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buddhavacana

Was the Buddha omniscient and was he able to predict the future?

Bhikkhu Anālayo states in The Genesis of the Bodhisattva Ideal, Hamburg University Press 2010 p. 51 that

Gautama’s decease must have created a vacuum that needed to be filled. Bereft of the possibility of having a personal encounter with the living Buddha, for disciples in need of some form of emotional contact with the object of their first refuge, recollecting his marvellous qualities would have been of considerable importance. … The vacuum created by the teacher’s demise would have had its effect not only on the internal level – within the community of disciples – but also on the external level, namely in relation to other contemporary religious groups and practitioners.

Hence there is a need to “authenticate” the Buddha as an eminent spiritual teacher by referencing his noble and spiritual lineage, his mastery of supernatural powers, his omniscience, and ultimately the ability for a devotee to “take refuge” and “receive blessings” from one long departed.

Let’s examine the Buddha’s supposed prediction of the advent of the “next” Buddha. This is mainly described in the Madhyama-āgama in the Discourse on an Explanation about the Past (說本 MA 66 T i 508c09). According to Anālayo in The Genesis of the Bodhisattva Ideal p. 113:

The Buddha thereupon narrates in detail how in a future time, when human lifespan will reach up to eighty thousand years, a wheel-turning king by the name of Śaṅkha will arise, who eventually will go forth and reach liberation. On hearing this description, a monk by the name of Ajita stands up and, with hands held in respectful gesture towards the Buddha, aspires to become the wheel-turning King Śaṅkha at that future time. The Buddha rebukes Ajita for postponing what could already be accomplished now – namely attaining liberation – after which he nevertheless predicts that Ajita will indeed become the wheel-turning King Śaṅkha.

The Buddha continues by describing the Buddha Maitreya under whom Śaṅkha will go forth. Another monk by the same name of Maitreya stands up and, with hands held in respectful gesture towards the Buddha, formulates the aspiration of becoming the future Buddha Maitreya. The Buddha praises him for making such an aspiration, predicts that he will indeed become the future Buddha Maitreya, and bestows a golden coloured robe on him.

It seems odd that the Buddha rebukes Ajita for deferring his liberation and yet praises Maitreya for his aspiration to become the next Buddha. It would have made more sense for Maitreya to become the next Buddha whilst the current Buddha was still alive, allowing for a smooth transition and a succession plan.

In the Tipiṭaka, Maitreya is also stated as the next Buddha in Cakkavattisutta DN 26 PTS 3.58–3.79. The placing of the occurrence of the Maitreya episode in parallels of this sutta across the canons of the three major sects show the following variations:

  • after the description of the wheel-turning king Saṅkha (Cakkavattisutta in the Dīgha Nikāya);
  • before the description of the wheel-turning king Saṅkha (轉輪聖王修行經 in the Dīrgha Āgama);
  • not found at all (轉輪王經 in the Madhyama Āgama).

Anālayo theorises that the inclusion of Maitreya seems to be a late addition, as there would be no reason to exclude it. Furthermore, the corresponding paragraph in Cakkavattisutta following where the Maitreya episode has been inserted seems a bit clumsy, and would have been a better transition if it immediately followed the description of King Saṅkha. Therefore:

Compared to these two versions, the Madhyama-āgama discourse appears to testify to a state of the discourse when this addition had not yet happened.

The real issue here is that this presumes the Buddha is able to predict the future, to the precise names and actions of individuals, which presupposes a “deterministic” universe and contradicts the supposed “free will” embodied in Dependent Origination (ie. one has the ability to consciously choose to cease and fade away the links in the chain). According to Anālayo in p. 108:

A problem with the present passage in all versions is that, if taken literally, it presents a precise prediction of the names and actions of individuals at a rather distant time in the future. In the Pāli discourses, the present passage is thus not only the sole reference to the Buddha Maitreya, but also the sole instance where such a type of prediction is given.

From the perspective of the early Buddhist conception of causality, to make precise predictions that at some remote time in the future someone named so-and-so will do such-and-such a thing to some degree conflicts with the notion of dependent arising (pratītya-samutpāda), according to which things are conditioned but not wholly determined. To predict the far away future in such detail would require a strong form of predeterminism. There should not be any free will or choice operating in the lives of the people concerned – in particular in the lives of the two individuals that will become the wheel-turning king and the Buddha in the future – otherwise they might end up doing something that differs from what has been predicted.

In fact, Upāli even questions the Buddha’s prediction in T 452 at T XIV 418c7, and according to Anālayo on p. 127:

Upāli questions the Buddha about the monk who has been predicted as the future Buddha Maitreya. In his query, Upāli expresses his puzzlement about the fact that this monk neither engages in the development of concentration nor eradicates his defilements.

Anālayo then further theorises on p. 125 that the primary purpose for introducing Maitreya as the next Buddha seems to be to address:

… the needs of the faithful in search of a way of compensating for the loss of leadership and inspiration after the demise of the teacher. … The Discourse on an Explanation about the Past more directly addresses the dilemma of the teacher’s disappearance by providing a substitute for the deceased Gautama: the bodhisattva Maitreya who will continue the lineage of Buddhas by becoming the next fully-awakened Buddha.

This tendency to exalt the Buddha as a consequence of the vacuum created by his decease, initiated by an increasing concern with his marvels and with his predecessors and successor(s), eventually blossomed into a claim that the Buddha was in fact omniscient.

In Pāsarāsisutta MN 26 PTS 1.161–1.175 we find lo and behold the Buddha indeed claimed to know “all”:

25.6 ‘Sabbābhibhū sabbavidūhamasmi, ‘I am the champion, the knower of all, 25.7 Sabbesu dhammesu anūpalitto; unsullied in the midst of all things.

Furthermore, this was subsequently expanded to anyone who wishes to reach enlightenment, and in fact it is not possible to attain awakening without understanding and fully knowing “all” in Sabbapariññāsutta Iti 7 PTS 4 PTS 4 Verse 7:

2.1 “Sabbaṁ, bhikkhave, anabhijānaṁ aparijānaṁ tattha cittaṁ avirājayaṁ appajahaṁ abhabbo dukkhakkhayāya." “Mendicants, without directly knowing and completely understanding the all, without dispassion for it and giving it up, you can’t end suffering.

However, these two passages presumably had an original meaning not of omniscience but that an enlightened person truly “saw things as they are”. In Kāḷakārāmasutta AN 4.24 PTS 2.25–2.26 this was clarified to:

2.1 Yaṁ, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samārakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya diṭṭhaṁ sutaṁ mutaṁ viññātaṁ pattaṁ pariyesitaṁ anuvicaritaṁ manasā, tamahaṁ jānāmi. “In this world—with its gods, Māras and Brahmās, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its gods and humans—whatever is seen, heard, thought, known, attained, sought, and explored by the mind: that I know.

In fact the Buddha explicitly denied having ever made a claim to omniscience in Tevijjavacchasutta MN 71 PTS 1.482–1.483, but this sutta seems to have been omitted in other canons, possibly a sign of censorship.

5.1 “sutaṁ metaṁ, bhante: “Sir, I have heard this: 5.2 ‘samaṇo gotamo sabbaññū sabbadassāvī, aparisesaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paṭijānāti, ‘The ascetic Gotama claims to be all-knowing and all-seeing, to know and see everything without exception, thus: 5.3 carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satataṁ samitaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitan’ti. “Knowledge and vision are constantly and continually present to me, while walking, standing, sleeping, and waking.”’ 5.4 Ye te, bhante, evamāhaṁsu: ‘samaṇo gotamo sabbaññū sabbadassāvī, aparisesaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paṭijānāti, carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satataṁ samitaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitan’ti, kacci te, bhante, bhagavato vuttavādino, na ca bhagavantaṁ abhūtena abbhācikkhanti, dhammassa cānudhammaṁ byākaronti, na ca koci sahadhammiko vādānuvādo gārayhaṁ ṭhānaṁ āgacchatī”ti? I trust that those who say this repeat what the Buddha has said, and do not misrepresent him with an untruth? Is their explanation in line with the teaching? Are there any legitimate grounds for rebuke and criticism?” 5.5 “Ye te, vaccha, evamāhaṁsu: ‘samaṇo gotamo sabbaññū sabbadassāvī, aparisesaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paṭijānāti, carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satataṁ samitaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitan’ti, na me te vuttavādino, abbhācikkhanti ca pana maṁ asatā abhūtenā”ti. “Vaccha, those who say this do not repeat what I have said. They misrepresent me with what is false and untrue.”

Kaṇṇakatthalasutta MN 90 PTS 2.126–2.133 then seems to soften this:

‘natthi so samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakideva sabbaṁ ñassati, sabbaṁ dakkhiti, netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjatī’”ti. ‘There is no ascetic or brahmin who will know all and see all simultaneously: that is not possible.’”

So apparently it may be possible to know and see all, just not at once. This paves the way to declare the Buddha as “serially omniscient” in Sabbaññubhāvapañha Mil 5.1.2 PTS 103–107:

“Bhante nāgasena, buddho sabbaññū”ti? ‘Venerable Nāgasena, was the Buddha omniscient?’ “Āma, mahārāja, bhagavā sabbaññū, na ca bhagavato satataṁ samitaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitaṁ, āvajjanapaṭibaddhaṁ bhagavato sabbaññutañāṇaṁ, āvajjitvā yadicchakaṁ jānātī”ti. ‘Yes, O king, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually (consciously) present with him. The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection.’ But if he did reflect he knew whatever he wanted to know.

But wait, according to Anālayo in The Dawn of Abhidharma p. 120, 一切智 MA 212 at T i 793c6 states: “Counterparts to this statement in the Madhyama-āgama and in the Bhaiṣajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya have the slightly different formulation that there is no other recluse or Brahmin who has omniscient knowledge at once.” So, others are not omniscient, but the Buddha can be.

According to Sujato, this paves the way for Buddha’s omniscience to be the standard view in later books:

Anālayo then points out that in Ekottarāgama 48.3 at T II 787c4: “the Tathāgata … thoroughly understands all in the three times: future, past, and present”, 如來 … 當來, 過去, 現在, 三世皆悉明了; the same statement recurs in T 453 (佛說彌勒下生經) at T XIV 421a8.

Gombrich states in Popperian Vinaya: Conjecture and Refutation in Practice, in Pramāṇakīrtiḥ, Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday (2007): ”… the idea that the Buddha was omniscient is strikingly at odds with the picture of him presented in every Vinaya tradition”. These “show that the Buddha … occasionally made a false start and found it necessary to reverse a decision. Since omniscience includes knowledge of the future, this is not omniscience.”

Also, one would imagine that the Buddha, if he had been omniscient and could predict the future, would have been able to prevent many things, including the uprising of Devadatta.