How Buddhism Began

Caution

This summary is generated by AI (Google Gemini 2.5 Pro).

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

• The book’s main purpose is to present the Buddha’s ideas within their historical context.
• A key theme (Chapters II and III) is the relationship between the Buddha’s ideas and contemporary brahminical thought.
  • Joanna Jurewicz’s research suggests the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) is a detailed response to, and ironic reinterpretation of, Vedic cosmogony, notably by denying the ātman (self).
  • Alexander Wynne’s work indicates that the Buddha’s meditation teachings developed from and reacted against brahminical teachings.
• Another line of inquiry is tracing doctrinal changes within the Pali Canon, showing the evolution of ideas (e.g., metaphors becoming literal) rather than focusing on textual chronology or alleging deliberate alterations.
• The author addresses critiques, such as Bhikkhu Bodhi’s, regarding inconsistencies in the Nikāyas, and clarifies his interpretations, sometimes finding agreement.
• When proposing new interpretations, the author explains why ancient commentators might have overlooked them, often due to unfamiliarity with the brahminism of the Buddha’s era or efforts to smooth textual inconsistencies.
• Dr. Sue Hamilton’s research is highlighted, arguing the Buddha focused on lived experience and its improvement, rather than ontological debates about reality or the self’s existence, which is deemed unknowable and irrelevant to salvation.
• Noa Gal’s work builds on Hamilton’s, tracing the evolution from the Buddha’s metaphysics to the Abhidhamma.
• The text discusses monks “released by insight” (paññā-vimutto) who lack supernormal powers, citing the story of Pūrṇa from the Divyāvadāna, suggesting prior jhāna practice without full development of its potential.
• An episode in the Divyāvadāna concerning Maudgalyāyana suggests that sectarian orthodoxy was not rigid and soteriology could be adapted.
• Two changes in this second edition: a correction on a metrical matter and a revised translation of “nibbāna” from “blowing out” to “going out” to emphasize its intransitive nature.

PREFACE

• The book originated from the 1994 Jordan Lectures, which involved four pre-circulated papers discussed in seminars, and a public lecture.
• The initial chapter retains the style of the public lecture, leading to some heterogeneity in presentation.
• The author notes that revisions based on seminar discussions were limited due to other duties.
• Inconsistencies in Pali hyphenation and word forms (stem vs. nominative) are deliberate choices for effective communication.
• Translation of Pali words aims for clarity, sometimes using multiple English equivalents for one Pali word, while maintaining consistency for the same Pali term where important.
• Terminology usage is clarified:
  • karma and nirvana are treated as naturalised English words for general concepts.
  • karman and nirvāna refer specifically to Sanskrit terms in brahminical contexts.
  • kamma and nibbāna refer specifically to Pali terms in the Pali Canon or Theravāda Buddhism.
  • brahman is a naturalised English word; Brahmā refers to the deity, and brahmin to the hereditary status.
• Acknowledgements are given for secretarial help, index preparation, and to the Numata Foundation for support that facilitated crucial research.
• The preface is dated Oxford, September 1995.

1. Debate, Skill in Means, Allegory and Literalism

• The author presents work in progress with tentative conclusions, drawing on Karl Popper’s epistemology that knowledge is provisional and advances through criticism, and his warning against essentialism (defining “what things are”) in favor of understanding “why they occur and how they work.”
• The lectures focus on doctrinal history, exploring how the Buddha’s teachings emerged through debate and how they may have been subtly changed by early followers, raising questions about Buddhist reactions to such ideas and the relationship between the Buddha’s words and the textual records.
• The Buddha, like Popper, held a non-essentialist view; his teachings (dharma) were nominalist, viewing concepts as labels, contrasting with the essentialist Brahminical scriptures. The Pali Canon’s ontology is realistic, focusing on how components (khandhas) function.
• The Buddha distinguished the dharma (eternal, abstract truths) from the sāsana (the institutionalized, historical phenomenon of Buddhism). The sāsana, being empirical, is impermanent and subject to change and decline, implying Buddhism as a human phenomenon lacks an unchanging essence.
• Diverse forms of Buddhism are connected by a causal chain of events (conditioned genesis), rather than static common features, offering a solution to the problem of defining “Buddhism.”
• The author advocates a “middle way” in studying Buddhist history, avoiding both over-simplification and excessive deconstructionist relativism.
• The Pali Canon’s texts, primarily known from relatively recent manuscripts, underwent corruption during centuries of transmission. Critical textual study, including comparison with Chinese versions and reasoned emendation (even without direct manuscript support), is necessary.
• The Buddha’s teachings evolved through debate within the socio-religious context of 5th century B.C. India, reacting to Brahminism and other contemporary sects, though direct evidence for this environment is limited.
• Understanding this Indian context is crucial to avoid misinterpreting Buddhist doctrines (e.g., anātman as a refutation of the Upaniṣadic ātman, not Western soul concepts) and to see the Buddha’s pragmatic, non-theoretical approach.
• The Buddha employed “skill in means” (upāya-kauśalya), adapting his message and terminology to his audience, resulting in varied expressions that were likely later standardized or leveled out by tradition.
• The diverse backgrounds of converts and ongoing debates within the Sangha also contributed to doctrinal developments and textual variations, some of which may post-date the Buddha.
• Allegory, described as an artful form of literalism, was used in texts (e.g., Brahmā entreating the Buddha to teach) to convey arguments, possibly by the compilers of the texts.
• Unintentional literalism, particularly “scholastic literalism” (interpreting words with excessive precision and creating unintended distinctions), was a major force for change in early Buddhist doctrine.
• The Buddha himself warned against literalism (e.g., the pada-parama hearer who learns words without understanding). The Alagaddūpama Sutta’s simile of the raft illustrates that teachings (dhammā) are a means for “crossing over” and their specific formulations should not be clung to, contrary to later misinterpretations that, by taking dhammā out of context, saw it as a call to abandon all objects of thought.

2. How, not What: Kamma as a Reaction to Brahminism

• The Buddha’s teachings developed in dialogue with contemporary religious figures, particularly brahmins, emphasizing how things work over what they are, unlike brahminical essentialism.
• Uncertainty exists regarding the extent to which the Buddha aimed for a philosophically coherent doctrine versus later systematization, with parallels in Mādhyamika debates (Prāsangikas vs. Svātantrikas).
• The Buddha stressed experience and rational argument, as seen in the Kālāma Sutta, which advocates self-assessment and highlights morality’s practical benefits.
• The Tevijja Sutta critiques brahmins for claiming knowledge of the path to Brahmā without direct experience, contrasting with the Buddha’s own three experiential knowledges (vijjā) which appropriated and surpassed brahminical textual knowledge.
• Buddhist philosophy likely arose as an “unintended consequence” of the Buddha’s extensive dialogues and teaching activities.
• The Buddha’s core teachings responded to Upaniṣadic doctrines (e.g., Bṛhadāranyaka), accepting some premises (like rebirth according to works) but criticizing others, particularly the concept of an unchanging self (ātman) and the nature of ultimate reality (brahman).
• Upaniṣadic teachings summarized: rebirth by ritual karman; escape via gnosis of brahman (truth of Vedas); microcosm-macrocosm identity in an essential self (ātman/brahman); ātman as unchanging, plenum, bliss; ontology merged with epistemology.
• The Buddha accepted the Upaniṣadic dichotomy between the phenomenal world and its opposite but denied the latter’s existence as a “thing.” He taught life’s hallmarks as impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha), and not-self (anatta).
• The Buddha side-stepped ontological questions about the external world, possibly explaining later Buddhist disagreements on ontology.
• The term ‘dhamma’ evolved:
  • Brahminical Dharma: a blend of “is” and “ought,” with essences (sva-dharma).
  • Buddhist Dhamma (singular/plural): initially descriptive and normative (the Buddha’s teaching).
  • Dhammā (plural): also came to mean “objects of thought” or “elements of reality” as understood through Buddhist teachings, particularly in meditation (Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas), emphasizing perception and experience (‘how’) over substance (‘what’).
  • Later, lists of dhammā led to a form of ontology in Abhidhamma, resembling brahminical sva-dharmas, which Nāgārjuna critiqued.
• Morally, Buddhism contrasts with Brahminism’s idea of cosmic balance; Buddhist karma emphasizes individual responsibility and an open-ended universe, unlike Jainism’s closed system.
• The Buddha explicitly denied the ātman (e.g., Alagaddūpama Sutta refuting “This is mine, I am this, this is my self”), critiquing the Upaniṣadic identification of individual and world self. Thinking “I am” (asmi) was deemed a fundamental error tied to craving.
• A passage in SN III, 144 (cow dung pellet) is interpreted as an allusion to and refutation of a Vedic doctrine about acquiring a self (ātman/attabhāva) for the next world.
• Arguments that the Buddha was a Vedāntin, citing terms like ‘brahma-bhūto’, are countered by stating the Buddha used opponents’ language metaphorically.
• The Udāna passage (“There is, monks, an unborn…”) is interpreted as logical (cessation of process is conceivable) rather than ontological, given its isolated context and the Udāna’s later compilation.
• The Buddha did not confuse epistemology with ontology or reify consciousness (viññāṇa), which is a dependent process (consciousness of something).
• The Kevaddha Sutta verse (“Consciousness has no attribute…”) is interpreted as referring to nirvana (transcendence of duality), not an idealistic ontology reifying consciousness.
• The doctrine of pațicca-samuppāda (conditioned origination) summarizes the Buddha’s focus on ‘how not what,’ explaining processes non-randomly. It is central yet acknowledged as profound and difficult.
• The Mahā-tanhā-sañkhaya Sutta refutes the idea of an unchanging transmigrating consciousness, asserting consciousness is dependently originated, like fire depending on fuel.
• Action (kamma), specifically intention, is central to the Buddha’s worldview, contrasting with the Upaniṣadic focus on Being. The redefinition of karma as intention ethicized the universe.
• A distinction is made between ‘typical’ karma (overt acts) and ‘dogmatic’ karma (any morally charged intention/action, including mental), the latter being a more generalized concept.
• The Vaibhāṣika school’s division of karma into intention and subsequent ‘information’ (vijñapti/avijñapti) led to a reification of karma as a subtle physical substance, diverging from original teachings.
• Transfer of merit (patti-dāna in Theravāda) became significant, moving Buddhism towards a religion where salvation could be aided by others, analogous to grace.
• The Tevijja Sutta, read as a response to the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, suggests that pervading the universe with kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity (brahma-vihāras) leads to ‘release of the mind’ (ceto-vimutti), which is Enlightenment/nirvana.
• Joining Brahmā at death is presented as a metaphor for an arahant’s nirvana, not literal rebirth, though later tradition interpreted it literally. This implies that total benevolence (an ethicized process) is a path to liberation.
• SN I, 75 (King Pasenadi) is interpreted as a rebuttal to Yājñavalkya, shifting from metaphysical self-realization to ethical concern for others based on universal self-cherishing: “one who loves self should not harm others.”
• The Buddha emphasized moral agency and the impact of actions (character formation), grounding worthwhile existence in morality, rather than defining a ‘self’ ontologically.

3. Metaphor, Allegory, Satire

• The Buddha extensively utilized simile, metaphor, and indirect expression (pariyāya) in his teachings, contrasting with the systematized abhidhamma.
• Nirvana (‘going out’) is a metaphor for the extinguishing of the three “fires”: passion (greed), hatred, and delusion.
• These three fires allude to the three sacred fires of brahmin householders, which the Buddha metaphorically reinterpreted as duties towards parents, one’s household, and holy individuals.
• Later Buddhist tradition forgot the origin of this metaphor, leading to the “three poisons” concept in Mahāyāna, potentially contributing to the separation and devaluation of nirvana compared to bodhi (Enlightenment).
• Upādāna (attachment/grasping) also means “fuel,” thus the upādāna-kkhandhā (aggregates of grasping) are the five khandha (aggregates) metaphorically seen as bundles of fuel for the fires.
• The term khandha (bundle) is part of this fire metaphor. The “burden” sermon describes the five upādānakkhandha as the burden, the individual as the bearer, craving as taking up the burden, and cessation of craving as laying it down. Literal interpretation of this led to the Pudgalavādin school’s views.
• The five khandha are described as being “on fire,” highlighting their burdensome nature.
• The two types of nirvana, sa-upādi-sesa (with a residue of fuel) and an-upādi-sesa (without fuel), refer to the state of the khandha (fuel) after the fires are extinguished—either remaining but unburnt (in life) or completely gone (at death of an Enlightened one).
• The term upādi (fuel) was later confused with upadhi (basis for craving).
• The fire metaphor is echoed in the Lotus Sūtra’s allegory of the burning house, where the Buddha uses “skill in means” (promising toys/paths) to save beings (children) from the burning world, an innovative application of the concept to justify untruth for a noble motive.
• The Vinaya Khandhaka narrative of the Buddha converting fire-worshipping brahmins through miracles before preaching the Fire Sermon is likely an allegory demonstrating his superiority over brahminical practices and his impersonation of Agni (being called Añgirasa).
• Buddhism also engaged in a “contest” with nāga worship, evidenced by:
  • Allegorical stories like Mucalinda protecting the Buddha.
  • Vinaya rules against ordaining nāgas (animals) who cannot progress in the doctrine.
  • The Sri Lankan ordination custom where candidates are called ‘nāga’.
  • Metaphorical reinterpretation of ‘nāga’ in the Sutta-nipāta to describe an Enlightened person, suggesting appropriation of the term to assert superiority.
• Much of the Buddha’s biography, both pre- and post-Enlightenment (e.g., luxurious upbringing, four signs, name Siddhattha), is likely allegorical, supporting theories of a later, stylized biographical composition.
• The Pabbajjā Sutta and Padhāna Sutta, likely originally one poem, allegorically depict the Buddha’s renunciation and Enlightenment as a battle against Māra (death/desire). The Padhāna Sutta’s depiction of achieving Enlightenment through asceticism contrasts with the middle path, suggesting internal debates or Jain influence.
• Māra is treated with varying seriousness, sometimes as a cosmic figure, other times satirized or humorously depicted (e.g., Moggallāna’s exorcism, Māra’s despondency).
• The Buddha used allegory satirically against brahminical cosmogony:
  • Parodying Brahmā’s creation story by depicting Brahmā deluding himself as a creator.
  • The Aggañña Sutta parodies brahminical accounts of societal origins as an allegory for the workings of desire. Taken literally, it led to inconsistencies in Buddhist cosmology.
• Buddhist cosmology, primarily concerned with rebirth states, developed a tripartite structure:
  • Plane of desire (kāmâvacara): gods, humans, animals, ghosts, hells.
  • Plane of form (rūpâvacara): Brahma worlds, for those reborn from certain meditations.
  • Plane of no form (arūpâvacara): highest meditative states, assuring nirvana.
• Literal interpretation of metaphorical teachings contributed to this cosmology; e.g., the brahma-vihāra (originally metaphors for “living with brahman”) became linked to rebirth in Brahma worlds. Buddhaghosa reified these ethical teachings into a hierarchic, spatial cosmology.
• A central issue was whether subjective meditative states had objective correlates, influenced by the Vedāntic idea of tan-mayatā (thought becoming consubstantial with its object). The Buddha, however, generally avoided confusing epistemology with ontology.
• Early Buddhism held two concepts of time: infinite, cyclical cosmic time, and individual experiential time ceasing with Enlightenment. This duality, unlike integrated brahminical views, left cosmic and personal time unconnected.
• The Buddha’s presuppositions about the macrocosm and the distinction between literal and metaphorical may have differed significantly from modern understanding, making questions about the objective existence of meditative realms complex.
• The Kevaddha Sutta’s satire of Brahmā involves a monk meditatively traveling through heavens, implying some form of existence for these realms and travel for the story to work.
• The Buddha’s stance on supernormal powers (iddhi) was inconsistent; he sometimes decried their display but texts also depict their use, often allegorically.
• Early texts blur boundaries between mind and physical reality:
  • Earthquakes can be caused by a meditator’s perception of earth and water.
  • A Mahāsānghika Vinaya text suggests saving a drowning person via a “perception of earth.”
• The Buddha’s teaching on the “world” (loka) is ambiguous: it is our experience through the six senses, and its end is necessary for ending suffering. The term loka-mānī could mean “thinking oneself to be the world” or “thinking that there is a world,” leaving ontological questions open, likely deliberately.

4. Retracing an Ancient Debate: How Insight Worsted Concentration in the Pali Canon

• The chapter examines historical changes and doctrinal developments within the Pali Canon, notably the idea that Enlightenment can be achieved through intellectual analysis (paññā, insight) alone, without meditation.
• This concept, though explicit in few Sutta Pitaka texts, authorized a practice tradition in Theravāda Buddhism, which is possibly the only surviving school accepting it. Harivarman’s Satya-siddhi-śāstra (Bahuśrutīya school) also reached this conclusion.
• Two processes of change are identified: scholastic literalism (creating distinctions by over-interpreting texts) and debate among monks. Discrepancies in texts are attributed to the Buddha’s varied teachings or these debates.
• The Puggala-paññatti classifies individuals into a seven-fold hierarchy: ubhato-bhāga-vimutto (released on both sides), pañña-vimutto (released by insight), kāya-sakkhī (bodily witness), ditthi-ppatto (who has seen the point), saddhā-vimutto (released by faith), dhammānusārī (follower of the teaching), and saddhānusārī (follower through faith).
• This list is sometimes extended (e.g., to nine or ten types) and appears frequently in the Sutta Pitaka.
• The Ktțāgiri Sutta (MN 70) is the primary Sutta Pitaka text that differentiates these seven types, explaining them in terms of vimokkha (meditative releases) and āsava (corruptions):
  • 1. Ubhato-bhāga-vimutto: Touches formless releases, corruptions destroyed by insight (arahant).
  • 2. Pañña-vimutto: Does not touch formless releases, corruptions destroyed by insight (arahant).
  • 3. Kāya-sakkhī: Touches formless releases, some corruptions destroyed (not arahant).
  • 4. Ditthi-ppatto: Does not touch formless releases, some corruptions destroyed, has understood Buddha’s teachings (not arahant).
  • 5. Saddhā-vimutto: Does not touch formless releases, some corruptions destroyed, settled faith in Buddha (not arahant).
  • 6. Dhammānusārī: Does not touch formless releases, corruptions not destroyed, finds satisfaction in teachings via insight, possesses five faculties (not arahant).
  • 7. Saddhānusārī: Does not touch formless releases, corruptions not destroyed, only faith/affection for Buddha, possesses five faculties (not arahant).
• The Puggala-paññatti further systematizes this, indicating types 4 and 5 are higher grades of 6 and 7 respectively.
• Anomalies in the list include the ‘released by faith’ (type 5) not actually being released, and the attainment of ‘formless releases’ by the ‘one released both ways’ appearing redundant for actual release, which is determined by insight destroying corruptions.
• AN IV, 74-9 is interpreted as part of a debate on the value of faith, concentration, and insight, where the author attempts to elevate concentration by substituting a concentration-focused type for the ‘follower through faith’.
• AN I, 118-120 provides direct evidence of debate, where the Buddha suggests that faith, concentration, or insight can lead to high spiritual attainment, contrasting with the list of seven’s emphasis on insight alone for release.
• The terms ‘follower of the teaching’ (dhammānusārī) and ‘follower through faith’ (saddhānusārī) likely referred to a single category in older texts (e.g., Alagaddūpama Sutta, Cūla Gopālaka Sutta) but were later differentiated and ranked through scholastic interpretation (e.g., SN V, 200; SN III, 225).
• The devaluation of concentration in favor of insight may stem from texts like the Susīma Sutta (SN II, 119-128), which, in its Pali form (argued to be a reworking of an older Chinese version), suggests monks claimed to be ‘released by insight’ alone, without meditative attainments.
• Paññā-vimutti (‘release by insight’) and ceto-vimutti (‘release of the mind’) were likely originally synonymous, referring to a single release event triggered by insight, rather than distinct technical terms for different types of release.
• Later scholasticism, evidenced in texts like MN I, 437 and AN I, 61, began to treat ceto-vimutti and paññā-vimutti as distinct, associated with different paths (calm/meditation vs. intuition/insight).
• Four interpretations of the relationship between meditation (samādhi) and understanding (paññā) are found: 1) Ranked progression (meditation essential for understanding); 2) Both employed, either prioritized; 3) Alternatives leading to possibly different Enlightenments; 4) Understanding superior and can be used alone, meditation alone insufficient.
• Early formulae for nirvana (e.g., Sāmañña-phala Sutta, Vinaya accounts of Buddha’s and first disciples’ enlightenment) use ceto-vimutti or show ceto-vimutti and paññā-vimutti as referring to the same unified experience of release through insight, not supporting a dichotomy.
• The Mahānidāna Sutta describes a paññā-vimutto as one who has meditated through various states and understood their impermanence, and an ubhato-bhāga-vimutto (‘released on both sides’) as a meditator who masters these states and achieves ceto-vimutti/paññā-vimutti.
• The Pali Susīma Sutta’s portrayal of monks “released by insight” without meditative achievements (interpreted by commentary as “meditation-less ‘dry intuiters’”) is seen as a key development, possibly due to Sangha apologetics.
• The Musīla and Nārada Sutta (SN XII, 68) challenges the Susīma Sutta’s implication: Nārada, despite intellectual understanding (sammā-paññāya) of dependent origination, states he is not an arahant because he lacks deeper experiential realization (“cannot touch it physically”).
• The formulations from the Susīma Sutta and the concept of ubhato-bhāga-vimutto influenced the top types in the seven-fold list and led to texts like SN I, 191, which categorizes arahants by different attainments (three knowledges, six super-knowledges, released on both sides, released by insight), suggesting alternative paths.
• AN III, 355-6 (Mahā Cunda’s sermon, likely late) shows monks divided into dhamma-yogā (intellectuals) and jhāyī (meditators), indicating the doctrinal shift had practical consequences, with both groups urged to respect each other’s rare achievements.
• The author argues: 1) Enlightenment without meditation was likely not original Buddhist teaching, and paññā-vimutti did not initially mean this. 2) Paññā-vimutti evolved to mean Enlightenment without (certain) meditation, influenced by texts like the Susīma Sutta. 3) This led to groups of monks in the Pali tradition seeking Enlightenment without meditation.
• Chronologically, texts featuring these developed ideas are considered later, possibly requiring 2-3 generations for such soteriological shifts to occur within the monastic community.
• The trend involved dichotomizing calm (meditation) and understanding (intellectual analysis), increasingly valuing the latter, resulting in Theravāda monks who pursue Enlightenment without meditation. A similar, though distinct, trend to extol insight (prajñā) is noted in early Mahāyāna.

APPENDIX

• Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s article ‘Musīla et Nārada: Le Chemin de Nirvāna’ identifies two opposed theories of salvation in Buddhist sources:
  • Intellectual achievement: Emphasizes prajñā (discrimination), vipaśyanā (contemplation), seeing the Four Noble Truths, and dharma-pravicaya (discrimination between things). The ascetic recognizes reality (painful, impermanent, etc.), eliminates desire, and ends transmigration.
  • Ascetic/ecstatic disciplines: Focuses on śamatha (calm), samādhi (concentration), dhyānas (ecstasies), and bhāvanā (meditation). This path leads to states like saṃjñāvedayitanirodha (cessation of perception and feeling), connecting the ascetic with Nirvāṇa. This path is not unique to Buddhism and does not necessarily involve ‘seeing the truths’ or speculative prajñā.
• De La Vallée Poussin notes that both paths aim for Nirvāṇa. One view holds that Nirvāṇa must be physically contacted through contemplation, while the other believes intellectual realization of Nirvāṇa is sufficient.

5. Who was Angulimāla?

• Angulimāla was a notorious brigand known for wearing a necklace made from his victims’ fingers, aiming to collect a thousand.
• He was converted by the Buddha after a miraculous chase where he could not catch the normally walking Buddha, followed by a dialogue involving a pun on the word “stop” (titṭthati).
• The story is found in the Pali Canon, primarily in the Angulimāla Sutta (AS) and the Thera-gāthā (Thag).
• The AS describes Angulimāla as a ferocious brahmin and recounts his later act of truth (Añgulimāla paritta) saving a woman in difficult labor, highlighting his transformation.
• Pali commentaries (Papañcasūdan̄̄ and Paramattha-dīpanī) provide a backstory where Angulimāla (originally Ahimsaka or Himsaka) was a good student whose teacher, misled by jealous peers, demanded a thousand fingers (or legs) as a fee, leading to his violent career. These accounts are considered somewhat incoherent by the author.
• A critical verse in the conversion dialogue (Thag 868 / AS) is textually corrupt and metrically problematic, with existing translations and commentary interpretations deemed unsatisfactory.
• The author proposes a textual emendation in this verse from “mahesi” (great seer, referring to the Buddha) to “maheso” (the Great Lord, i.e., Śiva).
• This reinterpretation suggests Angulimāla’s line “ciram vatā me mahito maheso” means he had long been honouring Śiva to fulfil a vow, thus explaining his finger necklace as a religious practice of a proto-Śaiva/Śākta devotee.
• The mention of “sahassapāpaṃ” (a thousand evils/crimes) in the same verse is suggested as the origin for the detail of needing a thousand victims.
• This view places Angulimāla’s actions within the context of early tantric-like practices, involving identification with a deity and extreme vows, predating later formalized Tantra.
• The author cites evidence from the Pali Canon for early Kālī worship, such as Mahākāla’s verses in the Thera-gāthā describing a visualization of Kālī adorned with human body parts.
• Other possible references to Śiva (e.g., Sivo devaputto, siva-vijjā, Īsāna, mahesakkha) and Kālī (e.g., Māra’s mother/sister, the nun Caṇ̣akālī) in the Pali Canon are noted.
• Angulimāla’s collection of fingers from living victims is presented as consistent with traditions of blood sacrifice to deities like Kālī, who is known as a patron of robbers.
• Early Buddhism is characterized as antithetical to such tantric practices, emphasizing self-control, being unconcerned with ritual impurity, and upholding strict morality.
• The later development of Vajrayāna Buddhism saw an integration of tantric elements, which were, however, re-contextualized within Buddhist ethics.
• The conversion of Angulimāla is presented figuratively as the Buddha’s capacity to transform not just an individual but also the extreme religious system he represented.