than the firewood”, is the second of the five positions, otherness (Candrakīrti: anyatvasya pratiṣedhāt, “by the denial of otherness”), origin having been denied in 10.13; Kalupahana (1986) “Apart from fuel there is no fire”. ↩

  94. upādāna here is what the self takes up, the five collections: Candrakīrti, upādīyate ity upādānaṃ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ, “the upādāna is what is taken up, the five upādānaskandhas”, and he who is designated on the basis of them is the upādātṛ, the self; Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”, Garfield (1995) “the aggregates”. The glossary’s “fuel”, from this chapter’s simile, is kept, and indhana is “firewood” to keep the two apart. ↩

  95. Kalupahana (1986) attaches sārdhaṃ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ to the means, “through the examples of fire and fuel, together with the examples of pot, cloth”; the instrument is agnīndhanābhyām alone, and the pot and the cloth are further objects of the same fivefold analysis, each against its cause, its parts, its characteristic and its qualities, as Candrakīrti says (sa nānayor eva, kiṃ tarhi sārdhaṃ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ, “it is not of these two alone, but together with pot, cloth and the rest”) and as Garfield (1995) reads. ↩

  96. satattvam … pṛthak pṛthak: Candrakīrti glosses satattvam as apṛthaktvam, ananyatvam, ekatvam, “non-separateness, non-otherness, oneness”, and pṛthak pṛthak as the declaring of otherness, so that the verse rejects both the sameness and the difference of the self and existents that the chapter has examined; so Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “the self is the same as or different from the entities”. Kalupahana (1986) takes satattva in its dictionary sense, “having reality”: “the substantiality of the self as well as of discrete existents”. ↩

  97. Poussin’s edition names the chapter pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣā, Kalupahana (1986) “Examination of the Prior and Posterior Extremities”; the DSBC’s saṃsāraparīkṣā is kept. ↩

  98. Kalupahana (1986) renders amṛtaḥ “an immortal” and Garfield (1995) “a deathless one”; the word is both (MW “immortal”; a-mṛta, “not dead”), and Candrakīrti takes it of one who has not died elsewhere, in a former life, anyatrāmṛtasya ihotpādo nāsti, “there is no arising here of one who has not died elsewhere”, the counterpart of 11.4’s jarāmaraṇam ajātasya, “ageing and death of one unborn”. ↩

  99. Poussin’s edition reads na jarāmaraṇenaiva jātiś ca saha yujyate, “nor is jāti fitting together with jarāmaraṇa”, whence Kalupahana (1986) “decay-death as concomitant of birth”; the DSBC’s two nominatives, jarāmaraṇaṃ caiva jātiś ca, say the same and are kept. ↩

  100. Garfield (1995) renders “Why are you led to posit”, the Tibetan’s second person, and Kalupahana (1986) “why be obsessed by”; prapañcayanti is third plural, “they”, those who hold the sequences (Candrakīrti reads it of the fools, avastuka eva bālānāṃ prapañcaḥ, “the fools’ proliferation has no real object”, or, with kim as “not at all”, of the liberated ones, who do not), and it is the verb of the glossary’s prapañca (proliferation): to spread out, elaborate, falsely imagine (Edgerton, of the same verb at 22.15). ↩

  101. Kalupahana (1986) renders santy arthā ye ca kecana “or whatever fruits there are”; artha is “thing”, Candrakīrti’s padārthāḥ, knowledge and the known, proof and the proved, part and whole, quality and its bearer, the list that 11.8 resumes as “all existents”. ↩

  102. The DSBC prints bhāvanāṃ; read bhāvānāṃ, “of all existents”, the genitive plural with sarveṣām, as Poussin’s edition has it; its koṭī for koṭiḥ in the same line is a by-form of the word (MW) and stands. ↩

  103. tac ca kāryaṃ na yujyate: kārya is read as the gerundive, “to be made”, with Candrakīrti’s gloss tad duḥkham iṣyamāṇaṃ kāryaṃ kartavyaṃ na yujyate and Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “It is not the kind of thing to be produced”; Kalupahana (1986) reads the noun, “[Suffering as] such an effect is indeed not appropriate”, as 11.7 uses kārya for the effect. Both are grammatical and make the same point, that suffering produced in any of the four ways is not fitting. ↩

  104. Kalupahana (1986) renders “If from these those that are different were to come to be”, taking the ablatives as origin and supplying “come to be”; anya with the ablative is “other than” (Candrakīrti: anye syuḥ, “would be other”, of the collections of the birth and of the death). In the last clause both he and Garfield (1995) swap the demonstratives, “these are caused by those”; the Sanskrit has parair ebhir amī kṛtāḥ, “those made by these others”, as Candrakīrti paraphrases it, etaiḥ parabhūtaiḥ skandhair amī parabhūtāḥ kṛtāḥ. ↩

  105. Kalupahana (1986) splits the verse into a statement, “that own person can exist without suffering”, and a question; the Sanskrit is one question, duḥkhaṃ punar vinā svapudgalaḥ sa katamaḥ, “which is that own person apart from suffering?”, and “can exist” is supplied; Garfield (1995) reads as the page does. ↩

  106. Garfield (1995) asks about the giver, “who is that person — when suffering is given by another”; the Sanskrit’s yasmai pradīyate … sa duḥkhena vinā kutaḥ asks about the recipient, “he to whom it is given — whence is he apart from suffering?”, the giver being 12.6’s question: Candrakīrti closes 12.5 with pratigrāhaka eva nāsti, “there is no recipient at all”, and opens 12.6 with yaś ca dadāti, asāv api nāsti, “and the one who gives, he too does not exist”; Kalupahana (1986) “the latter” as the page. ↩

  107. The DSBC prints this verse in square brackets, opened before it and closed before 12.7; Poussin’s edition has it without brackets, Candrakīrti comments on it, and Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate it, so it is translated like the rest. ↩

  108. The DSBC prints yad kuryāt, unsandhied; read yat kuryāt, as Poussin’s edition has it. Its svayaṃ kṛtasya with a space, at the start of the verse, is the compound it writes svayaṃkṛtam at the end. ↩

  109. Garfield (1995) renders “Whoever caused the suffering of another must have caused his own suffering”, with the Tibetan; the Sanskrit’s paro … duḥkhaṃ yat kuryāt has the other as the agent of “would make”, and tat tasya syāt svayaṃkṛtam “that would be self-made for him” (Candrakīrti: manuṣyapudgalasya svayaṃkṛtam eva tad bhavati, “for the human person it is simply self-made”), as Kalupahana (1986) reads. ↩

  110. Kalupahana (1986) renders “So long as suffering is not self-caused, it is indeed not caused by oneself” and “If the other were not to do it by himself”; tāvat here is “first, to begin with” (“so long as” wants yāvat), tenaiva tat kṛtam is “that is made by that very [suffering]”, the referent being suffering itself, which cannot act on itself (Candrakīrti: svātmani vṛttivirodhāt, “because of the contradiction of operating on oneself”), and paro nātmakṛtaḥ is a bahuvrīhi of the other, “the other is not made by itself” (Candrakīrti: sa eva tāvan nātmanā kṛtaḥ), as Garfield (1995) reads. ↩

  111. Kalupahana (1986) renders “If suffering were to be caused by both, it would be caused by each individually”, reversing condition and consequence; yadi closes the second clause, syād ekaikakṛtaṃ yadi, so “it would be made by both, if it could be made by each one”, which 12.2–12.8 has refuted, as Candrakīrti has it, yadi hi ekaikena duḥkhasya karaṇaṃ syāt, syāt tadānīm ubhābhyāṃ kṛtaṃ duḥkham, and as Garfield (1995) reads. ↩

  112. Kalupahana (1986) renders bāhyānām … bhāvānām “other existents”; bāhya is “external, outside”, the things outside the person, Candrakīrti bāhyā api bījāṅkuraghaṭapaṭādayo bhāvāḥ, “external existents too, seed, sprout, pot, cloth and the rest”, as Garfield (1995) reads. ↩

  113. saṃskāras here are the constructed things, all of which are of deceptive quality, Kalupahana (1986) “dispositions”, Garfield (1995) “compounded phenomena”; the glossary’s “mental constructions” is kept. ↩

  114. Kalupahana (1986) renders the second half “All things that are of deceptive nature involve dispositions”, reversing subject and predicate (his note: not all dharmas delude, only the saṃskāras); in sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṃskārāḥ the saṃskāras are the subject and moṣadharmāṇaḥ the predicate, as the syllogism requires (what is of deceptive quality is false; all saṃskāras are of deceptive quality; therefore they are false) and as Garfield (1995) reads it. ↩

  115. Kalupahana (1986) reads tu as “too” and the compound in apposition, “That too, namely, that which illuminates emptiness, has been spoken of by the Blessed One”; Garfield (1995) “What deceives?” and “has said about this that emptiness is completely true”, a paraphrase of the Tibetan. tu, “but”, marks the reply to the objection, muṣyate is passive, “what is deceived (literally robbed, √muṣ, the root of moṣa) there?”, and śūnyatāparidīpakam is the predicate of etat, “spoken … as illuminating śūnyatā”. ↩

  116. The DSBC reads kasyātha, a question, “or else, of what other than milk will there be the state of curd?”; Poussin’s edition reads kasyacid, whence Kalupahana (1986) “Butter-ness would then be something other than milk”. The DSBC is kept; Garfield’s (1995) “Or curd would have come to be an entity different from milk” shows that the Tibetan had atha too. ↩

  117. Poussin’s edition reads syāc chūnyam iti kiṃcana, whence Kalupahana (1986) “there would then be something called empty”; the DSBC’s śūnyam api, “something empty too”, is kept, the point, that the empty is relative to the not empty, being the same either way. ↩

  118. Garfield (1995) renders tān asādhyān babhāṣire “That one will accomplish nothing”, reading the Tibetan’s passive actively; asādhya is the gerundive, “not to be mastered, incurable” (Monier-Williams), agreeing with tān, the persons, as Kalupahana (1986) “incorrigible” has it, and the Kāśyapaparivarta that Candrakīrti quotes here says of one for whom śūnyatā is itself a view tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi, “him I call incurable”, with its simile of the medicine that purges the disease and then stays in the body. ↩

  119. Garfield (1995) attaches “in this threefold way” to the whole verse; evam carries the triad of 14.1 over to passion, and traidhena opens the second half for the remaining kleśas and āyatanas, as Kalupahana (1986) “should be seen in the triadic mode” has it; the sense is the same. ↩

  120. The DSBC prints na vidhate; read na vidyate, “is not found”, as Poussin’s edition prints it and 14.4 repeats it: the cadence of the pāda wants its sixth syllable, vid, heavy. ↩

  121. Garfield (1995) reads sārdham as a time, “When one thing and another are simultaneous, it is also not tenable that there is difference”, the Tibetan lhan cig taken temporally; sārdham, “together with, jointly with” (Monier-Williams), states the relation of the one thing to the other, as Kalupahana (1986) “jointly with another” has it. ↩

  122. The DSBC prints pratītyānyān; read pratītyānyan, anyat before nānyad, the neuter singular of the verse’s other anyad and of tad anyat in the second half. ↩

  123. Kalupahana (1986) renders the second half “Because something depends upon something, a different thing is not appropriate”, reading tasmāt as “therefore” and losing the correlation; yat … yat … tasmāt tat are correlatives, that (tat) which depends on something is not other than that (tasmāt) on which it depends, as Garfield (1995) reads it. ↩

  124. bhavet has no predicate: Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) supply “exist”, “it would exist even without that other thing”; the page supplies the otherness just stated, “it would be so even apart from the other”, the absurd consequence that the second half’s nāsti then denies. ↩

  125. kathaṃ … nāma is also the idiom “how indeed, how, pray” (Monier-Williams), Kalupahana (1986) “how could there be a self-nature that is made?”, Garfield (1995) “How could it be appropriate for fabricated essence to come to be?”; nāma is read as “called”, as the Tibetan zhes bya ba, “so-called”, appears to read it, and the point, that a made svabhāva is a contradiction, is the same either way. ↩

  126. Kalupahana (1986) makes akṛtrimaḥ an attribute, “an unmade self-nature is also non-contingent upon another”; hi … ca co-ordinate two predicates, “svabhāva is not artificial and is independent of another”, which the question of the first half needs asserted, as Garfield (1995) reads it. ↩

  127. In svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate the first parabhāvasya is read by its parts, parasya bhāvasya, “of another existent”, since the definition would otherwise define parabhāva by itself: so Kalupahana (1986) “self-nature of other-nature is called other-nature”, and Garfield (1995) “the essence of difference in entities is what is called the entity of difference”; the Tibetan gzhan gyi dngos po'i rang bzhin, “the nature of another entity”, reads it by its parts. ↩

  128. Poussin’s edition reads svabhāve parabhāve vā sati, whence Kalupahana (1986) “only when there is self-nature or other-nature”; the DSBC’s ca, “and”, is kept, and Garfield’s (1995) “essences and entities” has the Tibetan’s “and”. ↩

  129. The DSBC’s vā … vā pairs the verse’s two questions, “either … or”; Poussin’s edition reads ca … ca, “and … and”, and Kalupahana (1986) renders neither. ↩

  130. The DSBC prints nāśrīyet vicakṣaṇaḥ, a syllable short and without the sandhi; read nāśrīyeta, as Poussin’s edition prints it, the optative of ā-√śri, “rely on, resort to”, Kalupahana (1986) “should not rely upon”; Garfield’s (1995) “Does not say ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’” paraphrases the Tibetan, whose brten is “rely” too. ↩

  131. saṃskāras in this chapter are the constructed things that transmigrate, whose nirvāṇa is examined (16.4) and that are bound or released (16.5), Kalupahana (1986) “dispositions”, Garfield (1995) “compounded phenomena”; the glossary’s “mental constructions” is kept. ↩

  132. upādāna in this chapter is what is taken up in a birth, the skandhas left for the next (16.3), and the clinging that binds (16.6, 16.9), Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) “grasping”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept. ↩

  133. Kalupahana (1986) renders vibhavaḥ “other-becoming” (his note explains it as “come to be non-existent”) and kiṃ saṃsariṣyati “Wherein does he transmigrate?”; vibhava is Edgerton’s bahuvrīhi “free from existence”, not the “passing away” of chapter 21, as Garfield (1995) “nonexistent” reads it, and kiṃ saṃsariṣyati, “what will transmigrate?”, answers 16.2’s kaḥ saṃsariṣyati, “who will transmigrate?” (an adverbial kim, “why will it transmigrate?”, is also possible). ↩

  134. The DSBC prints saṃsarriṣyati; read saṃsariṣyati, as in 16.2 and as Poussin’s edition prints it. ↩

  135. Kalupahana (1986) renders “If it is assumed that bondage exists prior to the binding of that which is to be bound, that does not exist”, folding badhnīyād bandhanaṃ kāmam into “if it is assumed” and taking bandhyāt pūrvam of the binding; Garfield (1995) “If prior to binding there is a bound one, there would be bondage”, the Tibetan putting the bound one first. bandhyāt is the ablative of the gerundive, “before the one to be bound”, bandhanam is the subject of bhavet, and badhnīyād … kāmam is the consequence granted for the argument, “bondage would bind, granted”. ↩

  136. The DSBC prints bhavet yadi, without the sandhi; read bhaved yadi, as Poussin’s edition prints it. ↩

  137. upādānamahāgrahaḥ is read as a genitive compound, “the great grasping of upādāna”; it may equally be a karmadhāraya, “the great grasp that is upādāna”, the grasp at nirvāṇa being itself the upādāna that binds (16.6); Kalupahana (1986) “a gigantic grasping” and Garfield (1995) “a great grasping” leave upādāna unrendered. ↩

  138. Garfield (1995) renders “When you can’t bring about nirvāṇa, nor the purification of cyclic existence, what is cyclic existence, and what is the nirvāṇa you examine?”, a paraphrase of the Tibetan; samāropa, “superimposition”, and apakarṣaṇa, “removal”, are the two acts that na … na denies, yatra … tatra is “where … there” and vikalpyate “is imagined”, as Kalupahana (1986) “neither the attribution of freedom nor the elimination of the life-process … being discriminated” reads it. ↩

  139. Kalupahana (1986), “this is the friendly way”, attaches maitram to dharmaḥ; it is neuter and agrees with cetaḥ, the mind of goodwill, not with the masculine dharmaḥ, and Garfield (1995), “with a compassionate mind”, keeps it with the mind. ↩

  140. Kalupahana (1986) renders aviratayaḥ and viratayaḥ “associated with delight” and “with non-delight”, as if from rati; virati is abstention (Monier-Williams avirati “incontinence”), and the two classes are the non-intimation of non-restraint and that of restraint. ↩

  141. dharma here is a thing, one of the seven listed, and at 17.20 the teaching, the glossary’s senses; “righteousness”, the gloss of 17.1, is the sense there and at 17.11 only, the good as against adharma. ↩

  142. The DSBC divides tiṣṭhatyā pākakālāccet; read tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet, ā with the ablative pākakālāt, “until the time of ripening”. ↩

  143. Kalupahana (1986), “Therefore, whatever thought-series there is, that proceeds from a thought”, takes tasmāt as the adverb; it stands between yaḥ and the ablative cetasaḥ it agrees with, “from that mind”, the mind of 17.1, answering 17.7’s bījāt. ↩

  144. Garfield (1995), “the method of realizing the Dharma”, reads dharmasya as the teaching, which the Tibetan chos allows; a dharma whose means are the ten white paths of action and whose fruit is the five qualities of desire is the righteousness of 17.1, merit, Kalupahana (1986) “good”. ↩

  145. Kalupahana (1986) “which is appropriate” and Garfield (1995) “what is tenable here” read yujyate, “is fitting”, the verb of 17.24; the DSBC and Poussin’s edition both have yojyate, the causative passive “is applied”, the conception that is to be put to the problem. ↩

  146. Kalupahana (1986), “Like an imperishable promissory note, so is debt as well as action”, makes avipraṇāśa an adjective of the note; avipraṇāśaḥ is masculine nominative against the neuter pattram, a noun, the non-perishing of 17.15–19, and yathā … tathā … iva pairs it with the document and karman with the debt. Garfield (1995) runs the two similes together, from the Tibetan. ↩

  147. dhātu here is the realm, as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate it, the fourfold division being by the realms of desire, form and formlessness and the undefiled; the glossary’s “component” is kept. ↩

  148. Garfield (1995), “if action were destroyed through transformation”, makes the transference destroy the action, with the Tibetan; saṃkrameṇa vā is a second instrument of praheyaḥ syāt, a second way the non-perishing might be abandoned, and the destruction of karman comes only among the faults that follow. ↩

  149. The DSBC prints pratisaṃghau; read pratisaṃdhau, “at rebirth”, as Poussin’s edition has it and Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate (“at the moment of birth”). ↩

  150. Kalupahana (1986) “only one would arise” and Garfield (1995) “only one will arise” leave the subject open, as if one of the karmans arose; saḥ is the non-perishing of 17.14–16 and ekaḥ its predicate: one non-perishing arises at rebirth for all the karmans of the same realm, the genitives depending on it. ↩

  151. dṛṣṭe dharme is the idiom for the present life (Edgerton dṛṣṭadharma, Pali diṭṭhadhamma), Kalupahana (1986) “in the present life”, Garfield (1995) “in this visible world”; not the dharma of 17.1. ↩

  152. Garfield (1995), “each comprising action and the unexpired separately, will remain while ripening”, has the Tibetan; karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ is the distributive genitive, one non-perishing for each karman, and vipakve 'pi the locative absolute with api, “even when ripened”, as Kalupahana (1986) “stays so even when matured”. ↩

  153. Garfield (1995) makes the fruit the subject, “That fruit, if extinction or death occurs, ceases”; saḥ is masculine, the non-perishing, phala neuter, and the fruit sits inside the ablative phalavyatikramāt, as Kalupahana (1986) construes it. ↩

  154. anāsravaṃ sāsravaṃ is “without āsravas” and “with āsravas”, Kalupahana (1986) “without influxes” and “with influxes”, Garfield (1995) “the stainless and the stained”; “defiled” keeps the glossary’s “defilement” for āsrava (Pali āsava), the rendering that the kleśa (defilement) of 17.26 shares: two words under one English word. ↩

  155. Kalupahana (1986) predicates, “Emptiness, however, is not annihilation; life-process is also not eternal”; ca … na ca coordinates, and the nominatives stand in apposition to dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ, the three things taught: emptiness and yet no annihilation, the cycle and yet no eternity, and the non-perishing, as Garfield (1995) also lists them. ↩

  156. Garfield (1995) reverses reason and consequence, “Because action does not arise, it is seen to be without essence”, with the Tibetan; kasmāt … yatas tataḥ asks why karman does not arise and answers with niḥsvabhāvam, as Kalupahana (1986) has it. ↩

  157. Kalupahana (1986) reads two consequences, “An ignoble life as well as error would follow”; prasajyate is singular, doṣaḥ stands in apposition to abrahmacaryavāsaḥ, the one fault, and ca joins the second half to the first. ↩

  158. Kalupahana (1986) “the distinction between the performance of merit and evil” and Garfield (1995) “between virtue and evil”; puṇyapāpakṛtoḥ is the genitive dual of the agent noun -kṛt, the two doers, whose distinction 17.28–30 takes up. ↩

  159. Kalupahana (1986), “If action were to be determined, because it possesses self-nature”, makes svābhāvikam the reason for vyavasthitam; yasmāt … tasmāt gives karman being fixed as the reason for the re-ripening, and yadi svābhāvikam closes the verse as the condition, as Garfield (1995) construes it. ↩

  160. Kalupahana (1986) reads cedaṃ as ced idam, “If this action is associated with defilements”; cet before idam would give ced idam, so cedaṃ is ca idam, and the premise is stated, not supposed. ↩

  161. Kalupahana (1986), “it would have the characteristics of the non-aggregates”, analyses askandhalakṣaṇa as askandha-lakṣaṇa; the bahuvrīhi negates the possession: a self other than the skandhas would lack what they have, and so could not be apprehended, as Garfield (1995) also reads it. ↩

  162. Garfield (1995) has no object in the second half, “One who does not grasp onto ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ he does not perceive”; nirmamaṃ nirahaṃkāraṃ are accusative, the object of paśyati: whoever sees someone as free of “mine” and “I” does not see, as Kalupahana (1986) construes it. ↩

  163. upādāna here is the taking up that leads to birth, Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept. Garfield (1995) “the appropriator” has the Tibetan nye bar len pa, which serves the agent as well as the act, where upādānam is the neuter action noun, not the agent upādātṛ. ↩

  164. Kalupahana (1986) “defilements of action” takes karmakleśāḥ as a tatpuruṣa, and “belong to one who discriminates” takes vikalpataḥ as a person; the compound is the dvandva of 17.27, karma kleśāś ca, both of them exhausted, and vikalpataḥ the ablative in -taḥ like 17.14’s dhātutaḥ, as Garfield (1995) has it. ↩

  165. Kalupahana (1986), “they have not spoken of something as the self or as the non-self”, makes na govern deśitam; iti closes nātmā na cānātmā kaścit as the content taught, the third of three parallel predicates with api, as Garfield (1995) also reads it. ↩

  166. The DSBC prints nirvṛttam; read nivṛttam, “has turned back”, with Poussin’s edition, the parallel nivṛttaḥ in the same line and the Tibetan ldog pa; Kalupahana (1986) “has ceased”, Garfield (1995) “is nonexistent”. ↩

  167. Poussin’s edition reads the locative absolute nivṛtte cittagocare, “when the range of mind has turned back”, which Kalupahana (1986) follows, making the second clause the condition of the first; the DSBC’s nominative nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ, two coordinate statements, is kept, as Garfield (1995) also has them. ↩

  168. aparapratyaya is the fixed adjective “not dependent on others” (Edgerton; Pali aparappaccaya), the pratyaya being reliance on another’s word, Garfield (1995) “not dependent on another”, Kalupahana (1986) “independently realized” from Candrakīrti’s gloss; the glossary’s “cause” for pratyaya does not reach inside the compound. ↩

  169. Kalupahana (1986) takes artha as meaning, “without discriminations and a variety of meanings”; artha here is the thing, as in the benediction’s anekārtham anānārtham, “not one thing, not different things”, and 18.10 spells the pair out, “not that very thing” and “other than it”; Garfield (1995) “without distinctions”. ↩

  170. anekārtham anānārtham as in the benediction, summing up 18.10; Kalupahana (1986) “without a variety of meanings or one single meaning”, Garfield (1995) “without identity, without distinction”. ↩

  171. asaṃsargāt is “from non-association”, the solitary Buddhas’ knowledge arising without keeping company with, and being taught by, others (Monier-Williams saṃsarga “association, intercourse”), Kalupahana (1986) “without association”, Garfield (1995) “without a teacher”, from the Tibetan; the glossary’s “conjunction” for saṃsarga, chapter 14’s word for the seer and the seen, is not the sense here. ↩

  172. The DSBC prints pratyutpanna’nāgataśca in the second half; read pratyutpanno ’nāgataś ca, the nominative with its sandhi, as in 19.1–2 and Poussin’s edition. ↩

  173. parivartakau is “rotated in turn”, the remaining two times each taken in turn as the point of reference, and with every other accusative of the verse it is the object of lakṣayet, “one should mark”; Kalupahana (1986) “the remaining two periods” and Garfield (1995) “the other two divisions” take the word in Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit sense “section”. ↩

  174. The relative yo gṛhyeta qualifies the enduring time of the clause before it, “an enduring time is not found which might be grasped”, as the Tibetan has it, Garfield (1995) “nothing one could grasp as stationary time exists”, and agṛhītaś ca kālaḥ opens the final question; Kalupahana (1986) “even if the unobserved time were to be observed” makes agṛhīta the subject of gṛhyeta, which nothing in the Sanskrit supports. ↩

  175. The DSBC prints datvā; read dattvā, “having given”, as in 20.6 ādattvā and Poussin’s edition. ↩

  176. phalasya is the recipient, “to the fruit”, not “of the fruit”, as the commentators and the Tibetan’s dative 'bras bu la take it: what is given, yad dattam in the second half, is the part of the primary cause handed to the fruit, and 20.6 phalasyādattvā is read the same way. ↩

  177. vṛtaḥ, “enveloped” (vṛ, to cover, to surround), is a primary cause already joined with its fruit, the commentators’ saṃbaddha, Garfield (1995) “joined with its effect”, and the dilemma wants it so, since such a cause has nothing left to generate; Kalupahana (1986) “separated from the latter” takes vṛta as warded off. ↩

  178. katamat is neuter and qualifies phalam, “which fruit”, as Garfield (1995) has it; Kalupahana (1986) “what cause, even if it were not separated from the effect, will give rise to the effect” attaches it to the primary cause, and his “imperceptibly or perceptibly” paraphrases the absolutives adṛṣṭvā … dṛṣṭvā, whose agent is the primary cause. Poussin’s edition reads vā dṛṣṭvā vā for the DSBC’s na dṛṣṭvāpi, whence his “either … or”; the sense is the same. ↩

  179. Kalupahana (1986) reverses subject and predicate in the second half, “For, the non-ceased and non-arisen will also be the non-empty”, with a “for” the Sanskrit lacks; tad marks aśūnyam as the subject carried on from the first half, the non-empty fruit which will be unceased and unarisen, as Garfield (1995) reads it. ↩

  180. The DSBC prints ahetunāḥ, with a stray visarga; read ahetunā, the instrumental “to what is not a primary cause”, with Poussin’s edition. ↩

  181. kiṃ is neuter: it qualifies phalam, “what fruit”, or is the question particle, “will a primary cause generate a fruit that …?”, as Kalupahana (1986) takes it (“how is it that a cause will produce an effect …”), the same sense either way; Garfield (1995) “what could have caused it to arise” attaches it to the primary cause, which hetuḥ, masculine, does not allow. ↩

  182. Kalupahana (1986) prints anātmanā and renders “not produced by itself or by another”; the DSBC, Poussin’s edition and the Tibetan read ātmānam ātmanā, “itself by itself”, as Garfield (1995) has it. The one negation and verb, na … janayate, span the two halves through the relative yā … sā, so “[generate]” is supplied in the first half and repeated by the second. ↩

  183. vinaiva janma maraṇam is a nominal sentence, kept without a supplied verb: it states the consequence of the question before it, a death without a birth; Kalupahana (1986) carries the question over it (“how can there be dissolution without occurrence, death without birth …”) and Garfield (1995) makes it a second question (“How could there be death without birth?”). ↩

  184. Poussin’s edition reads caivaṃ, “and thus”, in the second half, whence Kalupahana (1986) “similarly”; the DSBC’s caiva, as in 21.5, is kept. ↩

  185. kṣaya is taken of the existent that decays, “what decays”, with Candrakīrti, Kalupahana (1986) “that which is waning” and Garfield (1995) “the disappeared”; the word’s abstract sense, “the coming to be of decay”, is also possible, but 21.8 makes an existent the locus of coming to be and passing away, and this verse asks of that existent whether it decays or not. ↩

  186. Garfield (1995) renders nityo ’nityo ’tha vā bhavet “must be both permanent and impermanent”; atha vā is “or”, the two horns of the dilemma, “either permanent or impermanent”, as Kalupahana (1986) has it. ↩

  187. The DSBC prints bhāvabhyupapannasya, a syllable short of the pāda’s eight; read bhāvam abhyupapannasya as in 21.14 and Poussin’s edition. ↩

  188. bhava in 21.15–21 is the ongoing process of existence, the continuum of appearance and disappearance of fruit and primary cause that the verse defines, Kalupahana (1986) “becoming”, Garfield (1995) “cyclic existence” (the Tibetan srid pa); the glossary’s “existence” is kept. ↩

  189. Kalupahana (1986) “with the repeated non-arising of that which ceases” attaches punar to the negation; apunarutpatti is “not arising again”, as apunarbhava is not being born again, and Garfield (1995) “from the nonarising of the destroyed” reads it so. ↩

  190. Garfield (1995) renders the second half “cyclic existence ceases completely, having been pacified”, without ucchedaḥ; the Sanskrit asserts annihilation at the time of nirvāṇa as the consequence pressed on the view of 21.15, Kalupahana (1986) “there will be annihilation”. ↩

  191. sārdham, “together”, opening the second half, is construed with yujyate of the first, as the Tibetan has it (lhan cig in the protasis): the one ceasing and the one being born are not fitting together, at one time; Kalupahana (1986) “would also be dying at the same time” and Garfield (1995) “whoever is dying with the aggregates” take it into the consequence, as the ca after it invites, and the point, death and birth at once in the same skandhas, is the same either way. ↩

  192. The DSBC prints skandhanupādāya; read skandhān upādāya, “taking up the skandhas”: buddhaḥ skandhānupādāya is eight syllables where skandhānanupādāya would be nine, and Poussin’s edition, Candrakīrti and the Tibetan all read upādāya, as Kalupahana (1986) “dependent upon the aggregates” and Garfield (1995) “depended on the aggregates” translate it. The Buddha’s dependence on the skandhas is the premise that 22.3 takes up (pratītya parabhāvaṃ yaḥ). ↩

  193. Garfield (1995) puts the negation on the verb, “Its selfhood is not appropriate”, with the Tibetan; in the Sanskrit it stands inside the predicate, sa nātmety upapadyate (Poussin’s edition so 'nātmety, the compound anātmā), “that he is not a self is possible”, as Kalupahana (1986) “would appropriately be without self”. ↩

  194. Kalupahana (1986) makes the gerund a cause, “if there were to be a tathāgata because of non-grasping on to the aggregates”; anupādāya is the circumstance of the hypothesis, a tathāgata who has not taken up the skandhas, as 22.6’s parallel anupādāya nāsti shows and as Garfield (1995) “without depending on the aggregates” has it. ↩

  195. Kalupahana (1986) renders yaś ca nāsty anupādāya “he who does not exist dependently”, dropping the privative, and upādāsyate as a passive, “be grasped”; the future middle is “he will take up”, its subject sa, the tathāgata, and its object the skandhas of the first line, as Garfield (1995) “come to be so [dependent]” also has it, though his first half, “no Tathāgata dependent upon the aggregates”, loses the an- in turn. ↩

  196. upādāna in this chapter is what is taken up in a birth, the skandhas, Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”, Garfield (1995) “appropriation” and “grasping”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept, as is “taker of fuel” for upādātṛ in 22.10. ↩

  197. Kalupahana (1986) cuts the first line into two items, “no sphere of non-grasping, nor … something as grasping”, and both he and Garfield (1995) make the second line a question, “How can there be a tathāgata?”; the Sanskrit is two statements, anupādattam upādānaṃ na bhavati kiṃcana, “there is no upādāna whatsoever that is not taken up”, and na cāsti nirupādānaḥ kathaṃcana tathāgataḥ, “in no way is there a tathāgata without upādāna”, kathaṃcana with na being “in any way”, not “how”. Garfield’s “There is no appropriator” answers to no word of the verse. ↩

  198. Kalupahana (1986) reads the dvandva tattvānyatvena as “in the form of a different identity”; it is “by way of identity or otherness”, the first two of the five ways of 22.1, as Garfield (1995) “neither identical nor different”. tattva here is identity, being that very thing, not the glossary’s tattva (reality). ↩

  199. Kalupahana (1986) takes grāho gṛhītaḥ as two things, “on the basis of grasping or the grasped”, and joins “exists or does not exist” to the firm grasp; Garfield (1995) has the grasp “exists” but nothing for nāstīti. In the Sanskrit astīti tathāgataḥ is the content of the grasp and nāstīti the content of vikalpayan: having grasped that the tathāgata exists, one would imagine “he does not exist” even of the extinguished one. Poussin’s edition has the same words in another order, yena grāho gṛhītas tu ghano 'stīti tathāgataḥ, with ghana an adjective of the grasp, which leaves the sense unchanged. ↩

  200. Kalupahana (1986) makes the distortions the subject of the second line, “Perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant arise depending upon these”; śubhāśubhaviparyāsān is accusative, the object of pratītya, and the subject of saṃbhavanti is passion, hatred and delusion, as Garfield (1995) has it. The Tibetan reads the compound as a dvandva of three, Garfield “the pleasant, the unpleasant, and errors” (so again in 23.2 and 23.6); the sense, passion from the distortion “pleasant” and hatred from “unpleasant” (23.12), and Candrakīrti want the tatpuruṣa “the distortions of the pleasant and the unpleasant”. ↩

  201. Kalupahana (1986) again makes the distortions the subject, “Whatever perversions of the pleasant and the unpleasant that occur dependently are not evident”; the accusative viparyāsān is the object of pratītya, and ye … te are the kleśas that depend on them, as Garfield (1995) “whatever depends on the pleasant and the unpleasant”. ↩

  202. The DSBC prints svabhāvāanna, with a doubled vowel; read svabhāvān na, as Poussin’s edition. ↩

  203. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) make the second line a statement, “in the absence of anyone, these defilements seem to exist without belonging to anyone”, “Without that possessor, The defilements are nobody’s”; āho is an interjection of asking and of doubt (Monier-Williams), and opens the alternative question the page keeps. ↩

  204. Garfield (1995) again reads the compound as the Tibetan’s dvandva, “The pleasant, the unpleasant, and the errors”; Kalupahana (1986) and the page read “the distortions of the pleasant and the unpleasant”, as at 23.1. ↩

  205. sparśa in the list of the six objects (rūpa, śabda, rasa, sparśa, gandha, dharma) is the tangible, the object of the sense of touch (Monier-Williams; the spraṣṭavya), as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) “touch”; the glossary’s “contact” is the sense of the link sparśa and is not read here or in 23.8. dharmas in the same list are the objects of the mind, the glossary’s “phenomena”, Kalupahana and Garfield “concepts”. ↩

  206. The DSBC’s doṣasya is the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit form of dveṣasya, “of hatred” (Edgerton), not “of fault”; Poussin’s edition prints dveṣasya. ↩

  207. Kalupahana (1986) takes kevalāḥ as “all these” (Monier-Williams “entire, whole”); “mere” is its other sense, which the illusory persons and reflections of 23.9 want, as Garfield (1995) “only”. ↩

  208. Kalupahana (1986) renders “in people who are fabrications of illusion”, with puruṣa as the head of the compound and kalpa “fabrication”; kalpa at the end of a compound is “resembling, like”, and teṣu are the six objects of 23.8, “in those which resemble illusory persons”, as Garfield (1995) “those that are like an illusory person”. ↩

  209. The DSBC prints śubha nāstyaśubhaṃ, the anusvāra lost; read śubhaṃ nāsty aśubhaṃ, as Poussin’s edition and the full form anapekṣyāśubhaṃ nāsti śubhaṃ of 23.11. ↩

  210. Where prajñapayemahi attaches is open: Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) give it the first clause, “We make known that the unpleasant does not exist without being contingent upon the pleasant”, the page yat pratītya śubham, “we would designate the pleasant depending on it”, and so in 23.11; both are grammatical, and the point, the mutual dependence of the pleasant and the unpleasant, is the same either way. The Tibetan has no clause for the pleasant’s dependence on the unpleasant and derives “the pleasant is not tenable” from the unpleasant’s dependence alone, which the Sanskrit does not say. ↩

  211. Kalupahana (1986) makes the first line a conditional with its own consequence, “if there were to be grasping on to the view … then there is perversion”, and the last words two nouns, “how can there be grasping or perversion?”; grāho viparyayaḥ is subject and predicate, “the grasp is a distortion”, as 23.14’s grāhaḥ … kiṃ na viparyayaḥ (which Kalupahana so renders) and as Garfield (1995) “How could that grasping be an error?”. ↩

  212. Garfield (1995) makes the content of the grasp “In emptiness there is nothing impermanent”, 23.13’s own nānityaṃ vidyate śūnye, with the Tibetan; the Sanskrit anityam ity api grāhaḥ śūnye is the grasp “impermanent” with regard to what is empty, the counterpart of “permanent” with regard to the impermanent, as Kalupahana (1986) “What is empty is impermanent”. ↩

  213. The DSBC encloses this verse in square brackets; Poussin’s edition prints it, Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) translate it, and it is translated like the rest. ↩

  214. Kalupahana (1986) takes bhūtāḥ as the participle, “defilements … have come to be on the basis of self-nature”; with abhūtāḥ and asadbhāvam in 23.25 the sense is Edgerton’s “real, true”, as Garfield (1995) “existed through his essence”. ↩

  215. sākṣikarma, “personal realisation”, is the fourth of the tasks on the four āryasatya, which Candrakīrti lists as the full understanding of duḥkha, the giving up of its origin, the development of the path and the personal realisation of cessation (duḥkhasatyaparijñānaṃ … samudayasya prahāṇaṃ … pratipado bhāvanā … nirodhasya sākṣikarma); the glossary’s “realisation” for āryasatya itself, Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) “noble truth”, is kept, so that “realisation” stands in this verse in two senses. ↩

  216. Poussin’s edition reads catvāry āryaphalāni, “the four noble fruits”, as Kalupahana (1986) translates; the DSBC’s catvāry api phalāni, “the four fruits too”, is kept, being the wording of 24.27 in the DSBC and in Poussin’s edition alike, and Garfield (1995) too has “the four fruits” without “noble”. ↩

  217. Garfield (1995) makes the eight persons a second consequence of the Saṃgha’s non-existence, “nor will the eight kinds of person”, in the Tibetan’s order; the Sanskrit’s na cet santi te 'ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ is the condition, “if those eight … do not exist”, as Kalupahana (1986) also has it. ↩

  218. The DSBC prints pratibāghase; read pratibādhase, “you reject”, the verb of 24.6, 24.17, 24.23 and 24.36, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  219. śūnyatāṃ goes with bruvāṇaḥ of 24.5, “speaking of śūnyatā”, as Candrakīrti states outright (śūnyatāṃ bruvāṇa ity anena saṃbandhaḥ) and as Kalupahana (1986), “speaking in this manner about emptiness”, and Garfield (1995), whose Tibetan carries the word into 24.5, take it: the opponent’s charge is that asserting emptiness destroys the fruit, merit and the conventions, which 24.36 turns back, not that emptiness is rejected; the verb pratibādhase, last in the Sanskrit, comes forward in English. ↩

  220. dharma here and in 24.33–24.35, paired with adharma, is merit and demerit, Candrakīrti’s dharmādharmau with their desired and undesired fruits (saha taddhetukena iṣṭāniṣṭaphalena), not the glossary’s teaching or phenomenon; Kalupahana (1986) “good and bad”, Garfield (1995) “right or wrong actions”. ↩

  221. Kalupahana (1986) attaches śūnyatāṃ śūnyatārthaṃ ca to vihanyase, “you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness”; the accusatives are objects of vetsi with prayojanam (a passive “tormented by” would want instrumentals), as Garfield (1995) also takes them, and Candrakīrti on 24.13 names the three things not understood, śūnyatāṃ śūnyatārthaṃ śūnyatāprayojanaṃ ca. ↩

  222. Poussin’s edition reads gambhīraṃ, with tattvam, “the profound tattva”, as Kalupahana (1986) translates and as Garfield’s (1995) “the Buddha’s profound truth” suggests of the Tibetan; the DSBC’s gambhīre, qualifying buddhaśāsane, “the profound instruction”, is kept, the sense barely changing. ↩

  223. The DSBC prints mandameghasam; read mandamedhasam, “one of dull intellect” (manda-medhas), as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  224. vidyā in the simile is the spell or magical science (duṣprasādhitā, “wrongly mastered”, is said of the sādhana of a spell), as Garfield (1995) “a spell incorrectly cast” has it with the Tibetan rig sngags, and as Candrakīrti’s illustration of the verse, the jewel, the spell and the herb (maṇi, mantra, auṣadha) that harm when wrongly used, bears out; Kalupahana (1986) “knowledge that is wrongly cultivated”. ↩

  225. Kalupahana (1986) renders adhilaya “obsession” and makes the sa of the second half that obsession, “that [obsession] is not appropriate in the context of the empty”; Edgerton’s dictionary cites this verse under adhilaya “objection, refutation”, Candrakīrti glosses it adhikṣepaṃ nirākaraṇaṃ pratikṣepam and continues of the doṣaprasaṅga, which is the sa (“it is not possible in the empty”), and Garfield (1995) too has “refutations”. ↩

  226. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) make the second half a simile, “like one who has mounted his horse”; the verse has no yathā or iva (aśvam evāsi vismṛtaḥ, “you have forgotten”), and the rider is Candrakīrti’s explanation of it (yathā hi kaścid … evam eva bhavān). ↩

  227. Kalupahana (1986) renders ahetupratyayān “non-causal conditions”; it is the bahuvrīhi, “without primary cause and cause”, as Garfield (1995) also has it and as Candrakīrti glosses, avidyamānahetupratyayān padārthān … nirhetukān. ↩

  228. Kalupahana (1986) renders karaṇam “performance of action”; it is the instrument, the kāraka beside the agent and the action, which Candrakīrti illustrates with the potter’s wheel (cakrādikasya karaṇasya) beside the potter and the act of making. ↩

  229. Kalupahana (1986) renders sā prajñaptir upādāya “that is dependent upon convention”, as if prajñapti were the object of upādāya; prajñaptiḥ is nominative, the predicate, “that is a prajñapti in dependence” (upādāya prajñaptiḥ), as Garfield (1995) “a dependent designation” has it and as Candrakīrti settles it: saiva śūnyatā upādāya prajñaptir iti vyavasthāpyate. ↩

  230. The DSBC prints kato; read kuto, “how” (or “whence”), as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  231. svabhāvaparyavasthānāt is the opponent’s holding to svabhāva, not its immutability: paryavasthāna is “obstinate resistance” and, in Buddhist Sanskrit, “possession, obsession” (Edgerton), and Candrakīrti glosses the compound of the opponent, svabhāvaṃ gṛhītvā pratyavatiṣṭhamānaḥ, grasping svabhāva and standing firm on it; Kalupahana (1986) “by adhering to a notion of self-nature”, Garfield (1995) “if an essence is posited”. ↩

  232. Kalupahana (1986) supplies “[i.e., the path]” and Garfield (1995) has “it cannot have an essence”, of the path; svābhāvyaṃ te na vidyate is general, and the path is Candrakīrti’s application of it (svabhāvatā āryamārgasya na syāt), which the general statement covers. ↩

  233. duḥkhanirodhatvāt, an ablative in -tvāt, gives the ground or motive, not the means: the path is what leads to the cessation, its end, as Candrakīrti has it, duḥkhasya nirodhaprāptyarthaṃ … bhāvanā mārgasyeṣyate; Garfield (1995) “to obtain the cessation of suffering” reads it so, Kalupahana (1986) “through the cessation of suffering” as the means. The object of prāpayiṣyati is unexpressed; “to attainment” supplies it. ↩

  234. tasya is of duḥkha, as Candrakīrti has it (aparijñātasvabhāvasya duḥkhasya … parijñānam); Garfield (1995) attaches it to the svabhāva, “through its essence”. ↩

  235. punaḥ here and in 24.28 is “later”: what is not understood by svabhāva cannot be understood afterwards, since svabhāva does not change (the second half), and Candrakīrti paraphrases tat paścāt parijñāyata iti kalpyate, tad ayuktam; Kalupahana (1986) “subsequently”, Garfield (1995) omits the word. ↩

  236. Kalupahana (1986) takes prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇe as a locative, “in relation to the activities of relinquishing, realizing”, with “this [explanation]” as the subject; it is the dual nominative, subject with bhāvanā and phalāni of the plural yujyante, as Garfield (1995) also has it and as Candrakīrti reads: te ete dve prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇe yā ca mārgasya bhāvanā, eṣāpi … na yujyante. ↩

  237. The Sanskrit Kalupahana (1986) prints reads svabhāvenādhigataṃ, lacking the an- of every edition, and he translates “a fruit that has already been realized through self-nature”; the DSBC, Poussin’s edition and the Tibetan (Garfield (1995) “already unrealized”) read anadhigataṃ, “unattained”, with Candrakīrti’s pūrvam anadhigatasvabhāvānāṃ paścād apy adhigamo nopapadyate, parallel to 24.26; punaḥ is “later” as there. ↩

  238. Kalupahana (1986) takes the genitive aśūnyasya as the agent, “what could the non-empty do?”, and renders the passive kriyate as active, “self-nature does not perform”; the genitive is the object and the verb is of making, as Candrakīrti reads them, kiṃ hi aśūnyasya kartavyam? na hi svabhāvasyāśūnyasya kāraṇam upapadyate vidyamānatvāt, nothing can be made of what is not empty, because it already exists; Garfield (1995) “what could one do”, “cannot be produced”. ↩

  239. nimitta here and in 24.35 is the occasion or ground of the fruit, “occasioned by” (so Kalupahana (1986)), not the glossary’s “sign”. ↩

  240. Garfield (1995) makes the second half a conditional, “if the fruit arose from right or wrong actions, according to you, it wouldn’t exist”; dharmādharmanimittaṃ ca phalaṃ tava na vidyate has no yadi, and Kalupahana (1986) and Candrakīrti (tadā dharmādharmajaṃ phalaṃ tava na saṃbhavati) read the plain statement. ↩

  241. The DSBC prints lokikān where 24.6 and Poussin’s edition have laukikān, “worldly”; Edgerton records lokika as a Buddhist Sanskrit spelling, so it may be genuine, and it is read as laukikān. ↩

  242. Poussin’s edition reads yat pratītyasamutpādaśūnyatāṃ pratibādhase, “in that you reject the śūnyatā of pratītyasamutpāda”, on which Candrakīrti comments (yacchabdaḥ kriyāviśeṣaṇam, the word yat qualifies the verb) and which Kalupahana (1986) renders “when you contradict”; the DSBC’s yaḥ, “you who reject”, is kept, the sense being the same. ↩

  243. The subject of yady aśūnyam is unexpressed: Kalupahana (1986) supplies “the non-empty [is evident]”, Garfield (1995) “(the world)” from 24.38; Candrakīrti supplies all this, yadi hi aśūnyaṃ sasvabhāvaṃ sarvam etat syāt, the idaṃ sarvam of 24.1 and 24.20, which “it” carries. ↩

  244. Kalupahana (1986) renders iṣyate “does one expect freedom” and Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “does one wish nirvāṇa to arise”, the root’s first sense; here and in 25.2 the verb has its sense in debate, “is held, admitted”, as in Candrakīrti’s introduction to the verse, kleśagaṇasya prahāṇāt sopadhiśeṣaṃ nirvāṇam iṣyate: the opponent asks of what the Mādhyamika can hold nirvāṇa to be the abandoning or the cessation. ↩

  245. anupādāya has no object in the Sanskrit; what is taken up is, in Candrakīrti’s gloss, the assemblage of a thing’s own causes (tad upādāya bhavet, svakāraṇasāmagrīm āśritya bhavet), so that Kalupahana (1986) renders the gerund “independent” and Garfield (1995) “nondependent”; “taking up”, the verb of the glossary’s upādāna “fuel”, is kept without an object, as in chapter 22. ↩

  246. Garfield (1995) carries the nirvāṇam that opens the third pāda into the second half, “Where nirvāṇa is not existent, it cannot be a nonexistent”; the verse has the shape of 25.6 and 25.8, whose third pāda opens with the nirvāṇam of the question in the same way, and Candrakīrti restates the first half as kim abhāvo bhaviṣyati nirvāṇam? abhāvo 'pi na bhaviṣyati, the second half being the general rule, as Kalupahana (1986) reads it. ↩

  247. Kalupahana (1986) makes two sentences of the verse, “Whatever is of the nature of coming and going that occurs contingently or dependently. Freedom is, therefore, indicated as being non-contingent and independent”, with “therefore” supplied and saḥ dropped; saḥ is the subject of upadiśyate, that same moving to and fro, when not depending and not taking up, being taught to be nirvāṇa, as Garfield (1995) reads and as Candrakīrti says: asya janmamaraṇaparaṃparāprabandhasya apratītya vā anupādāya vā apravṛttis tan nirvāṇam. ↩

  248. Garfield (1995) makes nirvāṇa the subject and ubhayam its object, “since it would depend on both of these”, the Tibetan’s turn; ubhayaṃ … tat is the pair itself, each of the two taking up (Candrakīrti: bhāvam upādāya abhāvaḥ, abhāvaṃ copādāya bhāvaḥ, iti kṛtvā ubhayam etad … upādāyaiva bhavati, na anupādāya), which Kalupahana (1986) renders “existence and non-existence are, indeed, dependent upon one another”. ↩

  249. Poussin’s edition reads the second half na tayor ekatrāstitvam ālokatamasor yathā, “there is no existence of those two in one place, as of light and darkness”, which Kalupahana (1986) translates, and Candrakīrti’s text has tayor ekatra nāstitvam; the DSBC’s tayor abhāvo hy ekatra prakāśatamasor iva is kept, the same point in other words. ↩

  250. Garfield (1995) “by whom is it expounded” asks for a knower, Kalupahana (1986) “by means of what is it made known as neither existence nor non-existence” for an instrument, with tad as nirvāṇa and iti marking what is made known; Candrakīrti asks both, whether such a nirvāṇa has anyone to apprehend it (kaścid evaṃvidhaḥ pratipattāsti) and whether it is grasped by vijñāna or by jñāna (kena … ajyate gṛhyate prakāśate vā), and “by what”, with “that” pointing at the quoted words, leaves both open. ↩

  251. The DSBC prints naivabhāvo naiva bhāva iti; read naivābhāvo naiva bhāva iti, “neither a non-existent nor an existent”, as the first half of the verse and 25.15 have it and as Poussin’s edition and Candrakīrti’s text read. ↩

  252. Poussin’s edition reads nohyate, “is not conceived” (√ūh), in this verse and in 25.18, as does Candrakīrti’s text, whose commentary glosses it na gṛhyate and sums up 25.18 with yathā nājyaṃ na cohyaṃ, naming both verbs; Kalupahana (1986) “it is not assumed” translates it. The DSBC’s nājyate, “is not made clear” (√añj, the verb of 25.16 in both editions), is kept; Garfield’s (1995) “is neither said to be” is the Tibetan, which stands nearer the DSBC’s verb. ↩

  253. Kalupahana (1986) takes antaram as “between” and kiṃcit susūkṣmam as the subject, “between them not even a subtle something is evident”, and Garfield (1995) gives both, “not even the slightest difference between them, or even the subtlest thing”; antara “difference” takes up 25.19’s viśeṣaṇa, Candrakīrti’s comment turns on saṃsārasya nirvāṇenāviśiṣṭatvāt, saṃsāra being undistinguished from nirvāṇa, and “between” would leave the genitive tayoḥ with nothing to govern it. ↩

  254. Garfield (1995), in the Tibetan’s order, folds the first two groups of views into one, “views that after cessation there is a limit, etc.”; Kalupahana (1986) attaches “after death” to all of them. Candrakīrti keeps three groups on three bases: the four views on the Tathāgata after cessation nirvāṇaparāmarśena pravṛttāḥ, the four on the finite world aparāntaṃ samāśritya, the four on the eternal world pūrvāntaṃ samāśritāḥ, as in 27.1–2. ↩

  255. Kalupahana (1986) reads kim as “why” and supplies the verb, “why [speculate on] the finite, the infinite …”, here and in 25.23; anantam, antavat and 25.23’s śāśvatam are neuter predicates of kim, what could be infinite when all dharmas are empty, as Garfield (1995) reads and as Candrakīrti puts it: caturdaśāpy etāni avyākṛtavastūni asati bhāvasvarūpe naiva yujyante. ↩

  256. Kalupahana (1986) makes the first half the object of deśitaḥ, “The Buddha did not teach the appeasement of all objects, the appeasement of obsession, and the auspicious as some thing to some one at some place”, with śivaḥ a third item; Candrakīrti reads the first half as nirvāṇa described (sarveṣāṃ prapañcānāṃ nimittānāṃ ya upaśamo 'pravṛttis tan nirvāṇam), the quieting itself auspicious because quiet by nature (sa eva copaśamaḥ prakṛtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivaḥ), and the second half as what follows when the Buddhas abide in it, no dharma, defiled or purified, taught to anyone anywhere, as Garfield (1995) also reads; the first half repeats the benediction’s prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam. ↩

  257. saṃskāra here is the second link, the actions that one covered by avidyā performs towards a new birth, in Candrakīrti’s words trividhān karmalakṣaṇān saṃskārān, wholesome, unwholesome and imperturbable, or of body, speech and mind (kuśalā akuśalā ānejyāś ca … kāyikā vācikā mānasāś ceti); Kalupahana (1986) “dispositions”, Garfield (1995) “the three kinds of actions which as dispositions impel one”; the glossary’s “mental constructions” is kept. ↩

  258. āgamya, the gerund of ā-gam, is in Buddhist Sanskrit a postposition, “owing to, because of, on account of” (Edgerton), as Pāḷi āgamma; Candrakīrti’s paraphrase of 26.5 uses the same idiom, sparśam āgamya, and restates it as sparśahetukā vedanā, feeling caused by contact. Kalupahana (1986) “depending upon” and Garfield (1995) “depending on” render it with the word of pratītya in 26.4; “owing to” keeps the two apart. ↩

  259. Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, “craving arises because of feeling”, which the first words of the verse have said already; vedanārtham is the purpose, feeling being what one craves for, as Kalupahana (1986) “feeling-directed” and Candrakīrti: vedanānimittam eva abhilāṣaṃ karoti … tasyāḥ punaḥ punaḥ saṃyogārthaṃ paritṛṣyate, one craves union again and again with a pleasant feeling. ↩

  260. upādāna here is the ninth link, the fourfold taking up, of sense pleasures, of views, of rules and observances and of a doctrine of self (Candrakīrti: kāmadṛṣṭiśīlavratātmavādopādānākhyaṃ caturvidhaṃ karmākṣepakāraṇam, “the fourfold cause that projects action”), Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) “grasping”; the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept, with “the taker of fuel” for 26.7’s upādātṛ. ↩

  261. Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan’s recasting, makes the taker come to be, “When there is grasping, the grasper comes into existence … being freed, he would not come into existence”; bhavaḥ, the tenth link, is the subject of pravartate and upādātuḥ its genitive, as Kalupahana (1986) reads, “becoming on the part of the grasper proceeds”, and Candrakīrti glosses: tasya upādātuḥ upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ upajāyate … tadānīṃ tasya na bhaved bhavaḥ. ↩

  262. Kalupahana (1986) reads the compound as “suffering relating to decay and death, etc.”; the formula of the links has duḥkha as an item of its own between parideva and daurmanasya, and Candrakīrti glosses the items one by one with duḥkha separate, pañcendriyāsātanipāto duḥkham, manoniṣṭanipāto daurmanasyam, their explanation being as in the sūtra (eṣāṃ ca yathāsūtram eva vyākhyānaṃ veditavyam). ↩

  263. Poussin’s edition and Candrakīrti’s text read saṃsāramūlān, an adjective of the saṃskāras, as Kalupahana (1986) translates, “dispositions that constitute the source of the life process”; the DSBC’s neuter saṃsāramūlaṃ is kept, in apposition. Garfield (1995), with the Tibetan, has “The root of cyclic existence is action. Therefore, the wise one does not act”, where the Sanskrit has avidvān saṃskaroti, “the one who does not know constructs”. ↩

  264. Poussin’s edition and Candrakīrti’s text read jñānenāsyaiva bhāvanāt, “from the development, through knowledge, of just this”, the dependent origination just set out (Candrakīrti: asyaiva pratītyasamutpādasya yathāvad aviparītabhāvanātaḥ avidyā prahīyate), which Kalupahana (1986) renders with a bracket of his own, “the practice of that [non-occurrence of dispositions] through wisdom”; Garfield’s (1995) “through meditation and wisdom” is the Tibetan. On the DSBC’s genitive jñānasya the asya goes with the knowledge, “of this very knowledge”, and that is kept. ↩

  265. Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) make the ‘eternal world’ views a second set beside ‘I was’, ‘I was not’ (Garfield “And the view that the world is permanent, etc.”, with the Tibetan; Kalupahana “views asserting an eternal world, etc. based upon [the perception]: ‘Did I exist or not exist in the past?’”, his supplement to Poussin’s first line, which Poussin reconstructed from the Tibetan as a question, dṛṣṭayo ’bhūvaṃ nābhūvaṃ kiṃ nv atīte ’dhvanī ti ca). The DSBC’s line, a statement, has no conjunction, and yās tāḥ śāśvatalokādyāḥ identifies the two: ‘I was’, ‘I was not’ are themselves the ‘eternal world’ views, as 27.3–8 and 27.15–18 treat them. ↩

  266. pūrvānta, “the past” (and aparānta in 27.2, “the future”), is Edgerton’s whole-word entry, Kalupahana (1986) “the prior end [of existence]”, Garfield (1995) “a prior limit”; the glossary’s “extreme” for anta is not applied inside the compound, whose “end” is the one that antavān lokaḥ, “the world is finite”, takes up in 27.21–28 and that antādyāḥ in 27.2, “‘finite’ and so on”, abbreviates. ↩

  267. The bhaviṣyāmi that opens the second line completes the question kim anyo ’nāgate ’dhvani, and iti ca closes it, so the views resting on the future are two, as 27.14 pairs them and as Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield (1995) read. ↩

  268. upādāna in this chapter is what is taken up in a birth, the aggregates, Kalupahana (1986) “grasping”, Garfield (1995) “appropriation” (“appropriator” here, with the Tibetan); the glossary’s “fuel”, from chapter 10’s simile, is kept, with “taker of fuel” for upādātṛ in 27.6 and 27.26. ↩

  269. Kalupahana (1986) renders upādānaṃ viśiṣyate “then grasping is identified”, as if “is specified”; the passive of vi-śiṣ is “is distinguished, differs”, the point being that the upādāna of one birth differs from that of another, so that a self freed from upādāna is then asked for, as Garfield (1995) has it (“the appropriator is different”). ↩

  270. Garfield (1995) has “How can one accept that future appropriating is the appropriator?”, the Tibetan’s rendering of the future tense as an adjective; bhaviṣyati is the verb, “how will the upādāna be the taker”, as Kalupahana (1986) reads it (“how can grasping be the grasper?”). ↩

  271. Kalupahana (1986) reads the second half as two statements, “A person who is without grasping can be observed. However, if he were to be different [from grasping], he could not be observed”, an empiricist reading he defends against Candrakīrti in his note; yadi governs the optative gṛhyeta, “if it were other, it would be apprehended without upādāna”, and the indicative na ca gṛhyate states the fact, as Garfield (1995) has it in substance. ↩

  272. Kalupahana (1986) renders “A self does not exist. Yet, it is not the case that a person who does not grasp does not exist”, moving anupādānaḥ to the second clause to make a positive non-grasper, on the ground of Kumārajīva’s Chinese, as his note says; anupādānaḥ stands beside ātmā nāsti as its predicate, “there is no self without upādāna”, and nāpi nāsti, “nor does it not exist”, has that self as its subject, as Garfield (1995) reads it (“There is no self without appropriation. But it is not true that it does not exist”). ↩

  273. Garfield (1995) has nothing for tathaiva ca sa saṃtiṣṭhet, “and that one would remain just so”, beyond “If this were so”; Kalupahana (1986) keeps the clause (“he would remain the same”). ↩

  274. The DSBC prints jāyet cāmṛtaḥ, a syllable short; read jāyeta, the optative, as Poussin’s edition has it (jāyeta vāmṛtaḥ, “or” for the DSBC’s “and”). ↩

  275. Kalupahana (1986) renders amṛtaḥ as a substantive, “an immortal would emerge”; with sa saṃtiṣṭhet, “that one would remain just so”, the absurdity is a birth without a death, “it would be born not having died”, as Garfield (1995) has it (“Without death, one would be born”). ↩

  276. Poussin’s edition reconstructs the verse from the Tibetan, as Kalupahana (1986) notes, reading ucchedaḥ karmaṇāṃ nāśas tathā ’nyena kṛtakarmaṇām anyena paribhogaḥ syād evam ādi prasajyate, with the same sense; Kalupahana’s “the fruit of action performed by one will be experienced by another” and Garfield’s (1995) “Different agents’ actions would be experienced by each other” render that text, and the DSBC’s kṛtam anyena karma ca pratisaṃvedayed anyaḥ, “karman done by one another would experience”, is kept. ↩

  277. Kalupahana (1986) renders “Yet, in that context, the error of assuming an emergent without prior existence does not follow”, attaching the negation to prasajyate, a reading that serves his point about the Sautrāntika abhūtvā bhāva; nāpi negates abhūtvā samudbhūtaḥ, “nor has it arisen without having been”, and hi gives the reason, “for here a fault follows”, the fault the second half then states, made or without a primary cause, as Garfield (1995) reads it. ↩

  278. The DSBC prints sa devaṃ sa manuṣyaḥ; read sa devaḥ, the nominative parallel to sa manuṣyaḥ, as Poussin’s edition has it. ↩

  279. The DSBC prints śāsvatam; read śāśvatam, as the second line spells it. ↩

  280. Kalupahana (1986) makes the second half a condition and its result, “If the divine being were to be non-arisen, then he would not be born and that would constitute the eternal”; it is a statement and its reason, hi: “and the god would be unarisen, for the eternal is not born”, as Garfield (1995) has it (“The god would be unborn. For any permanent thing is unborn”). ↩

  281. Kalupahana (1986) renders the first half “If it is thought that a human is the same as a divine being, then there would be the non-eternal”, a slip: Poussin’s text, as he prints it, has devād anyo manuṣyaś ced, “if the human is other than the god”, in both lines, as the DSBC does. ↩

  282. The DSBC prints manuṣyaśced saṃtatir, ced before s- where sandhi wants cet; Poussin’s edition, as Kalupahana (1986) prints it, has the same. ↩

  283. The DSBC prints aśāsvataṃ; read aśāśvataṃ, as Poussin’s edition and 27.18 have it. ↩

  284. Kalupahana (1986) renders the second half “then it is not possible to either assert the eternal or the non-eternal”, dropping kāmam and ity api and reading the half as the refutation; it has no verb, and says that, both being established (siddhe), granted (kāmam), ‘neither eternal nor non-eternal’ too (ity api) would be established, the fourth alternative standing or falling with the third, as Garfield (1995) reads it (“Then it could be established that it is neither permanent nor impermanent”). ↩

  285. Poussin’s edition reads saṃsāraḥ, “then saṃsāra would be beginningless”, followed by Kalupahana (1986), Garfield (1995) and the Tibetan, with no note of a reconstruction such as 27.1 and 27.11 carry; the DSBC’s śāśvataḥ, “that one would be beginningless and eternal”, is kept, since 27.20 takes it up (nāsti cec chāśvataḥ kaścit, “if there is no one eternal”); both readings are possible, and the manuscripts would decide. ↩

  286. The DSBC prints saṃtāano; read saṃtāno. ↩

  287. Poussin’s edition reads dīpārciṣām iva pravartate, “proceeds like the flames of a lamp”, with nāntānantavattvaṃ ca yujyate in the second half, whence Kalupahana (1986) “proceeds along”; the DSBC’s first half has no verb, and “is” is supplied, dīpārciṣām being a genitive parallel to skandhānām, “like that of the flames”. ↩

  288. The DSBC prints pratītyemālloko, the nasal of imān + lokaḥ (imāṃl loko) lost; Poussin’s edition prints imān loko. ↩

  289. As at 27.18, Kalupahana (1986) renders the second half “then it is not possible to assert either the finite or the infinite”; siddhe naivāntavat kāmaṃ naivānantavad ity api says that, that being established, granted, ‘neither finite nor infinite’ too would be established, as Garfield (1995) has it. ↩

  290. The DSBC prints the optative adeśayet; Poussin’s edition reads the imperfect adeśayat, “taught”, as Kalupahana (1986), Garfield (1995) and the Tibetan have it, and Candrakīrti glosses the verb as a past, so the page renders it so. ↩