The Devolution of Buddha's teachings

Introduction

We cannot be assured that the Buddhist scriptures contains the exact words of his teachings, nor can we be assured it only contains his teachings and not additional material added after he has died.

Although all efforts have been made to preserve the accuracy of the teachings, errors and omissions may have crept in over the years.

In particular, the words have been rearranged so that his teachings are suitable for oral recitation and memorisation. Sentences may have been altered, rearranged, and added to.

Additional content may have been added (potentially from disciples, or imported from other teachers and philosophies such as Jainism, Brahmanism or Hinduism).

Therefore, every piece of text or scripture needs to be carefully considered and evaluated before we accept it as something he actually taught.

Jonathan A. Silk in Establishing / Interpreting / Translating: Is It Just That Easy? ¹ critiques the traditional scholarly goal of establishing a single, pure, original version of a text, arguing this approach is particularly unsuitable for Buddhist scriptures which likely never had a singular “Ur-text” due to their oral origins and modular construction. He contends that creating an “eclectic edition” from various sources is a form of “textual eugenics,” an authoritarian act that devalues the actual historical manuscripts used by communities and creates an artificial text that never existed. Instead, Silk advocates for a democratic or libertarian perspective that treats every manuscript and recension not as a “corrupt” variant but as a legitimate historical document, valuable for what it reveals about a text’s reception and transmission. This rejection of a single authoritative text implies that there can be no single correct interpretation or translation, challenging scholars to respect the diversity of the textual tradition rather than imposing their own hierarchical and ultimately artificial version.

Discrepancies and Variations

This applies even to (supposedly) his earliest discourses. According to 3V/1.6 Pañcavaggiyakathā, after giving the First Discourse to his five former companions, one of them ( āyasmā Aññāsi Koṇḍañña) understood immediately. He requested and received pabbajja (renunciation) and upasampadā (ordination) from the Buddha and thus became his first disciple.

81. And while this exposition was being spoken, to āyasmā Koṇḍañña there arose the pure, stainless insight into the Dhamma: ‘Whatever is subject to origination is subject to cessation.’

…

84. Then the Bhagavā uttered this exclamation: “Indeed, Koṇḍañña has understood! Indeed, Koṇḍañña has understood!” In this way, the āyasmā Koṇḍañña came to be known as “Aññāsi Koṇḍañña” (Koṇḍañña Who Has Understood).

85. Then the āyasmā Aññāsi Koṇḍañña, who has seen the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, deeply penetrated the Dhamma, overcome uncertainty, free from doubt, not relying on another teacher’s instructions, said to the Bhagavā: “Bhante, may I receive the going forth (pabbajjā) in the Bhagavā’s presence? May I receive the full ordination (upasampadā)?” “Come, bhikkhu,” the Bhagavā said, “The Dhamma is well-proclaimed. Live the optimal life for the complete ending of suffering.” That itself was the āyasmant’s full ordination.

In between the the first and second discourses, the Buddha taught another discourse (not elaborated) which caused another two āyasmants to understand and also receive ordination - Vappa and Bhaddiya. After this, the three disciples who has understood went on an alms round and fetched food whilst the Buddha taught the remaining two with another discourse (also not elaborated). This caused the remaining two to understand and receive the ordination.

The Buddha then taught what is now known as the Second Discourse to all five āyasmants, which caused all of them to become fully liberated (arahants).

105. The Bhagavā said this.

Pleased, the bhikkhus from the group of five rejoiced in the Bhagavā’s words.

And while this exposition was being spoken to the bhikkhus from the group of five, their minds were freed from the corruptions through letting go.

At that time there were six arahants in the world.

The above passages imply the progress from not understanding, to understanding, to liberation, took probably a day or two (taking the gathering of alms and the meal into account). And yet, in 9M/3.6 Pāsarāsisutta it seems the process took much longer, possibly many days:

992. I was able to instruct the group of five bhikkhus. Indeed, bhikkhave, I instructed two bhikkhus, while three bhikkhus went for alms. With what the three bhikkhus brought back after going for alms, we six sustained ourselves. Indeed, bhikkhave, I instructed three bhikkhus, while two bhikkhus went for alms. With what the two bhikkhus brought back after going for alms, we six sustained ourselves.

Johannes Bronkhorst argues in The Two Traditions Of Meditation In Ancient India p. 84 that the Buddha’s early teachings were probably “personal advice, adjusted to the needs of each person.” Both Bronkhorst and Gombrich argues that the Four Realisations (cattāri ariyasaccāni) are unlikely to constitute “liberating insight” as they do not really describe the specific process of attaining liberation or articulate the necessary prerequisites, such as the elimination of taints. Therefore, it seems likely the exact formulation of the truths are a later synthesis. Similar arguments can be made for the contents of the Second and Third Discourses, and even the formulation of the links to Dependent Origination may have been adjusted and amended over time, given the variance in the number of items in the chain in various suttas.

Turning `buddhavacana` into `abhidhamma` and `Mahāyāna`

According to Jayarava in Why Did Buddhists Abandon Buddhavacana?:

There is no general agreement, whether historically or presently, on what constitutes buddhavacana. The concept is also contested in the sense that Buddhists found the buddhavacana they inherited unconvincing or otherwise unsatisfactory and replaced it with other words that they labelled buddhavacana, a practice that is arguably still current.

Why would anyone do this, ie. deliberately replace or augment the Buddha’s teachings with related and similar teachings? One answer may lie in the 17A8/1.1.8 Uttaravipattisutta, where Utarra delivered a seemingly “original” discourse to some monks (presumably sometime after the Buddha had passed away). King Vessavaṇa overheard the discourse, and went to the gods of the Thirty-Three to ask Sakka, lord of the gods, whether this was an “authentic” teaching, one that the Buddha might have taught. Sakka was so concerned by this he appeared in front of Uttara and asked:

60. Bhante, was this, āyasmā Uttara, your own inspiration, or was it the word of the Bhagavā, the arahant, the fully awakened Buddha?”

Uttara’s reply is interesting.

“Well then, O devānaminda (Sakka, lord of the gods), I will give you an analogy. By that analogy some wise persons understand the meaning of what has been spoken.”

61. “Just as, O devānaminda, not far from a village or a town, there is a great heap of grain. From there, a large crowd of people would carry away grain — with carrying poles, with baskets, with their laps, and with cupped hands. If indeed, O ldevānaminda, someone were to approach that large crowd of people and ask: ‘From where do you carry this grain?’, how, O devānaminda, would that large crowd of people answer correctly?” “‘We carry it from that great heap of grain,’ sir, that large crowd of people would answer correctly.” “Just so, O devānaminda, whatever is well-spoken, all that is the word of the Bhagavā, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Awakened One. Deriving from that, we and others speak.”

According to Anālayo in The Dawn of Abhidharma p. 149:

Uttara illustrates this with the help of using a simile that describes a large group of people who take grain from a great heap and carry it away in various containers. On being asked where they got the grain, they will answer that they got it from the great heap. The simile makes it clear that the dictum was meant to indicate that the Buddha was the real source of anything Uttara had been teaching, even if Uttara had not been repeating something that in this exact manner had already been spoken by the Buddha.

The discourse then takes an interesting turn, as Śakra informs Uttara that the Buddha had actually given this teaching earlier. However, memory of this teaching delivered by the Buddha had in the meantime been lost among the four assemblies of disciples (monks, nuns, male lay followers, and female lay followers).

This illustrates that some of Buddha’s disciples felt confident enough they fully understood Budhha’s teachings that they could craft original discourses in the belief the Buddha would have spoken them if he had still been alive. Moreover, it implies that some of Buddha’s teachings have indeed been “lost” but it is acceptable for enlightened monks to resuscitate them, thus paving the way for some sects to claim that they have additional suttas that potentially supersede Buddha’s teachings because these “extra” suttas were previously “lost” or “hidden.” For example, the Mahāyānists claim the Lotus Sutra was Buddha’s last sermon, even though the style and character of the sutra is very different from those in the Tipiṭaka.

Once the first step has been established, it seemed logical to continue and create additional original discourses. For example, the 11M/2 Anupadavagga is a discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya of the Theravāda tradition of which no parallel is known, hence likely to be pure invention of the Theravādans. There are also discourses in the other canonical collections that are not present in the Tipiṭika.

According to Anālayo in [The Dawn of Abhidharma], the Abhidhamma in the Tipiṭaka, which is also unique to Theravāda although other sects have their own versions, evolved from lists of discourse topics (such as the ones found in 8D/10 Saṅgītisutta and 8D/11 Dasuttarasutta), central themes, and potentially commentaries on the discourses into the voluminous collection it is today. The Abhidhamma takes an abstract or conceptual perspective on the core teachings and then exhaustively analyses them by attempting to provide a comprehensive inventory of everything connected to these teachings. Presumably at this time the instructions given in the discourses were perceived as somewhat lacking and insufficient - the final results go beyond what early discourses consider necessary for successful realisation. Eventually the Abhidhamma, which started out as a commentary “about” the dhamma, became the “superior” or “higher” dhamma, thereby overshadowing in importance the texts on which it originally commented.

Anālayo further points out that from a Mahāyāna viewpoint, “the early discourses are considered as teachings that are “inferior” (hīna). The teachings of the Abhidharma in turn are considered by their followers to be “superior” (abhi-) in comparison to the early discourses. In this way, the early teachings increasingly tend to fade in importance and are eventually superseded by the new texts, a development that in turn led to the formation of independent textual collections, the Abhidharma-piṭaka and the Bodhisattva-piṭaka, considered to be superior to the early discourses.” The Mahayanists then further argue that Mahāyāna is the word of the Buddha which had been collected by bodhisattvas like Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, etc. or originated from the realm of the nāgas, as well as from devas, gandharvas, and rākṣasas. They were not included in the canonical collections because they were beyond the ken of the śrāvaka[S]s responsible for collecting the word of the Buddha.

For the Theravādans, the Atthasālinī argues that all of the seven texts of the Abhidhamma collection should be considered the word of the Buddha. This would then imply even the texts criticising beliefs of other sects are also the word of the Buddha.

Standardisation and Creation

Mark Allon in his interesting book The Composition and Transmission of Early Buddhist Texts with Specific Reference to Sutras gives ”… an overview of the main stylistic features of early Buddhist sutras and the organizational principles employed in the formation of textual collections of sutras that support the idea of these texts and collections being transmitted as fixed entities, and then examine the ways in which such texts changed and were changed over time, attempt to identify the reasons why this occurred, and give an account of the challenge this represents to the idea of oral transmission requiring fixity.” In doing so, he compares the same passages across different canonical collections in various languages such as Gandhari, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan.

According to Mark on p. 10:

These texts, both prose and verse, are very much textual or literary artifices. They are not verbatim, or tape-recorder, records of the sayings and discourses of the individuals concerned nor casual descriptions of their actions or of related events. They are highly structured and stylized, extremely formulaic and repetitive, carefully crafted constructs, at least as we have them. And this is so at all levels. Further, the wording used to describe or depict a given event, concept, teaching, or practice is highly standardized across the corpus of such texts transmitted by a given monastic community. As such they do not reflect how a person would normally speak, preach, debate, and interact, or describe an event.

Many discourses start with:

evaṃ me sutaṃ ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā ... viharati.

Thus heard by me, at one time the Bhagavā dwells in …

and often end with:

idam avoca bhagavā. attamanā te bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandun ti.

The Bhagavā said this. Pleased, those bhikkhus rejoiced in the words of the Bhagavā.

The text of most suttas seem to be “highly structured, carefully crafted” and therefore unlikely to be the actual words that the Buddha would have used, but a homogenisation or distillation of them into a standardised format (presumably useful for memorization).

Even the grammar, choice and ordering of words are standardised. As Mark describes in p. 14:

For example, a characteristic feature of canonical prose are strings of grammatically parallel units, such as nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, that express the same or similar general idea, with each subsequent unit nuancing or expanding the meaning of the preceding ones, presenting further qualities of the thing described, or presenting a similar category of item. … Further, the component units of these structures or strings are normally arranged according to a waxing number of syllables, that is, the first unit has fewer syllables than the last (or at least their count does not decrease)

An example is this phrase (in bold) from 11M/4.2 Ānandabhaddekarattasutta:

782. Now at that time āyasmā Ānanda was educating, encouraging, firing up, and inspiring the mendicants in the assembly hall with a Dhamma talk on the topic of the recitation passage and analysis of One Fine Night.

Note the use of the four semi-synonymous verbs all starting with sa (sandasseti samādapeti samuttejeti sampahaṃseti) with a syllable pattern of 4+5+5+5. Its unlikely this sort of pattern, with shared sound and metrical similarities, would have occured in “normal” speech.

Another dominant stylistic characteristic of early Buddhist sutra prose is the use of formulas, that is, the wording used to depict a given concept, action, or event is highly standardized and predictable.

The use of formulas can be extended to entire suttas, allowing a number of “artificial” suttas to be created using just one formula. For example, 12S2/1.1.4 Vipassīsutta to 12S2/1.1.10 Gotamasutta, ”… the Buddha gives an account of the realization of paṭiccasamuppāda by the seven buddhas, beginning with the past buddha Vipassī and ending with himself. Each account is identical except for the change of the name of the buddha. As Allon notes on p. 36:

It is hard to imagine the scenario presented here in which a teacher, in this case the Buddha, gives separate discourses on individual buddha’s on different occasions. A more likely scenario is that such a teacher would give an account of his own realization of paṭiccasamuppāda, as we find presented for the Buddha elsewhere in the canon, possibly then followed by a brief statement that the same occurred for the six past buddhas, or more likely, that the Buddha’s account of his own realization was applied to the past buddhas by those who composed these texts to form six additional suttas.

There are many other instances in SN and AN where such artificially generated suttas can be found. Why create all these repetitive pseudo-suttas? There are many possible answers, including a “who has more suttas” competition with other religious groups, aids to memorisation, mental training, or a desire to be comprehensive. My personal interpretation is that these variants of suttas form a useful collection of building blocks to choose from, by individual monks or groups, for use when giving public talks to assemblies, choosing a specific sutta at the request of a layperson (perhaps as part of a ceremony or rite of passage), or as a gift or blessing to a patron. Just like a church minister may choose a topic for a Sunday sermon, “building block” suttas can be chosen and either assembled to form a longer discourse, or dissected and explained.

Differences, Simplification and Elaboration

When we compare suttas with their equivalents or “parallels” in other canonical collections, we often find similarities, but in some cases radical differences across the collections.

Allon notes in The Composition and Transmission of Early Buddhist Texts with Specific Reference to Sutras on p. 47:

The main differences encountered between parallel versions of early Buddhist texts preserved in Pali, Gandhari, or other Prakrit, in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Sanskrit, Chinese, and/or Tibetan are, apart from language and language related phenomena, the following:

whole episodes or descriptions of events, practices, teachings, and so on, found in one version are missing in one or more of the parallels;

differences in the sequence of events and order in which teachings are given;

differences in the arrangement of information within the description of an event, concept or practice;

differences in the information given within the description of an event, concept or practice;

different order of items in a list and differences in the number of items listed;

differences in the names of people and places in the description of what is essentially the same event;

differences in the wording used to portray a given event, concept or practice, including the use of different synonyms, differences in word order, and differences in the complexity of descriptions; differences in the use of markers such as indeclinables and vocatives of address;

differences in grammar, e.g. verbal tense, grammatical number, etc.

Where do these differences come from, and which one represents the “authentic” words of the Buddha?

It is very likely that none of them are truly authentic, but which one best represents the Buddha’s original intent?

Again, there are many theories, and debates across scholars. I won’t try and summarise these, but the issue rages on even today, with many conflicting opinions. For example, some scholars (eg. Gombrich, Wynne, Anālayo) argue the more closely aligned a sutta is with it’s parallels, the more likely a sutta is “authentic” since it must have been composed early enough to predate the schisms and the emergence of the various sects. On the other hand, some scholars (eg. Schopen) have also argued the homogeneity may have come from cross-sharing across communities, and “superior” versions of a sutta may be adopted by other sects. This is not as unlikely as it may first appear. We do know monks travelled widely and often stay with foreign communities, so it is not unusual for knowledge sharing to occur.

One theory is that some suttas may have been “simplified” by particular communities to aid memorization, or as part of a standardisation process. They may also have been simplified as part of the process of transposing or translating from a different dialect or language.

There is also the theory, based on the use of formulas and building blocks, that the longer suttas may well be composed by taking one or more formula, and then elaborating it with a story. Different communities may have different elaborations, and cross sharing may propagate a specific elaboration across more than one community, but with stylistic and textual differences depending on the scribe or preferences of the oral listener.

Inconsistencies

The Tipiṭaka is not internally consistent. These inconsistencies have been documented by many scholars including Polak, Gombrich, et al. For example, the chains of Dependent Origination sometimes number 6, 10 or 12. There are 4, sometimes 5, sometimes 6 elements, 12 or 36 sense-fields etc. The Buddha also acknowledges these inconsistencies and explains he has explained the teachings in different ways (Evaṁ pariyāyadesito kho, ānanda, mayā dhammo.) and his disciples could either “deal with it” or start arguing. 10M/1.9 Bahuvedanīyasutta

Even when it is consistent, we cannot be assured of authenticity or accuracy. Through a mechanism known as “pericope” many of his teachings have been altered to insert “stock phrases”, often to “pad” out a relatively short discourse into a more substantial discourse - these phrases may or may not represent his true intention or meaning and their insertion into the text may change the meaning or nuance of the text to something radically different.

For example, the first Discourse 14S5/12.2 Dhammacakkappavattanavagga shows evidence that it was originally shorter, and over time has been expanded (because texts from other sects omit some of the material). Also, the texts errorneously has the Buddha referring to his five former ascetic companions as bhikkhave - a term used for a group of ordained Buddhist monks, and at that time the 5 ascetics have not yet been ordained, for the saṅgha did not exist (yet).

A good example of the inclusion of a pericope creating a problem in the meaning of a phrase in the sutta is in 8D/3 Cakkavattisutta. This problem is extensively documented and analysed by Richard Gombrich in Three Souls, One Or None: The Vagaries Of A Pali Pericope, Journal of the Pali Text Society XI (1987) pp. 73 – 78.

Much more seriously, it seems some pericopes may not even represent the original teachings of the Buddha, but may have been imported from non-Buddhist practices. Bronkhorst, Polak and Wynne all argue the four arūpa meditative states may have been non-Buddhist practices that were known before the Buddha attained enlightenment:

the Stage of Infinity of Space (ākāsānañcāyatana);
the Stage of Infinity of Perception (viññāṇañcāyatana);
the Stage of Nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana);
the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana).

The last two of the above were dismissed by the Buddha as being non-conducive nor leading to enlightenment, and he identified them as specifically the teachings of Āḷāra Kālāma and Rāma in 9M/3.6 Pāsarāsisutta and 9M/4.6 Mahāsaccakasutta. See my translation of the latter in Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahāsaccakasutta).

Yet, inexplicably, these methods were subsequently inserted into various suttas (for example 11M/3.1 Cūḷasuññatasutta), presumably by later disciples. However, these methods are not presented as end goals, but as stepping stones towards suññataṁ (emptiness) and in some respects Cūḷasuññatasutta seems to be a proto-prajñāpāramitā sutta that links Theravadan concepts of meditation to Mahāyāna doctrine.

506. Indeed, Ānanda, whatever ascetics or brahmins in the past attained and dwelled in the pure, supreme, unsurpassed suññataṁ (emptiness), all of them attained and dwelled in this same pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness. Indeed, Ānanda, whatever ascetics or brahmins in the future will attain and dwell in the pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness, all of them will attain and dwell in this same pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness. Indeed, Ānanda, whatever ascetics or brahmins at present attain and dwell in the pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness, all of them attain and dwell in this same pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness. Therefore, Ānanda, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will attain and dwell in the pure, supreme, unsurpassed emptiness.’

Misinterpretations

Even if his teaching is authentic and accurately preserved, there is a possibility that we (including scholars, practitioners and translators) may misinterpret it.

Gombrich stated in What the Buddha Thought p.2 that the Buddha was “startlingly original”. He questioned and refuted his ideological opponents, he often has a different perspective and does not follow the same philosophical path as others. His way of thinking is also very different from orthodox traditions. Even today, the Buddha’s teachings are strikingly different from other major religions.

Therefore it is not surprising that some followers and practitioners of Buddhism may not have interpreted his teachings in the way he intended. It is possible to derive realist, idealist, mystical, nihilist and other interpretations, by emphasing some teachings and deemphasising others. Some ignore the historical context of his teachings and may not realise that some teachings are refutations of braministic and Jainistic beliefs, and instead interpret the Buddha as endorsing or even promoting these beliefs. It is the human tendency to see what we want to see, and to filter ideas through our own biases and prejudices.

The Buddha himself warns against the danger of misinterpreting the texts by people who only memorise the words but don’t grasp the meaning in 9M/3.2 Alagaddūpamasutta.

786. Here, bhikkhave, some foolish people learn the Dhamma:

suttaṃ (discourses,)

geyyaṃ (mixed prose and verse,)

veyyākaraṇaṃ (explanations,)

gāthaṃ (verses,)

udānaṃ (inspired utterances,)

itivuttakaṃ (‘as it was said’ speeches,)

jātakaṃ (birth stories,)

abbhutadhammaṃ (amazing phenomena, and)

vedallaṃ (question-and-answer sessions.)

Having learned that Dhamma, they don’t examine the meaning of those teachings with wisdom. For them, those teachings don’t bear scrutiny when their meaning is not examined with wisdom. They learn the Dhamma for the purpose of criticizing others and for escaping criticism in debate. They don’t experience the benefit for which they learned the Dhamma. For them, those teachings, being badly grasped, lead to their harm and suffering for a long time. Why is that? Because, mendicants, the teachings were badly grasped.

According to Gombrich’s translation in How Buddhism Began p. 23:

…some foolish people memorise his teachings but do not use their intelligence to work out what they mean, so that the teachings afford them no insight. The advantages they derive from their learning are being able to criticise others and to quote; but they do not get what should be the real benefit of such learning. Because they have misunderstood the teaching, it only does them harm.

Some people believe that the Buddha’s teachings are esoteric and difficult to understand, that they transcend rationality and ultimately describe supramundane ideas that is inexpressible in language. I used to think this too, but now I believe the core teachings of the Buddha are simple and understandable as long as one is willing to set aside preconceptions and pay attention to what he is truly trying to say.

Lack of context

Many people today experience the Buddha’s teachings by reading translated texts, or following the teachings of a Buddhist teacher in their native language, or English. This is understandable, as Pāli is a “dead” language, so it is no one’s native language. I believe that to truly understand the Buddha’s teaching, one needs to read the “original” Pāli texts. No matter how good the translation may be, few words have precise equivalents across languages, and in particular abstract or technical terms are very difficult to translate and prone to misinterpretations and ambiguities. (What the Buddha Thought p. 5)

In addition, some of his teachings reference Vedic or Brahman philosophy and sometimes cannot be properly understood without knowledge of the these philosophies.

A good example is the doctrine of anattā which is widely translated as “no self”, but the word attā in Pali (ātman[S]) refers to the Vedic notion of an “eternal self” that was originally linked to the universal principle of brahman[S] and the Supreme Being and Creator God Brahmā[S]. According to Vedic literature, one who is freed from desire becomes immortal and joins with the brahman and the Brahmā (or sometimes described as “union with the Godhead”). The ātman, brahman and Brahmā are all manifestations of the the same concept but across the microscopic, macroscopic and cosmic realms. The Buddha’s anattā doctrine is a refutal of this and so translating it as “no self” is inadequate and can lead to a common misinterpretation that the Buddha was promoting the concept of nihilism. (What the Buddha Thought pp. 36-43)

Sometimes, the lack of context can can have humourous consequences. The well-known story of the notorious murderer Aṅgulimāla in Aṅgulimālasutta MN 86 PTS 2.98–2.105 creates a problem where we don’t really know why Aṅgulimāla was wearing a garland of fingers and apparently murdering people. The Papañca-sudani commentary on this sutta (ascribed to Buddhaghosa) invents a complete backstory for Aṅgulimāla but it is incoherent. The verse associated with the sutta is also difficult to parse and doesn’t scan properly, which means it is corrupted. Gombrich convincingly argues in How Buddhism Began Chapter V, that Aṅgulimāla must have been a Śaiva/Śākta believer who worshipped Śiva, a goddess that takes limbs from corpses and wears a garland and Aṅgulimāla was trying to adopt the deity’s iconic appearance and emulating the goddess’ behaviour.

In some places, the Buddha even adopts a satirical tone by making fun at accepted Brahman philosophy and beliefs. The 8D/4 Aggaññasutta clearly is a parody of brahminical cosmogony. As Gombrich notes on HBB81:

The whole story of the origin of society, which forms the bulk of the text, is a parody of brahminical texts, especially the Ṛg Vedic ‘Hymn of Creation’ (RV X, 129) and the cosmogony at BAU 1, 2. The formation of the earth at the beginning of a world-cycle, its population by beings, their gradual social differentiation, the origins of sex and property, and finally the invention of kingship and the creation of the four brahminical varja (social classes) – all are a parodistic re-working of brahminical speculations, and at the same time an allegory of the malign workings of desire.

Buddhists should know the Buddha has already proclaimed the universe as having no absolute beginning, it’s just the cycle of existence. As per 12S2/4.1.1 Tiṇakaṭṭhasutta:

828. “Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving.

Despite that, according to Gombrich on p. 82:

Buddhists have since the earliest times taken it seriously as an account of the origins of society and kingship, and even traced the Buddha’s own royal origins back to Maha-sammata, the person chosen to be the first king; they have interpreted the word as a proper name, though it originally meant ‘agreed to be great’. But now we see that the Buddha never intended to propound a cosmogony.

Many of the Buddha’s teachings are delivered in a style known as pariyāya (“roundabout” or “indirect”), which employs metaphors, allegories, parables which are not meant to be interpreted literally. These metaphors are based on the social and historical context of Buddha’s time, and may not be easily grasped in the absence of that context. (What the Buddha Thought p. 6)

Gombrich further argues in HBB75:

… much of the narrative telling what the Buddha did in the days and weeks following his Enlightenment is allegorical in origin; and I suspect that one could push this argument even further. The same goes for his biography up to the Enlightenment. Others have noticed this before me, so I shall not dwell on it. The stress on the luxury in which the future Buddha was brought up serves to emphasise his mature rejection of worldly goods. His being shielded from all knowledge of old age, sickness and death symbolises the way in which we turn a blind eye to the unpleasant facts of existence, and heightens the impact of the prince’s encounter with the four “signs” or omens (pubba nimitta): the story of how on his way to the pleasure grounds he successively encounters an aged man, an ill man, a corpse, and a tranquil ascetic who seems to offer the solution.

Of course Māra, the personification of Death, appears in Buddhist literature in several places, and usually signifies desire, or craving. Even then, different authors and compilers had different opinions and attitudes.

Furthermore, the Buddha often employs a method known as upāya-kauśalya[S] (“skill in means”) where he responds to an opponent not by disagreeing with them, but by appearing to agree but then take their words and reinterpret them to give them quite different meanings that demonstrate the Buddha’s perspective. An example is kamma which means “act, action, deed” and in brahmanism signifies ritualistic practice, ie. one acquires merit by performing rituals correctly. The Buddha redefines kamma to mean “intention” so he took a word that was meant literally into a metaphor. All these subtleties are often lost in translation, and sometimes can be interpreted as the Buddha agreeing with a position when he was actually trying to refute it. (Gombrich, How Buddhism Began pp. 17-18, also What the Buddha Thought p. 7)

Silk, Jonathan A. “Establishing / Interpreting / Translating: Is It Just That Easy?”, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 36/37 2013/2014 (2015). ↩