Skip to content
buddhavacana

Five Collections (`pañcupādānakkhandhā`)

· 27 min read

five collections of fuel

The five collections of fuel (pañcupādānakkhandhā) break our sense of identity down into components, and show that the sum total of who we believe we are are nothing more than an impermanent and ever shifting collection of processed phenomena experienced through our senses. It is clearly a refinement of the dependent origination framework. The Buddha uses it to disprove prevailing Brahmanical and Jain ideas of an eternal self that can be “purified” in order to attain “enlightenment”.

The collections are not an “eternal self”

Section titled “The collections are not an “eternal self””

298.

  • “Rūpaṃ (form), Bhikkhave, is anattā (not-self; atta is the Brahmanical concept of an eternal self, not necessarily our identity as a “self”).
  • And indeed here, Bhikkhave, if form were attā (self), this form would not lead to ābādho (affliction), and form could be obtained: ‘May my form be thus, may my form not be thus.’
  • And because indeed, Bhikkhave, form is not-self, therefore form leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: ‘May my form be thus, may my form not be thus.’

299. Vedanā (feeling) is not-self …

300. Saññā (apperception) is not-self …

Saṅkhārā (mental constructions) are not-self …

301. Viññāṇaṃ (consciousness) is not-self …

The collections are impermanent

Section titled “The collections are impermanent”

302.

“Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is form permanent or impermanent?”

“Aniccaṃ (impermanent), Bhante.”

“Now, is that which is impermanent suffering or happiness?”

“Dukkhaṃ (suffering), Bhante.”

“Now, is it proper to regard that which is impermanent, suffering, and vipariṇāmadhammaṃ (subject to change), as: etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā (This is mine, this I am, this is my self)?”

“Of course not, Bhante.”

“Feeling …

  • apperception …
  • mental constructions …
  • consciousness …

303. “Therefore, Bhikkhave, whatever form there is:

  • past, future, or present,

  • internal or external,

  • coarse or fine,

  • inferior or superior,

  • far or near

  • — all form should be regarded yathābhūtaṃ (in reality), with sammappaññā (correct understanding), thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’

304. Whatever feeling …

305. Whatever apperception …

Whatever mental constructions …

306. Whatever consciousness …

Letting go of the collections is the key to liberation

Section titled “Letting go of the collections is the key to liberation”

307. “Thus seeing, Bhikkhave, the sutavā (learned) ariyasāvako (disciple of the liberated) nibbindati (gives up)

  • form,
  • feeling,
  • apperception,
  • mental constructions,
  • consciousness.

Giving up, he virajjati (becomes detached).
From detachment he vimuccati (becomes liberated).
In liberation there is the ñāṇaṃ (knowledge): ‘liberated’.
He pajānāti (knows clearly): ‘Birth (of suffering) is finished, the optimal life is lived, what had to be done is done, there is nothing further for this present state of existence.’”

308. This the Bhagavā said. The group of five bhikkhū, delighted, rejoiced in the Bhagavā’s words. And while this detailed exposition was being spoken, the cittāni (minds) of the group of five bhikkhū, anupādāya (not grasping), were liberated from the āsavā (defilements).

Diagrams

Section titled “Diagrams”
graph
R["`*Rūpa*
(form)`"]
V["`*Vedanā*
(feeling)`"]
S["`*Saññā*
(apperception)`"]
S2["`*Saṅkhārā*
(mental constructions)`"]
V2["`*Viññāṇa*
(consciousness)`"]
PFP["`*atītānāgatapaccuppanna*
(past, future, or present)`"]
IE["`*ajjhatta* (internal)
*bahiddha* (external)`"]
CF["`*oḷārika* (coarse)
*sukhuma* (fine)`"]
FN["`*dūra* (far)
*santika* (near)`"]
Y["`*yathābhūtaṃ*
(in reality)`"]
SP["`*sammappaññā*
(correct understanding)`"]
R & V & S & S2 & V2 --> PFP & IE & CF & FN --> Y & SP --> E1 & E2 & E3
E1["`*netaṃ mama*
(This is not mine)`"]
E2["`*nesohamasmi*
(This I am not)`"]
E3["`*na meso atta*
(This is not my self)`"]
graph
  A["`*ariyasāvaka*
  (disciple of the liberated)`"] --> P
  P["`*passanta*
  (seeing)`"] --> A0
  A0["`*sutavant*
  (learned)`"] --> A1
subgraph A1["nibbindati (give up)"]
    R["`*Rūpa*
    (form)`"]
    V["`*Vedanā*
    (feeling)`"]
    S["`*Saññā*
    (apperception)`"]
    S2["`*Saṅkhārā*
    (mental constructions)`"]
    V2["`*Viññāṇa*
    (consciousness)`"]
  end
A1 --> A2["`*virajjati*
(become detached)`"] -->
A3["`*vimuccati*
(become liberated)`"] -->
A4["`*ñāṇa*
(knowledge)`"] -->
A5["`*pajānāti*
(know clearly)`"] -->
A6["`*khīṇā jāti,
vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ,
kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ,
nāparaṃ itthattāya*
(Birth (of suffering) is finished,
the optimal life is lived,
what had to be done is done,
there is nothing further for this present state of existence.)`"]

References

Section titled “References”
Norman, K. R. (1997). A Philological Approach To Buddhism: The Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai Lectures 1994: Vol. V.
Wynne, A. (2010). The ātman and its negation - A conceptual and chronological analysis of early Buddhist thought. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 33(1–2), 103–171.

anattā (not-self)

Section titled “anattā (not-self)”

The teaching on anattā (not-self) is a detailed phenomenological deconstruction of the conventional notion of a permanent, independent self. By examining the five collections (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇa) as they appear in direct experience, their impermanent, conditioned, and uncontrollable nature is revealed. The conclusion that “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā” arises from this direct observation. This insight leads to giving up the components of experience previously identified with a “self”, followed by detachment, and ultimately, a liberation from the suffering fuelled by these transient phenomena. This liberation is an experiential state, a fundamental alteration in one’s relationship to one’s own conscious experience.

anattā can be a difficult word to translate. Many take it as meaning “no self” (including, apparently, Buddhaghosa). However, Norman (1997) in A Philological Approach To Buddhism writes:

When the Buddha stated that everything was anattā “not self”, we should expect that the view of attā “self” which he was denying was that held by other teachers at that time. We can, in fact, deduce, from what the Buddha rejected, the doctrine which the other teachers upheld. Once we know that the Buddha was using words in this way, then we are aided in our attempt to understand them and translate them.

The Buddha vigorously denied the brahmanical idea of the existence of the ātman, the idea that there is no difference between us and a world spirit, the standard advaitavāda “non-dual” doctrine, which is expressed in the Upaniṣads with the words tat tvam asi “You are that”. You are that. You are identical with that world spirit - the view that we all have a portion of that spirit in us and when everything which hides that identity is removed then we can be absorbed into ātman/brahman.

The Buddha, on the other hand, specifically condemned the view that the world and the self were the same thing, and that after death one might become permanent, lasting, eternal and not liable to change, and he rejected the idea that one could look at the various aspects of the world and say “that is mine, I am that, that is my self’, which is a clear echo of tat tvam asi, expressed from a different point of view. When the Buddha said: “rūpa ‘form’, etc., are not mine”, he was denying the view that there is no distinction between knower and known.

The Buddha’s rejection of the existence of the attā, i.e. his view that everything was “not self” (anattā), was based upon the brahmanical belief that the ātman was nitya “permanent” and sukha “happiness”. Hence the Buddha could refute this by pointing out that the world, which was supposed to be part of ātman, was in fact anicca “impermanent” and dukkha “misery” - his belief that the world was dukkha was, of course, the first noble truth.

The Buddha’s teaching about this is, however, not always understood. The word anattā is sometimes translated “having no soul”, and various things which are specified to be anattā are thought of as having no soul. We can see the need for better understanding of this vital concept of Buddhism when we survey the range of translations given for the phrase sabbe dhammā anattā which occurs in the Dhammapada and elsewhere: “All forms are unreal” (Max Mūller); “All the elements of being are non-self” (Radhakrishnan); “All things are not self” (Acharya Buddharakkhita); “All phenomena are nonsubstantial” (Kalupahana); “All things are ego-less” (Jayasekera); “All dhammas are without self”, says a very recent translation (Carter and Palihawadana).

Translations such as “without self” and “having no soul” cannot be correct, because the grammar and syntax show that anattā is not a possessive adjective, which it would need to be to have such a meaning. It is a descriptive compound, and if the correct translation for attā is “soul”, then the word would mean that these various things are “not soul”. This, however, cannot be correct, because the Buddha sometimes exhorted his followers to regard these things as parato, i.e. “as other”. We cannot, however, co-relate “as other” and “not soul”. It is clear that the only translation which it is possible to co-relate to “as other” is “not self”. We are not to regard these things as part of the self, and to clarify the point the Buddha asked his followers whether, when they saw wood being burned, they felt any pain. The answer was “No”, and the explanation given was that they did not feel any pain because the wood was not part of the self. It was other than the self. We might regard the Buddha’s refutation of the ātman/brahman idea as being somewhat empirical - as was Dr Johnson’s refutation of Bishop Berkeley’s theory of the non-existence of matter - but it was no less effective for all that.

Wynne (2010) in The ātman and its negation also does an extensive analysis of “no self” vs “not self” and concludes the explicit “No Self” interpretation developed later, as seen in texts like the Vajirā Sutta and the Abhidharma, when this subtle philosophy gave way to a “reductionistic realism” that analyses the person as a collection of essenceless components within an objectively real world, thus shifting the focus from a radical critique of conceptuality to the denial of a specific entity.

Backlinks