Buddhism and Scepticism

About Hamburg Buddhist Studies

• The series continues the University of Hamburg’s tradition of Buddhist studies.
• It uses a broad spectrum of academic approaches, covering both historical and contemporary issues.
• The series aims to make research accessible to both academic specialists and a wider audience.

About this Volume

• The book is a collection of papers from a 2017 conference at Hamburg University.
• It examines systematic doubt in Buddhist traditions from various perspectives, including comparative philosophy.
• The essays address whether Buddhism can be described as sceptical and explore possible links between Pyrrhonism and Buddhist scholasticism.

Contributors

• Vincent Eltschinger: Professor of Indian Buddhism, focusing on late Indian Buddhist philosophy.
• Georgios T. Halkias: Associate Professor of Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhism, researching the transmission of Buddhism.
• Oren Hanner: Research fellow focusing on Indian and Buddhist thought and ethics.
• Adrian Kuzminski: Independent scholar and author on Pyrrhonism and its connection to Buddhism.
• Ethan Mills: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, specializing in Indian scepticism.
• James Mark Shields: Professor of Comparative Humanities and Asian Thought, researching modern Buddhist thought and Japanese philosophy.
• Mark Siderits: Scholar in analytic Asian philosophy, focusing on classical Indian philosophy and analytic metaphysics.

Acknowledgements

• The book stems from a 2017 symposium at the University of Hamburg.
• Thanks are given to the sponsors: the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (MCAS), and the Asien-Afrika-Institut.
• Acknowledgements are also made to the symposium’s participants and the editorial team.

Introduction

• This collection of articles examines the role of philosophical scepticism in the formation and development of Buddhist thought.
• It uses three implementations of Western philosophical scepticism as a framework: scepticism as a way of life, as a practical problem, and as a theoretical problem.
• The contributions investigate scepticism in Buddhism from historical, philosophical, and comparative perspectives, often drawing parallels with Greek, Hellenistic, and modern Western philosophy.
• Mark Siderits argues that Buddhist philosophy is not usefully seen as sceptical, as its thinkers generally argue for a determinate view rather than a suspension of judgement.
• Vincent Eltschinger compares the epistemologist Dharmakīrti to Hellenistic schools, finding him closer to Stoic optimism about knowledge but using a form of probabilism for practical uncertainty, similar to the New Academy.
• Ethan Mills defends a reading of Nāgārjuna as a sceptic about philosophy, who first establishes the theory of emptiness and then uses it to undermine all philosophical views, including his own.
• Georgios Halkias and Adrian Kuzminski both argue for a historical link between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism, suggesting Pyrrho’s ideas were actively shaped by Indian thought.
• Oren Hanner shows how Vasubandhu addressed religious scepticism by directing doubt towards human understanding rather than scriptures, aiming to achieve certainty, not suspend judgement.
• James Mark Shields explores modern Buddhist movements (e.g., Secular Buddhism, Critical Buddhism) that explicitly integrate sceptical and critical principles into their vision of Buddhism.

Some Sceptical Doubts about “Buddhist Scepticism”

• The author is sceptical that Indian Buddhist philosophy contains much that can be usefully described as scepticism and argues that when Buddhist philosophers do use sceptical strategies, they encounter difficulties.
• Philosophical scepticism is defined as an epistemic stance of withholding judgement, distinguished into “radical scepticism” (denying knowledge is possible in a domain) and “Pyrrhonian” scepticism (withholding judgement on whether knowledge is possible).
• Yogācāra idealism, particularly Vasubandhu’s arguments, is contrasted with Berkeley’s. While Berkeley uses radical scepticism and semantic internalism, Vasubandhu employs metaphysical arguments (parsimony, problems with atomism) and is not a semantic internalist.
• Vasubandhu’s argument is vulnerable to a critique from semantic externalism (like Putnam’s “brains in a vat” argument), which shows that radical sceptical hypotheses can be self-refuting.
• The Buddha’s refusal to answer the “indeterminate questions” (avyākrta) is not evidence of scepticism but an early use of a “presupposition failure filter,” rejecting the questions as meaningless because they rely on a false presupposition (e.g., the existence of a “person”).
• Madhyamaka is often compared to Pyrrhonian scepticism due to parallels like aiming to end inquiry, facing charges of nihilism and self-refutation, and lacking a single “master argument.”
• Despite these parallels, the comparison fails because their aims differ: Pyrrhonism seeks tranquillity by acquiescing in appearances, while Madhyamaka seeks liberation from suffering by extirpating the delusional “I”-sense.
• Madhyamaka, unlike Pyrrhonism, is not indifferent to metaphysical realism; its doctrine of emptiness is a direct rejection of the idea that there is a way the world is independent of our concepts.
• Nāgārjuna’s critique of epistemology (pramānavāda) in the Vigrahavyāvartanī may illicitly presuppose epistemological internalism, while its opponents (like Nyāya) are externalists who can counter the charge of infinite regress.
• Ultimately, sceptical strategies lead to a standoff between the global anti-realism of Madhyamaka and the metaphysical realism of Buddhist Reductionism, as both can employ a theory of conventionally real epistemic instruments (pramānas).

Beyond Reasonable Doubt? A Note on Dharmakīrti and Scepticism

• The Indian Madhyamaka tradition is comparable to scepticism, as it rejects philosophical positions and criticizes dogmatics.
• In contrast, the philosopher Dharmakīrti’s epistemological tradition is more akin to Stoicism, adopting an optimistic attitude towards the possibility of knowledge and certainty.

Contrasting Epistemologies

• Dharmakīrti’s philosophy accepts two reliable sources of knowledge: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).
• Perception provides direct, unmediated access to reality, while inference eliminates errors and helps one understand reality’s true nature.
• This contrasts with the “sceptic” philosophies of Arcesilaus and Carneades, which reacted against Stoic optimism about knowledge.
• Arcesilaus attacked the Stoic concept of a “cognitive impression” as a criterion for truth, arguing that true and false impressions can be indistinguishable, and therefore one should suspend judgement.

Life and Action

• Stoics argued that suspending judgement makes action impossible, but sceptics like Arcesilaus proposed “reasonability” (eulogon) as a guide for action in the absence of certainty.
• Carneades suggested a criterion of “convincing impressions”—impressions that seem true but are fallible—as a basis for making decisions.
• Dharmakīrti, while not a sceptic, addressed the problem of acting when results are uncertain, such as in farming or religious practice.
• He argued that rational people act based on both certainty and doubt, especially concerning future or imperceptible matters.
• For intrinsically imperceptible religious matters, one must rely on scripture, but Dharmakīrti proposed methods to critically evaluate its reliability.
• One method is to verify a scripture’s claims about the empirical world and check for internal contradictions. Another is to confirm its central doctrines (like the Four Noble Truths) and infer its overall reliability.
• Dharmakīrti acknowledged that this inferential method is formally flawed and does not provide absolute certainty, concluding that scripture is not a perfect means of valid cognition.
• However, he maintained that this critical evaluation is the most reasonable strategy available for making decisions in situations of doubt, as it maximizes the probability of success.

Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy

• Nāgārjuna’s texts contain two conflicting tendencies: a “positive” one arguing for the thesis of universal emptiness, and a “negative” one encouraging the abandonment of all views.
• The author proposes a “sceptical interpretation” to resolve this conflict, arguing that Nāgārjuna is a sceptic about philosophy.
• Nāgārjuna’s goal is to use arguments for emptiness to purge Buddhists of any philosophical view, including the view of emptiness itself.

Scepticism about Philosophy

• “Scepticism about philosophy” is a cross-cultural tradition where philosophers use philosophical methods against philosophy itself.
• Like the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna does not offer his own theory but works dialectically, targeting the metaphysical and epistemological views of his opponents.
• The ultimate goal is not a new philosophical doctrine but the “pacification of conceptual proliferation” (prapañcopaśama).

Nāgārjuna’s Two Phases

• The author’s interpretation involves a two-phase philosophical procedure.
• Phase one involves offering positive arguments for emptiness and against essence (svabhāva).
• Phase two demonstrates that the idea of emptiness undermines itself and all other philosophical views, leaving the practitioner with no views at all.
• This interpretation accounts for both the positive and negative statements in Nāgārjuna’s texts.
• Emptiness is compared to a purgative medicine that, after curing the illness of holding views, must purge itself.
• Phase two is a state of peace described as the “pacification of conceptual proliferation,” which means ceasing to grasp at concepts and language.
• The link between the phases is that accepting emptiness (phase one) ultimately makes it impossible to hold any philosophical view (phase two).

The Cause of Scepticism: The Critique of Causation

• Nāgārjuna’s critique of causation in Chapter 1 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is used as a case study.
• He uses a tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) to reject the four possible theories of how things arise: from itself, from another, from both, or from no cause.
• These arguments are not meant to establish an alternative theory of causation but to uproot the very impulse to theorize about it.
• The argument follows the two-phase model: MMK Chapter 1 undermines causal theories, Chapter 24 presents a provisional view of emptiness, and Chapter 27 shows how this view undermines itself and all others.

Buddhist Scepticism: Religiosity Without Belief

• This interpretation is compatible with Buddhism because Nāgārjuna synthesizes two existing strands of Buddhist thought: the “analysis-insight” tendency (phase one) and the “quietist” tendency (phase two).
• Nāgārjuna’s scepticism serves a religious purpose as a practice of non-attachment, particularly for intellectuals prone to grasping at theories.
• This leads to a “religiosity without belief,” similar to how Pyrrhonian sceptics could participate in religious rituals without holding religious beliefs, making piety a matter of practice rather than creed.

Historical Precedents

• The author’s sceptical interpretation, though uncommon, has historical precedents in Buddhist traditions.
• The Indian commentator Candrakīrti describes nirvāna as the “pacification of conceptual proliferation,” aligning with phase two.
• In China, Kumārajīva and his student Sengzhao viewed negation as a therapeutic device to achieve a “void and still” mind.
• The clearest precedents are in Tibet, including an opponent refuted by Khedrupjey who held a radical sceptical view, and the 12th-century philosopher Patsab Nyimadrak, who saw Madhyamaka as a purely therapeutic practice for undermining all views.

Conclusion

• The author defends the interpretation of Nāgārjuna as a sceptic about philosophy whose work proceeds in two phases.
• Phase one uses arguments for emptiness to critique other views, while phase two shows that emptiness undermines itself, leading to the “pacification of conceptual proliferation” and the abandonment of all theories.
• This interpretation is philosophically interesting because it situates Nāgārjuna within the global history of scepticism, raises questions about scepticism and religion, and prompts metaphilosophical reflection.

Yavanayāna: Buddhist Soteriology in the Aristocles Passage

• Scholars like Nietzsche, Conze, and Kuzminski have long noted the similarities between Greek Pyrrhonism and Buddhism.
• The author proposes that these similarities are not accidental but the result of historical exchanges between wisdom traditions, particularly Pyrrho’s encounter with Indian ascetics.
• The essay examines Pyrrho’s philosophy as a Hellenistic soteriological vehicle (a Greek yāna, termed Yavanayāna) aimed at achieving lasting peace (ἀταραξία) by overcoming mental and emotional disturbance (ταραχή).

A Man of Windless Calm

• Pyrrho of Elis accompanied Alexander the Great to Bactria and India, where he spent time with Iranian Magi and Indian “gymnosophists” (naked masters).
• These encounters led him to develop a philosophy promoting the “suspension of assertions” (ἐποχή) and indifference (ἀπάθεια) towards death.
• After returning to Greece, he taught his disciples equanimity (ἰσοσθένεια), verbal abstinence (ἀφασία), and the goal of tranquillity (ἀταραξία).
• He was renowned for embodying his philosophy in his lifestyle and was described as “a man of windless calm.”

The Aristocles Passage

• Pyrrho’s most distinctive teaching is the combination of the indeterminacy thesis with the goal of ataraxia, a parallel found mainly in Indian philosophy.
• The primary source for Pyrrho’s thought is a summary by his student Timon, preserved by Aristocles of Messene, known as the Aristocles Passage (AP).
• The passage outlines a three-part inquiry for achieving wellbeing (εὐδαιμονία):
  1. What is the nature of things?
  2. What disposition should we adopt towards them?
  3. What will be the outcome?
• Despite its complex transmission, the AP is considered a reliable source for Pyrrho’s core philosophy.

The View: [Q1] What Is the Nature of “Things” (πράγματα)?

• This section corresponds to the “View” or “Base” of the soteriological system.
• Pyrrho’s answer to Q1 is that things (pragmata) are undifferentiable (ἀδιάφορα), without measure (ἀστάθμητα), and beyond judgment (ἀνεπίκριτα). This is compared to the Buddhist concept of emptiness, where phenomena lack a fixed, inherent essence.
• Consequently, our sense perceptions and views are neither true nor false. This aligns with the Buddhist position that our understanding is conditioned and we cannot make definitive claims about reality.

The Path: [Q2] What Disposition Ought We to Cultivate in Order to Relate to Pragmata?

• This section corresponds to the “Path” or “Practice.”
• Pyrrho’s answer to Q2 is that we should not have faith in our perceptions and beliefs.
• We should cultivate a disposition of being “without views” (ἀδόξαστους), “uninclined” (ἀκλινεῖς), and “unwavering” (ἀκραδάντους), which parallels the early Buddhist ideal of not grasping any view as supreme.
• This involves applying the tetralemma (Greek) or catuṣkoṭi (Sanskrit), a four-fold negation stating that a thing no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not.

The Fruit: [Q3] What Is the Outcome If We Adopt This Path of Training?

• This section corresponds to the “Fruit” or result of the practice.
• The outcome of this path is first verbal abstinence or non-assertion (ἀφασία).
• This is followed by tranquillity (ἀταραξὶα).
• Aenesidemus adds that it also leads to bliss or pleasure (ἡδονή), comparable to meditative bliss on the Buddhist path.
• For both Pyrrhonism and Buddhism, this state of serenity is not a direct causal result but the natural condition of a mind free from dogmatic assertions, which follows “by chance” like a shadow follows a body.

On Divinity and Goodness

• A seemingly dogmatic fragment where Pyrrho discusses “the nature of divinity and goodness” is interpreted as a conventional guide for living an equable life, not an assertion of ultimate truth.
• This aligns with the Madhyamaka distinction between conventional and ultimate truth, where one lives undogmatically according to ordinary life.
• The author draws a parallel between the Pyrrhonist as a physician of the soul, using arguments out of “love for humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) to cure dogmatism, and the Buddha as a physician administering the Dharma out of compassion.
• Both Pyrrhonism and Buddhism are presented as altruistic soteriologies aimed at the pacification of suffering.

The Evident and the Non-Evident: Buddhism through the Lens of Pyrrhonism

• This paper provides a summary of Pyrrhonism, explores Pyrrho’s connection to Indian thought, and compares elements of Pyrrhonism and Buddhism.

1.

• Pyrrhonism is an ancient Greek philosophy founded by Pyrrho of Elis, who accompanied Alexander the Great to India.
• Influenced by Indian Gymnosophists, Pyrrho’s philosophy involved agnosticism and the suspension of judgment.
• He held that nothing is inherently honorable or just, and that human actions are governed by custom and convention.
• Suspending judgment about one’s immediate experiences (sensations and thoughts) leads to ataraxia, or peace of mind.
• The historical record is sparse, with the most comprehensive texts written by Sextus Empiricus nearly 500 years after Pyrrho.

2.

• Ancient Pyrrhonism differs from modern skepticism; its followers were “sceptics” in the original Greek sense of being inquirers, not doubters.
• Pyrrhonists distinguished between “evident” things (immediate thoughts and sensations, which they accepted) and “non-evident” things (about which they suspended judgment).
• They rejected both positive dogmatism (e.g., Platonists, Stoics) and negative dogmatism (denying all knowledge).
• According to Sextus Empiricus, appearances (pragmata) are involuntary and cannot be in error; error only arises when we interpret them, which means taking something evident as a sign for something non-evident.

3.

• Sextus Empiricus classified facts (pragmata) into four types:
  • Manifestly evident (e.g., seeing a blue sky).
  • Temporarily non-evident (e.g., thinking of Athens while in Rome).
  • Practically non-evident (e.g., knowing if the number of stars is odd or even).
  • Inherently non-evident (e.g., God, the Soul, the Void), which can be imagined but are never experienced as sensations.
• Pyrrhonists observe that we only experience the absence of inherently non-evident things.
• Beliefs about these unprovable concepts (God, Soul, Justice, Nation) are a source of conflict.
• By suspending judgment on all such beliefs, Pyrrhonists found relief from conflict and achieved peace of mind (ataraxia).

4.

• The author argues that Pyrrhonism is a Greek adaptation of ideas Pyrrho encountered in India, a claim supported by Diogenes Laertius.
• Many Western scholars have tried to trace Pyrrhonism to Greek precedents like Democritus or the Cyrenaics.
• These scholars note that Democritus discussed the “nondifference of phenomena” and used terms like ataraxia, and that the Cyrenaics also took appearances as their guide.
• However, Sextus Empiricus explicitly rejected these connections, labelling Democritus a dogmatist for his belief in atoms and the void, and criticizing the Cyrenaics for their dogmatic claims about pleasure and external reality.

5.

• The author proposes that Pyrrhonism is a “phenomenalistic atomism,” which transforms Democritus’s physical atomism.
• In this view, the “atoms” are not physical particles but the thoughts and sensations that combine to form our experience (pragmata).
• This unique perspective, which no other Greek school held, was likely an insight Pyrrho gained from Indian gymnosophists, specifically Buddhists.
• Pyrrho may have translated the Buddhist principle of dependent origination—which explains experience without an external organizing power—into the Greek language of atomism.

6.

• The phenomenal elements of Pyrrhonism are compared to Buddhist dharmas—the momentary, fundamental qualities that constitute experience.
• A parallel is drawn between the Pyrrhonian distinction of evident/non-evident and the Madhyamaka Buddhist distinction of conventional/ultimate truth. Assenting to appearances is like accepting conventional truth, while assenting to the non-evident is like mistakenly believing conventional things have ultimate, inherent existence.
• Pyrrho’s defining achievement was adapting Democritean atomism to accommodate Buddhist phenomenalism.
• The ataraxia of Pyrrho is described as a serene self-containment, more similar to the Buddha’s disposition than to that of other Greek philosophers.

7.

• The author suggests seven parallels between Pyrrhonism and core Buddhist concepts:
  1. Pyrrhonian fluctuating appearances match Buddhist dependent origination.
  2. Pyrrhonian rejection of dogmatic belief matches Buddhist rejection of clinging/attachment.
  3. Pyrrhonian rejection of positive and negative dogmatism matches Buddhist rejection of eternalism and annihilationism.
  4. Pyrrhonian open inquiry matches the Buddhist Middle Path.
  5. Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment matches the Buddha’s “unanswered questions.”
  6. Pyrrhonian refusal to interpret appearances matches the Buddhist concept of “emptiness” (śūnyatā).
  7. Pyrrhonian ataraxia matches Buddhist enlightenment or liberation.
• Both philosophies advocate living according to what is apparent, without interpretation, as the path to peace of mind.

Scripture and Scepticism in Vasubandhu’s Exegetical Method

• The chapter examines the Indian Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu’s response to scepticism regarding scriptural knowledge.
• Vasubandhu’s method allows for scepticism but seeks to preserve the authority of Buddhist scriptures.
• He achieves this by converting “religious scepticism” (doubting the scriptures themselves) into “epistemological scepticism” (doubting the human ability to understand the scriptures correctly).
• This strategy shifts the focus of doubt from the infallible text to the fallible reader.
• This approach is consistent with other Buddhist hermeneutical tools, such as the distinction between a text’s explicit and implicit meaning.

Meta-Theory: Between Devotion and Doubt

• Vasubandhu’s writings exhibit both devotional and critical attitudes towards scripture.
• He reconciles these by directing devotion towards the scriptures and doubt towards human understanding of them.
• In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), he states that the Buddha’s words are a reliable source of knowledge, but human interpretation, including his own, can be flawed.
• In the Vyākhyāyukti (VY), he argues that raising objections in a pedagogical setting serves to increase the audience’s attention and leads to a deeper understanding, which ultimately fosters devotion.
• In polemical contexts, his exegesis aims to defend the authenticity of Mahāyāna scriptures against accusations that they are apocryphal.

Theory: Doubts and Objections in the Vyākhyāyukti

• In the Vyākhyāyukti (VY), Vasubandhu distinguishes between “doubt” and “objection.”
• Doubt is considered a negative and unwholesome state of mind arising from ignorance that must be dispelled.
• Objections, or inquiries, are a positive and essential element of scriptural commentary.
• Objections are grounded in reasoning (which includes perception, inference, and authoritative speech) and are used to point out apparent contradictions.
• Unlike irrational doubt, rational objections can be addressed and resolved, ultimately validating the scriptures by demonstrating that the initial scepticism was based on a misunderstanding.

Pedagogical Applications: Sceptical Arguments in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti

• Vasubandhu’s commentary, the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti (DhDhVV), demonstrates his method in a teaching context.
• He uses a hypothetical listener’s objections to clarify the doctrines of the primary text.
• All objections are consistently resolved, reinforcing the idea that scepticism arises from the listener’s misunderstanding, not from flaws in the text.
• The commentary’s style often makes it appear as if the primary scripture had already anticipated and answered the sceptical criticisms.

Argumentative Applications: Contested Scriptures in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

• In the polemical work Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), scepticism is directed at an opponent’s understanding of a scripture, not the scripture itself.
• Vasubandhu accuses opponents of hermeneutical errors, such as being too literal or wrongly reinterpreting an explicit statement.
• He acknowledges that debates can reach an impasse, particularly when disputants cannot agree on which scriptures are authoritative or how to apply interpretive rules.
• This situation is similar to the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s problem of irresolvable disagreement leading to circular reasoning.
• However, unlike a Pyrrhonian, Vasubandhu does not suspend judgement, believing that a correct exegetical method can lead to the true meaning.

Conclusion

• Vasubandhu is not a philosophical sceptic but incorporates scepticism as an essential tool in his exegetical system.
• He preserves the authority of scripture by channelling all doubt towards the fallibility of human understanding.
• Sceptical objections are treated either as prejudiced views to be corrected or as a means to deepen one’s grasp of the teachings.
• In his view, reasoning can err, but scriptures are an intrinsically true source of knowledge, even when they are misunderstood.

Sceptical Buddhism as Provenance and Project

• Examines the links between “secular,” “critical,” “sceptical,” and “radical” Buddhism as a 21st-century project.
• Questions whether sceptical Buddhism can coexist with an engaged practice aimed at relieving suffering in the modern world.

Sceptical Buddhism?

• Philosophical scepticism is a thoroughgoing critique of all knowledge, distinct from ordinary doubt which is grounded in belief.
• Pyrrhonian scepticism involves withholding assent to all non-evident propositions.
• Academic scepticism, exemplified by Descartes, uses reason and argument to arrive at conclusions.
• Japanese Critical Buddhists viewed Descartes’s methodological doubt as a model for contemporary Buddhism.

Batchelor’s Secular Buddhism

• Stephen Batchelor proposes a demythologized “secular Buddhism” suited for the 21st century.
• His approach seeks a middle way between dogmatic religion and unreflective atheism, emphasizing a “re-enchantment of the world.”
• He argues for a Buddhism that is critical, “goes against the stream” of reactivity, and prioritizes practical knowledge over metaphysics.
• The author critiques Batchelor for attributing negative traits like greed and hatred primarily to biological evolution, arguing this overlooks social and economic conditioning.

Critical Buddhism: “Buddhism is Criticism”

• A late 20th-century Japanese movement led by Matsumoto Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki.
• Argued that early Buddhism was rational and sceptical, but these aspects had withered, particularly in Zen.
• Advocated for a reformation based on a distinction between “critical” thinking (making clear distinctions) and “topical” thinking (essentialism).
• The goal is not satori (awakening) but “the clear discrimination of phenomena” in the service of wisdom and compassion, founded on faith in key doctrines like dependent origination.

Radical Buddhism

• Builds on a critique of Critical Buddhism’s “uncritical liberalism” by examining more politically engaged forms of Japanese Buddhism.
• “New Buddhist” movements in Meiji Japan emphasized being “this-worldly” and engaging with social, economic, and political causes of suffering.
• Some groups were influenced by anarchism and Marxism, showing little concern for metaphysics and focusing on a pragmatic approach.
• This is compared to the Western Epicurean tradition, which is not apolitical but critical of dogmatic political and religious practices that cause fear and unhappiness.

Buddhist Phenomenology

• Uses Jay Garfield’s work to frame Madhyamaka thought as a form of “pragmatic conventionalism.”
• This perspective sets aside ontology to focus on the lived world (lebenswelt), arguing that reality is dependent on our conceptual imputation.
• The aim of Buddhism is to transform our experience of the world, which is inescapably social and political.
• The key task is to distinguish between conventions that cause suffering and those that relieve it, avoiding harmony with the status quo.
• Like Buddhism, phenomenology is a sceptical and critical approach to our “natural attitude” about the world and self.

Conclusion

• Brings Buddhist thought into conversation with Western radical philosophies like the Epicurean, Marxist, and anarchist traditions.
• These traditions advocate for a “radical immanence” that moves away from metaphysics and sees the lack of ontological ground as a call to greater responsibility.
• The scepticism of the Epicurean tradition is a better match for a progressive contemporary Buddhism than Pyrrhonian scepticism.
• This approach requires a measure of “faith” in moral and political claims about human flourishing while remaining critical of “common sense” realism.