Kaccānagotta (`kaccānagottasutta`)

12S2/1.2.5 Kaccānagottasutta

This is an important sutta that repudiates the Sarvāstivādins’ belief that “everything exists” (past, present and future) and also Nagarjuna’s thesis that “nothing exists”. Here the Buddha (or, more likely, a disciple who is repudiating both extreme views that have become common amongst some Buddhists) postulates a “middle way” that says our perception of reality is based on the concept of dependent origination.

I have crafted a perhaps unconventional translation of this sutta to illustrate the above point succinctly.

Note that the Buddha’s use of lokasamudayaṃ and lokanirodhaṃ (the arising and ending of the world) is not referring to the creation and destruction of the physical universe (although it is tempting for modern readers to interpret it this way). He is referring to the instantiation and destruction of our perceived reality - based on our perceptual experience of phenomena. This is our own “personal” world, created in our minds.

The dvayanissito (dependent on a duality) that is referred to here is the debate whether there is an extrinsic reality corresponding to our perceived reality (atthitaṃ) or not. This has been an intriguing debate that has consumed Buddhist thinking for many centuries after the Buddha’s death.

The two “extremes” referred to by the Buddha could also be a reference to the “extremes” of Brahmanical thinking (the eternal self exists and can be purified through rituals) vs Jain thinking (the physical self is burdened by karma and needs to be shattered through asceticism).

88. [The Bhagavā] was staying at Sāvatthī.

Then āyasmā Kaccānagotta approached the Bhagavā; having approached and paid homage to the Bhagavā, he sat down at one side. Seated at one side, āyasmā Kaccānagotta said to the Bhagavā:

“‘Sammādiṭṭhi (right view), sammādiṭṭhi,’ it is said, Bhante. How far, Bhante, is there right view?”

89. “Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part dvayanissito (dependent on a duality) — atthitaṃ and natthitaṃ (whether reality exists or not).

When one sees with sammappaññā (right wisdom) lokasamudayaṃ (the arising of the world) yathābhūtaṃ (as it really is), the notion ‘the world does not exist’ does not occur.

When one sees with right wisdom lokanirodhaṃ (the ending of the world) as it really is, the notion that ‘the world exists’ does not occur.

Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part upayupādānābhinivesavinibandho (attached to engaging, grasping and clinging). But a person that does not enter upayupādānaṃ (approaching and clinging) cetaso (with intention), or adhiṭṭhānaṃ abhinivesānusayaṃ (the basis of attachment and inclination) - he does not grasp, he does not fixate on: ‘attā me’ (“This is my eternal self.”). When dukkha (suffering) arises, it arises; when suffering ceases, it ceases. He does not doubt, he is not perplexed. Herein, knowledge independent of others is found in him. To this extent, Kaccāna, there is right view.

90. “‘Sabbamatthi (everything exists, ie. there is an extrinsic reality beyond our perceptions),’ Kaccāna, is one extreme.

‘Sabbaṃ natthi (everything does not exist, ie. reality is an illusion),’ is the second extreme.

Without approaching either of these two extremes, Kaccāna, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle way [this is a restatement of paṭiccasamuppādo (dependent origination)]—

‘From avijjā (ignorance) arise saṅkhārā (mental constructions);

from mental constructions arises viññāṇaṃ (consciousness) …

and so on …

in this way there is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the utter fading away and cessation of ignorance, mental constructions cease; with the cessation of mental constructions, consciousness ceases … and so on … in this way there is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”